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PUNCHING ABOVE ITS WEIGHT? A CASE STUDY OF LUXEMBOURG’S 
POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
This thesis deals with member states' policy effectiveness in the European Union, using 
Luxembourg's capacity to get what it wanted in three crucial areas as a case study. 
Policy effectiveness is defined as the successful exercise of a member state's ability to 
include most of its policy preferences into the final legislation.  
 
The factors considered to influence policy effectiveness include the negotiation context, 
more specifically the decision-making procedure and time pressure. The distribution 
and intensity of other member states and holding the Presidency are also expected to 
 play a role. Furthermore, individual-level factors such as experience, past relations or 
belonging to the same political family are rarely systematically included in research, but 
these are also included. Finally domestic politics, such as the approval procedure and 
institutional coordination are considered. The decision making process, especially 
within the Council, is still a black box to most scholars - a challenge which in this 
research is met by elite interviews with the negotiators involved, by process tracing and 
by document analysis. 
 
 I empirically assess three cases where Luxembourg is reputed to have been policy 
effective: the creation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 1996, the reform of the 
v 
same in 2005, and the payment of unemployment benefits to frontier workers (EC 
Regulation 883/2004). In terms of Luxembourg's policy effectiveness, I find the 
following:  
 
1) that Luxembourg was highly policy effective in the creation of the SGP, due to Jean- 
Claude Juncker's double hat of Finance Minister and Prime Minister, as well as his 
expertise and his personal relations with other Heads of State. 
 
2) In the reform of the SGP, that Luxembourg was not policy effective despite holding 
the Presidency; Juncker was President of the Eurogroup and still had that same double 
hat. The widely distributed and intense preferences of France and Germany combined to 
produce an agreement which Luxembourg did not favour, but had nevertheless helped 
to produce. 
 
3) Finally, that, in Regulation 883/2004, Luxembourg was medium policy effective 
because of domestic constraints, a low distribution and intensity of preferences of the 
other member states and because of unanimity. 
 
 All of my case studies show evidence of two developments in terms of decision-making 
processes: the shift of decision-making from public to informal arenas, and the 
involvement of the European Council in areas which are not formally within its 
competence. 
Indeed, the compromises found were proposed in the Council of Ministers after several 
key member states had seen and agreed to them beforehand. Incidentally, the evidence 
also indicates that the European Parliament did not influence the legislative outcome at 
all in these cases. These results suggest several practical guidelines for member states. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1. Setting the scene 
 
 
This is a case study of how one member state, Luxembourg, has been able to be policy 
effective in EU negotiations. Policy effectiveness is defined in this thesis as the successful 
exercise of a member state‘s ability to include its policy preferences into the final 
legislation. As European integration develops, so does the need of member states to push 
their agendas and pursue their national interests. Two other reasons for trying to find out 
what makes a member state policy effective are the enlargement to East and Central Europe 
and the increase in policies which fall under the shared competence of the member states 
and the EU. The enlarged European Union of 27 member states presents an increasing 
heterogeneity of interests, preferences and domestic settings. These preferences must all be 
taken into account when negotiating particular policies; they necessarily complicate finding 
compromises and coming to an agreement. Member states have less time to make their 
point and argue their positions; the ‗tour de table‘ cannot allow every member state the 
same amount of time that they used to have in an EU of 12 or 15. The result is that more 
and more ‗deals‘ are done in the corridors and in informal meetings, thereby increasing the 
chance of exclusion from and hence influence in the ‗real‘ negotiations.  
 
The various treaties have given increased shared competences to the EU institutions, 
affecting more and more the everyday lives of citizens. Decisions taken in areas such as 
social policy have potentially far reaching consequences, and governments must be held to 
account, failing the involvement of national parliaments in many of the EU decision-
making processes. If a government fails to defend its interests in a politically sensitive area, 
it is necessary to establish why it has failed and how a government can use its resources to 
improve its policy effectiveness in subsequent negotiations. Governments have to explain 
2 
and justify to their citizens why they will be less well off or will be negatively affected by 
what their governments have agreed to in Council negotiations. By the same token, if a 
government manages to include most of its policy preferences into the final legislation, 
future lessons could be drawn from discovering what factors played a role in this outcome. 
Thus, there is a real need in European Union studies to go back to analysing the preferences 
of member states‘ governments and to establish if they have been effective in negotiating 
EU policies.  
 
The central research question of this thesis is therefore: which resources and factors 
improve the chances of a member state‘s government being policy effective? The aim is to 
measure the effectiveness of a member state in achieving its intended goals, and to identify 
the factors that influence policy effectiveness at the European level. To do this, the analysis 
has to begin with the national level, i.e. the internal structure and organisation of the 
government, society, state and EU policy. The preferences, strategies and zones of 
agreements are to a large extent formed at this level.  
 
The other level of analysis has to be in relation to the institutional structure of the EU, the 
decision-making procedures and norms. The unique decision-making procedures of the EU 
leave plenty of opportunities for member states to influence policy-making beyond their 
voting weight or formal powers. EU negotiations are usually a complex process, with many 
institutions and actors involved. The mandate for a new regulation, directive or treaty 
change is given to the European Commission by the Council, which has considerable 
leeway in proposing changes and creating a zone of possible agreement. The three levels of 
the Council- the working groups, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, and the 
Council of Ministers- constitute the arena in which member state governments actively 
pursue European integration and simultaneously try to achieve outcomes in harmony with 
their national interests. Increasingly, the European Parliament also plays an active role in 
negotiations, when it is entitled to do so. The picture that emerges is one in which a 
member state has to be involved on many different levels in order to be policy effective.  
 
3 
The decreasing importance of the European Commission and the increasing importance of 
the Council of Ministers and the EP in the decision-making process is a manifestation of 
the new realities of power relations among the institutions. This study takes this evolution 
into account and focuses on the member states‘ role in the decision-making process. The 
next sections present the framework, followed by a justification of the choices of cases. 
This chapter concludes with outlining the plan of the present thesis.  
 
 
2. The framework of this thesis 
 
The research process is divided into the following steps: Once the preferences of the 
member state in question are established, the Commission proposal is presented. The 
Commission proposal is an important element in the study of policy effectiveness, because 
it delimits the innovations that are possible- including some options and excluding others. 
The final legislative outcome has to be juxtaposed to the member states‘ policy preferences, 
and one needs to establish what the similarities and the differences are in detail. Measuring 
policy effectiveness is therefore conducted in five stages: 1) establishing the policy 
preferences of the member state 2) presenting the Commission proposal 3) establishing the 
strategy and the goals of the member state in the negotiations 4) presenting the final 
legislation 5) comparing and contrasting the final legalisation to the policy preferences and 
to the strategy and goals. A three degree classification into low, medium and high policy 
effectiveness simplifies the framework. 
 
Several research questions are addressed in this thesis: How does the domestic level 
influence the ability of a member state to influence regulations and directives? Is the 
negotiation context the major constraint/ aid in policy effectiveness? To what extent do the 
preferences of the other member states interfere in policy effectiveness? Does holding the 
presidency of the Council make a member state policy effective? Do individual-level 
factors matter at all? 
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2.1. Domestic politics 
 
The two-level games approach assumes that ―statesmen are typically trying to do two 
things at once; that is, they seek to manipulate domestic and international politics 
simultaneously. Diplomatic strategies and tactics are both constrained by what other states 
will accept and by what domestic constituencies will ratify.‖1 This factor can be divided 
into two aspects: the approval procedure in a broad sense and the coordination of the 
political institutions. 
 
The approval procedure does not only imply the ratification by the national Parliament, but 
also agreement of the coalition parties, the other societal actors. The implication is that the 
more difficult the approval procedure, the more likely the member state will be able to 
argue that it is constrained by these actors, and consequently can get more concessions and 
a deal closer to its preferences. Implicit in this proposition is that the member state could 
defect involuntarily from the implementation of the proposed agreement if none of the 
domestic actors consider it acceptable.
2
 An efficient coordination of the institutions 
involved in the negotiations is expected to lead to increased policy effectiveness. The link 
between the Permanent Representation and the national Ministries is expected to play a 
role. Good effective communication between civil servants and ministers, clear yet flexible 
mandates for the negotiators at the Technical Committee and the COREPER, short 
communication channels between the negotiators, all contribute towards achieving the 
common goal. Moreover, the coordination with the national Members of the European 
Parliament is expected to influence positively or negatively the final outcome. If the 
national MEPs are in close contact with the government, it is more likely that they can be 
counted on trying to upload the national economic interests to the EU within the EP.  
 
 
                                                          
1
 Moracvsik A. in ‗Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining‘, 
in Evans P. B., Jacobson H.  K., Putnam R. D., (1993) Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining 
and Domestic Politics. University of California Press, p. 15 
2
 Putnam R. D., (1988) ‗Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games.‘ International 
Organization, Vol.42, No. 3, pp 427-460 
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2.2. The negotiation context 
 
Considering that the decision-making procedure determines the rules of the game in the 
EU, it is imperative to take it into account. In the three cases chosen for this study, the 
involvement of the European Parliament differs; the cooperation and consultation 
procedures were used in the creation and reform of the SGP, while the co-decision 
procedure applied to the social security case study. QMV and unanimity were used in the 
three case studies. The pressure to find an agreement, any agreement, based on time 
constraints could be a significant factor when analysing negotiation outcomes. It is 
proposed that a member state is more likely to be policy effective under unanimity than 
under QMV. 
 
2.3. Distribution and intensity of preferences in the Council 
 
The distribution and intensity of preferences can significantly shape the outcome and the 
policy effectiveness of a member state. If there is a low distribution and low intensity of 
preferences, then a member state is more likely to be policy effective.  It is assumed that 
preferences of the member states in the Council significantly impact on a member state‘s 
ability to be policy effective.  
 
2.4. The presidency 
 
Tallberg provides a useful framework for analysing the resources a government can use 
when it takes over the presidency of the Council.
3
 Brokerage resources permit the 
presidency to construct and shape agreements that otherwise may not have come about. 
Asymmetrical information and control over procedure are strong resources for leading a 
negotiation. The presidency gives particular opportunities to be policy effective. It 
determines the pace of Council negotiations by setting the schedule. It can shape the 
number of formal and informal negotiation sessions and also has control over the method of 
negotiations (competing proposals or a single negotiating text). 
                                                          
3
Tallberg J., (2006) Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union. Cambridge University Press, p. 31 
6 
 
2.5. Individual-level factors 
 
Intangible resources at the EU level are thought to increase a member state‘s policy 
effectiveness. These are based on good past relationships, as they generally facilitate 
communication and understanding. As the personal ―chemistry‖ between two or more 
people is important in any relationship, it also plays a role in political negotiations; 
examples abound in the press and in academic literature.
4
 The time spent in government or 
in administration by the negotiators is reasonably expected to have an impact on the 
expertise of the negotiators, as the negotiators do not only know how past negotiations and 
outcomes came about, but they also know more about the positions and preferences of the 
other negotiators. A common phenomenon in EU negotiations is that deals are made in a 
small circle of actors. Within the Council, not every member state has significant interests 
in every issue that is being negotiated, or the member state can decide that another member 
state is better placed to voice the same concerns it has. It is implicit in this task that if the 
members of that circle find an agreement, the whole group will accept it, as the members of 
that circle represent the different preferences plus a broker/mediator (s).  
 
 
Before turning to the political system of Luxembourg, I intend to justify why I have chosen 
Luxembourg as a case study and why I have chosen these three case studies (the creation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact, its reform, and the reform of EC Regulation 1408/71). 
Indeed, it can be argued that such a small state‘s power is irrelevant in an enlarged 
European Union and does not merit investigation, apart from studies on small states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Védrine H., (1996) ‗Les mondes de François Mitterrand, À l'Élysée (1981-1995).‘ Paris, Fayard, p. 290-291. 
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3. Why choose Luxembourg and why these case studies? 
 
3.1. Has Luxembourg ever punched above its weight in the EU? 
 
Luxembourg has a reputation for ―punching above its weight in the EU‖, but is that 
impression based on any concrete evidence?
5
 Hosli found interestingly that in the Council, 
Luxembourg played the role of a ―dummy country without any formal impact between 
1958 and 1973: it had only one vote, and a qualified majority was considered to be 12. 
Since all other members had an even number of votes, Luxembourg formally was never 
able to be crucial for the fate of a voting coalition.‖6 This evidence illustrates the 
fundamental weakness of this very small state and the real dangers of being irrelevant and 
powerless in the EU. However, due to enlargements, several small states were able to 
increase their share of the votes; among them Luxembourg.  
 
Table 1.1: Table of Council votes over time:
7
 
 
country EC 6 
1958-1972 
1973-
1980 
1981- 
1985 
1986-
1994 
EC 15 
Ams. 
1995- 
2003 
EU 27 
Nice 
2003- 
2009 
Austria / / / / 4 10 
Belgium 2 5 5 5 5 12 
Bulgaria / / / / / 10 
Cyprus / / / / / 4 
Czech 
Republic 
/ / / / / 12 
Denmark / 3 3 3 3 7 
                                                          
5
 Panke D., (2010) ‗Dwarfs in International Negotiations - Punching Above Their Weights?‘ PSAI Conference 
Paper. 
6
 Hosli, M. (1996): ‗Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the 
European Union.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No.2, p. 270. 
7
 Hosli, M., (2000) Smaller States and the New Voting Weights in the Council. Instituut Clingendael. July, 
p.10 
8 
Estonia / / / / / 4 
Germany 4 10 10 10 10 29 
Greece / / 5 5 5 12 
Finland / / / / 3 7 
France 4 10 10 10 10 29 
Ireland / 3 3 3 3 7 
Italy 4 10 10 10 10 29 
Latvia / / / / / 4 
Lithuania / / / / / 7 
Luxembourg 1 2 2 2 2 4 
Hungary / / / / / 12 
Malta / / / / / 3 
Netherlands 2 5 5 5 5 13 
Poland / / / / / 27 
Portugal / / / 5 5 12 
Romania / / / / / 14 
Slovakia / / / / / 7 
Slovenia / / / / / 4 
Spain / / / 8 8 27 
Sweden / / / / 4 10 
UK / 10 10 10 10 29 
QMV 12 41 45 54 62 255 
Blocking 
minority 
6 18 19 23 26  
Total 17 58 63 76 87 345 
 
 
 
 
9 
But was Luxembourg overrepresented in terms of population? ―Luxembourg has a high 
standing as a member state of the EU where its influence and prestige exceed what small 
size might indicate.‖8 It cannot be disputed that Luxembourg is over-represented in terms of 
votes in the Council, in terms of having a Commissioner, and in terms of the number of 
MEPS in the European Parliament. The most extreme example of overrepresentation is 
evidenced in the governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) where every 
member state has one vote. This means both Luxembourg and Germany have the same 
number of votes. If we look at the degree of over-representation in terms of Council votes 
over time, and compare it to Germany, the following has been calculated by Moberg: 
 
Table 1.2: Ratio share of votes/share of population:  
 
Country EEC EEC9 EEC10 EEC12 EEC12* EEC15 
Nice 
EEC 27 Nice  
Luxembourg 30.57 25.37 23.63 23.02 23.93 14.80 12.8 
Germany 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.57 0.56 0.49 
Over-represented >1Under-represented <1 
*After German unification 
Source: Moberg 
9
 
 
This table shows quite clearly that while Luxembourg was vastly overrepresented in the 
original EEC of 6, it is still overrepresented under Nice Treaty rules in an EU of 27. It 
nevertheless also shows that the big member states are less and less underrepresented, and 
that the balance is moving towards the middle, even if very slowly. 
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Table 1.3: Ratio share of MEP seats/ share of population: 
 
Country Population 
in millions 
Number 
of MEPs 
Inhabitants 
per MEP 
% of 
population of 
EU 27 
population 
% of MEPs 
of total 
MEPs 
Luxembourg 0.46 6 76 667 0.09 0.815 
Germany 82.438 99 832 626 16.73 13.4 
France 62.886 72 873 416 12.76 9.7 
The 
Netherlands 
16.334 27 604 963 3.31 3.6 
Belgium 10.511 24 437 958 2.13 3.2 
EU Total 492,881 736 669 675a 100 100 
Source: European Parliament 2007
10
 
a: this number is the average of citizens that every MEP represents.  
 
Even in terms of MEP seats/share of population, the residents of Luxembourg are vastly 
overrepresented under the Treaty of Nice. This table shows clearly again that 
Luxembourg‘s residents are 10 times more represented in the EP than their share of the 
population would warrant. Luxembourg is clearly an ‗over-equal‘ member state.11 
 
The former French President Mitterrand said once: ―If one thinks of all the European 
agencies based in Luxembourg, one must recognise that Luxembourg‘s diplomats are the 
best of all the member states.‖12 Many observers cite the fact that Luxembourg City is one 
of the seats of the European institutions as both a factor and a result of policy 
effectiveness.
13
  Luxembourg City is still today firmly established as one of the capitals of 
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Europe. Meetings of the Council of Ministers are regularly held at the Kirchberg in 
Luxembourg in April, June and October. There are some Directorate Generals of the 
European Commission, Eurostat, and the Office of Publications, the European Court of 
Justice, the European Court of Auditors, and the European Investment Bank. The total 
population employed by the Communities is almost 3000. However, it remains to be 
demonstrated how being the seat of these institutions can lead to policy effectiveness. 
Considering that Brussels is the main capital of the EU, the argument would logically lead 
to the assumption that Belgium is the most policy effective member state of the EU. This 
hypothesis has yet to be operationalised and proven. It is however probable that being an 
EU capital confers visibility and induces more public awareness of the country.  
 
Even though Luxembourg is traditionally pro-European, it does ―not sacrifice its national 
interests at the European altar.‖14 Certain national interests may not call for more EU 
integration, more harmonised policies, or more power devolved to the Council of Ministers 
and the European Parliament. In Luxembourg for example, the banking secret is a major 
contributor to its status as a financial centre and incidentally to its GDP, as are hedge funds. 
The fact that the EU Commission, and many EU member states wanted to abolish banking 
secrecy and have achieved it, left Luxembourg‘s various governments in a dilemma 
politically and economically. Luxembourg has made use of its veto twice to fend off 
Commission initiatives in 1989 and 1994 in this area. In the end though, Luxembourg and 
its allies (Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and Liechtenstein) had to give in to the pressure of 
the EU, the OECD and the G20. Hirsch considers ―what is more remarkable is that they had 
been able to get away with ‗non-cooperative behaviour‘ for so long.‖15 Since the financial 
crisis, tax havens have come under siege because governments confronted with massive 
public deficits, were more prepared to track down every taxpayer‘s dues to finance their 
spending and bailout programmes. This case study shows according to Hirsch, that 
 ―ultimately, small states have no real chance to escape international pressure. Their 
resilience is on the wane. At best, they can play for time, but the moment of truth is 
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bound to come sooner or later. In this particular case, political tolerance for non-
compliance is heading rapidly towards zero. (...) The resilience of Luxembourg and 
Switzerland was undermined by the unusual pressure exerted on them by the 
OECD and the G20, relying on highly unusual intimidation tactics like naming and 
shaming. This is of course a special case, unlikely to occur in other domains of 
international relations, but it is quite striking.‖16 
 
Cynics such as one journalist from Le Monde would argue that, if Luxembourg is at all able 
to include most of its policy preferences into final legislation, then it was out of pure luck 
or because it was able to piggyback on the positions of bigger and more powerful member 
states- not for any reasons of its own doing. He notes scathingly on Luxembourg‘s ability 
to hold the presidency:  
―The praise of small nations for a ‗successful‘ presidency is based on how zealously 
the ‗little countries‘ implement the ideas of the ‗big countries‘, rather than for 
having brought their specific concerns or ideas to the European level.‖17   
After all, even if the country is vastly overrepresented in both the Council and the European 
Parliament, with its total share of the votes in both institutions it is very unlikely to be the 
pivotal player. Six votes out of 736, even if all the country‘s MEPs vote along national 
lines and forego their party allegiance, are hardly likely to tip the balance if intense national 
preferences are at play. In the Council however, the situation is slightly different, as 
Luxembourg has 6 votes out of 345. In the events leading to the eventual reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in 2003, Luxembourg was actually the pivotal player!
18
  
 
Therefore, does it really matter in the end whether a government manages to get what it 
wants because it hides behind other, stronger governments or whether it got it by its own 
pro-active behaviour in the negotiations? Is it not a strategy in itself, maybe borne out of 
necessity, but valid in its own right, since under QMV even the biggest member states 
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cannot ‗go it alone‘? Joseph Bech, a former Luxembourg PM (from 1926-1937 and 1953-
1958) and founder of the EEC, has once advised: ―When you have a good idea, find a 
bigger state to sponsor it and keep quiet‖.19 Alliances and coalitions are extremely 
important in EU negotiations; being able to form coherent alliances on issues can lead to 
policy effectiveness. Hence, it is not a question of hiding or piggybacking- it is a question 
of choosing the right strategy in the right situation to get whatever one wants.  
 
 
3.2. The single case study method 
 
I chose Luxembourg as a case study because, as one of the oldest member states, 
Luxembourg has had many opportunities to punch above its weight in the EU. However, I 
chose policy case studies which are relatively recent, as the institutional setting has changed 
greatly since the 1990s. The single case study method is used in this thesis because firstly, 
the costs of analysing several cases on their policy effectiveness would have become 
unreasonable because of the difficulties of gathering data on policy preferences and 
outcomes on many case studies.The requirements for data collection and analysis for more 
than a few case studies would also limit the ability to generate reliable findings, simply 
because not every member state has an interest in the topic under consideration.  
 
Secondly, the single case can be used ―in a more consciously theoretical manner in testing 
and elaborating theory.‖20 The reason for choosing Luxembourg was simple: the tiny size 
of the country makes it an ideal candidate; after all, if a ―micro-state‖ such as Luxembourg 
was able to include most of its policy preferences into the final EU legislation in an EU of 
12, 15 or 27, then any member state should be able to do that. Hence the approach is 
implicitly comparative. A case study of Luxembourg provides insights into how and why 
certain characteristics, irrespective of the size of the territory or population, increase the 
policy effectiveness of a country in the EU. Luxembourg, with roughly half a million 
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inhabitants, had been the smallest member state until Malta joined. Malta had not been 
chosen because at the start of this PhD thesis, it had only been a member state for 2 years 
and there would not had been sufficient case studies to investigate its policy effectiveness.  
 
Finally, this PhD had been generously funded by the Fonds National de la Recherche from 
Luxembourg, under the condition that the research project should be in the interest of the 
Research and Development context in Luxembourg. Luxembourg has been an understudied 
subject of analysis in Political Science, and in European integration studies. This thesis has 
as one of its aims to provide a long overdue focus on this particular small state.  
 
Some issues have been identified with using the single study method with the aim of being 
a useful tool in comparative methods- that the selection of a single case cannot overcome 
the fact that cross-unit N was minimal.  
―We would be unlikely to reject a hypothesis, or to consider it definitively proved, 
on the basis of the study of a single unit, particularly if the hypothesis had behind it 
a corpus of scholarly work.‖21  
The other risk is that if the findings do not confirm the central proposition, then nothing had 
been learned. If the results of this thesis were that, after all, Luxembourg had not managed 
to be policy effective in any of the cases, then this confirmed the common sense statement 
that small states find it more difficult, if not impossible, to be policy effective in the 
European Union. The single case study method in general offers depth of analysis, which 
gets lost in many small N case studies. Thick description helped elucidate the complexities 
of EU negotiations, and provided contextual explanations which would get lost in a 
quantitative setting.  
 
I decided not to include quantitative or statistical analyses in the research design of this 
thesis. While much research had been done on who has power in the EU in quantitative 
terms, these studies had several drawbacks. Firstly, it would be very difficult to quantify 
policy preferences in most policy areas for all the member states. As argued above and in 
                                                          
21
 Gerring J., (May, 2004) ‗What is a Case Study and what is it Good for?‘ The American Political Science 
Review Vol. 98, No. 2 p. 350 
15 
the literature review, many quantitative studies assume that the salience of any issue (or 
legislation) was equal in all member states, which is a fundamental flaw of that research 
method. Quantitative studies that do use data on policy preferences and issue salience have 
often been based on faulty or incomplete information, which in turn led to findings which 
were contradictory to other official sources. Therefore, a qualitative analysis was chosen as 
the appropriate method. 
 
 
3.3. The case studies 
 
Having looked at why Luxembourg is an appropriate case study for a member state‘s policy 
effectiveness, we can proceed to the three detailed case studies: the creation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact in 1996, the reform of the same in 2005 and EC Reg. 883/2004. The case 
studies range from high profile decisions to very specific, technical issues. The first case 
provides an example where Luxembourg has been able to be highly policy effective. The 
second case shows that Luxembourg had low policy effectiveness in the outcome, while 
Luxembourg was medium policy effective in the third case.  
 
The cases were selected where the Luxembourg government or the press claimed it had 
been policy effective, in order to test firstly the accuracy of this claim and secondly the 
reasons for this supposed policy effectiveness. It seems necessary to test the validity of 
these claims that Luxembourg was policy effective in all three cases, because policy 
effectiveness is not an easily observable fact, such as winning an election or the emergence 
of a new party. The criteria for the case selection means that the claims made had to be 
confined to an environment in which governments had an inherent interest in the outcome 
of negotiations. Only then can we expect the government to use its resources to try to be 
policy effective.  
 
The case selection was based on a supposed positive outcome of policy effectiveness, as it 
was easier to identify and isolate the factors which helped policy effectiveness. However, 
the case studies present different degrees of policy effectiveness, making it possible to 
16 
identify the factors which hamper or enhance policy effectiveness and whether the presence 
or absence of one factor matters or not. The reasons for this policy effectiveness or lack of 
it constitute then the major part of this analysis. A diachronic analysis permits us to analyse 
sequences.
22
 The cases were negotiations that happened in 1996, in 2003, and in 2005. In 
1996 and 2003, there were 15 member states, while in 2005 there were 25 member states. 
This research could bring some early (although non-conclusive) indicators towards whether 
member states were less policy effective after enlargement.  
 
 
4. Plan of the thesis 
 
The second chapter presents the political system of Luxembourg. It is divided into two 
parts: the main characteristics of the economy, society and political system, and then 
Luxembourg‘s relations with the other member states and the European Union. Considering 
that this case is quite neglected in Political Science, especially in the English language, we 
need to lay out some contextual factors.  
 
The third chapter is a review of the literature in a narrow sense. Some general theories of 
European integration based on member state power (Moravcsik
23
) and the most recent 
attempts at classifying member states in terms of power or policy effectiveness will be 
presented. Moreover, a new strand of academic literature on European integration has 
emerged, probably as an evolution to Moravscik‘s liberal intergovernmentalist theory. This 
new strand variously looks at member states‘ power (Bailer and Tallberg24), or at the 
presidency of the European Council (Moxon-Browne and Quaglia; Elgstrom and 
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Tallberg
25
), at leadership in the big bangs of European integration (Beach and 
Mazzucelli
26
). Finally, I show how my research fits into this literature.  
 
The fourth chapter presents the research framework and the methodology. First, the 
assumptions that underlie this research will be presented. ‗Policy effectiveness‘ will then be 
closely defined, along with the factors of domestic politics, the negotiation context, the 
distribution and intensity of preferences, the presidency and individual-level factors. The 
last section presents the research methods.  
 
The fifth chapter is the first empirical case study based on the creation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) in 1997. Luxembourg‘s strategic position between France and Germany 
contributed to the agreement. More specifically, the linguistic and cultural assets that 
Luxembourg enjoys because of its strategic location between the two countries give it 
plenty of opportunities to play the role of broker. An excellent understanding of both 
neighbours‘ concerns enhanced its negotiating capacity. In addition, Luxembourg was one 
of the only member states that fulfilled the convergence criteria suggested by Germany. 
Indeed, the Luxembourg government played the role of mediator in the negotiations of the 
SGP in 1996, despite not holding the presidency. This case study is thus appropriate to test 
all the propositions, and I test which one was the main factor in Luxembourg‘s success. The 
claim is that it managed to be highly policy effective based on the analysis of its 
preferences and the outcome. The combination of individual-level factors, institutional 
coordination and the distribution of preferences favoured Luxembourg‘s success. 
 
The sixth chapter presents a follow-up to the first case study. The raison d‘être and the 
troubled history of the SGP show that the context for negotiations of a reform were far from 
ideal in the beginning. When the negotiations started late 2004, early in 2005, many heads 
of state were sceptical that an agreement could be reached. The positions of France and 
Germany, on the one hand, and the Netherlands and Austria on the other were wildly 
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diverging. Luxembourg had the presidency, and a reform was brokered. In this case, it was 
low in terms of policy effectiveness. While some factors stayed constant compared to the 
creation of the SGP, a different result came about. While in 1996, the personal political 
weight of Juncker and his double hat of Prime Minister and Finance Minister were the main 
factors for Luxembourg‘s success; in 2005 the additional factors of chairing the Eurogroup 
and the presidency did not lead to policy effectiveness.  Just as in 1996, holding the 
presidency of the European Council can be (but is not necessarily) a factor for policy 
effectiveness. The main factors which influenced this low policy effectiveness can be 
traced back to the distribution and intensity of preferences of the other member states- more 
specifically the alliance of France and Germany who imposed its vision of a new SGP. 
 
The seventh chapter is the last case study on Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness. This 
chapter offers an institution- and actor-centered explanation of Luxembourg‘s role in the 
reform of the EC Regulation 1408/71. The negotiations on the allocation of unemployment 
benefits to frontier workers (EC Regulation 883/2004) were very delicate ones. The 
Commission proposed that unemployment benefits should be paid by the member state 
where the former employee was working, not where he was residing. The history and 
statistics of frontier workers in Luxembourg show the unique structure of Luxembourg‘s 
economy and its extreme dependence on frontier workers. A chronological presentation of 
the institutional process and negotiations from 1999 to 2003 show which factors played a 
part in Luxembourg‘s medium policy effectiveness. Finally, the outcome of the 
negotiations is presented. This case study argues that Luxembourg‘s strategy of giving in as 
little as possible and as late as possible in an environment of unanimity worked. 
Furthermore, it suggests that if an issue is of little interest to the big member states, the 
Commission proposal is abandoned in favour of a sub-optimal agreement and secondly that 
European governance is sometimes based on the delegation of negotiations to a small circle 
of actors.   
 
The eighth chapter presents the findings of the empirical case studies. Were the indicators 
of policy effectiveness well chosen? Do they accurately measure policy effectiveness? 
Which factors work in combination to produce the desired outcome? It is suggested that the 
19 
individual-level factors and the distribution and intensity of preferences influence most the 
degree of policy effectiveness. The factor that did not influence policy effectiveness in any 
case is the presidency. Domestic politics only played a role in one case; however this may 
be because until the economic crisis, budgetary coordination and monetary policy in 
general were not perceived as very salient by the media and the public. The negotiation 
context has had a negative impact on policy effectiveness. A review of what we have learnt 
about Luxembourg demonstrates the weaknesses of this small country in the European 
institutions, but shows ways to be policy effective. Finally, it draws a conclusion on 
undertaking research about policy effectiveness and identifies possible criticisms of this 
research as well as highlighting lessons and possibilities for future research.  
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Chapter 2: The current political system in Luxembourg  
 
 
 
1. The political landscape 
 
Before delving into the literature review of member states‘ policy effectiveness in the 
European Union, a presentation of Luxembourg‘s political system, its society and its 
idiosyncrasies should give some much-needed background information on what kind of 
state, government and people we are dealing with in these case studies. Partly because of its 
smallness, Luxembourg is often overlooked in Political Science studies and very little is 
actually known about it, apart from the common clichés: it is portrayed as extraordinarily 
wealthy due to being a tax haven and is a stable democracy coupled with an efficient 
corporatist structure of industrial relations.  
 
Luxembourg is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. The monarchy 
is one of the few whom the population explicitly expressed their support for in a 
referendum in 1919. The Parliament consists of 60 elected members. Just like in the 
Netherlands, the mandate of Member of Parliament is incompatible with being a member of 
the government, being a magistrate and being a member of the State Council. The Grand 
Duke is the Head of State and his powers are mostly ceremonial. He has to sign every piece 
of legislation after it has been passed in Parliament before it becomes effective. A 
constitutional and monarchical crisis was only narrowly averted in late 2008 and 2009 
when the Grand Duke refused to sign the law regulating the use of euthanasia, citing his 
religious beliefs for the refusal. In the end, the constitution was changed so that now he 
does not need to ―sanction and promulgate‖ laws anymore. The Grand Duke designates the 
Formateur on the basis of the election results, who then designates the members of 
government. The government presents its political programme to Parliament who votes on 
a confidence motion.  
21 
 
The number of ministerial departments usually exceeds the number of government 
members; one minister is usually responsible for several ministerial departments. This is a 
particularity, to which we shall return later on and which had a bearing on some of the case 
studies. Even the Prime Minister usually has responsibility for at least one other 
department; the current PM Juncker has held simultaneously the posts Minister of State, 
Minister of Employment and Finance Minister at various points over his 15 year long 
Premiership. Entering government in 1982 as secretary of State for Labour and Social 
Security in 1982, Juncker became Finance Minister in 1989. In 1994 he kept both his posts 
as Finance Minister and Minister for Employment, but he also became Prime Minister.
27
  
During Luxembourg‘s EU presidency in 1991, he presided over the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council, and contributed to the negotiations on the Economic and 
Monetary Union, notably by proposing the infamous opting-out clause for the United 
Kingdom. He stayed in the double functions of Finance Minister and Prime Minister from 
1995 until 2009, when he decided to quit being a Finance Minister and ―only‖ kept the 
office of Prime Minister, after his party was re-elected by the biggest margin since the 
Second World War (he also got his highest personal score that year). This means that 
Juncker has been in government for the past 28 years, of which he spent 20 years as 
Finance Minister, and 15 years as Prime Minister. He has chaired four EU Presidencies and 
has been the President of the Eurogroup, the group of the Finance Ministers of the 
Eurozone, since 2005, to which he was re-elected in 2010. In the previous legislative period 
between 2004 and 2009, the current Finance Minister Luc Frieden (CSV) was Minister of 
Justice, responsible for all issues of internal security, and Minister for the Treasury and the 
Budget. Between 2004 and 2006, he also was Minister of Defence. Jeannot Krecké (LSAP) 
was appointed Minister of the Economy and Foreign Trade, and Minister of Sport.  
The State Council could be considered as the second legislative assembly and functions as a 
moderating influence. It is composed of 21 Councillors, who are nominated and fired by the 
Grand Duke, on the basis of either the recommendations of the government, the Parliament 
or the State Council. The State Council is obliged to submit its opinion on most legislation 
before Parliament gets to vote. In its opinion, it has to consider whether the legislative 
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proposals conform to the Constitution, international conventions, and general principles of 
law. ―Its role is to persuade, not to impose. In this aspect, its role is consultative.‖28  
 
Concerning the size of the public administration, Luxembourg has only around 20 000 
people who work in some way for the state. The foreign policy executive suffers from a 
chronic overstretch, as it has around 200 staff members only. This is the main reason why 
Luxembourg always figures as a ―bad pupil‖ in the transposition of directives into national 
legislation, although the figures have been improving in 2009.
29
 The parliament and the 
administration simply cannot deal as quickly with the transposition as those from bigger 
states. The remaining sections of this chapter will present the population and society, the 
state of the economy, the political parties, the national and European elections, and finally 
the form of corporatism that prevails to this date in Luxembourg.  
 
 
1.1. Population, society and employment 
 
With its approximately 520 000 inhabitants and 2586 square kilometers, Luxembourg is 
wedged between France in the West, Belgium in the North and Germany in the East. 
Within the last 30 years, the population has increased by some 120 000 inhabitants, due in a 
large part to immigration.  
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Table 2.1: The population of Luxembourg (x 1000)  
 
Year 1981 1991 2001 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Population 
      Total population (x1000)  364.6 384.4 439.5 476.2 483.8 493.5 502.066 
women 186.7 196.1 223 240.4 244.2 248.7 252.66 
Luxembourgeois 268.8 271.4 277.2 277.9 277.9 278 285.7 
Foreigners(x1000) 95.8 113 162.3 198.3 205.9 215.5 216.4 
- Portuguese 29.3 39.1 58.7 73.7 76.6 80 79.8 
- Italians 22.3 19.5 19 19.1 19.1 19.4 18.2 
- French 11.9 13 20 25.2 26.6 28.5 29.7 
 - Belgians 7.9 10.1 14.8 16.5 16.5 16.7 16.7 
 - Germans 8.9 8.8 10.1 11.3 11.6 12 12 
- British 2 3.2 4.3 4.9 5 5.3 5.5 
- Dutch 2.9 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9 
- Other EU 10.6 6.6 9.2 16.5 17.9 19.5 20.5 
- others … 9.2 22.5 27.3 28.8 30.2 30.1 
Foreigners in % 26.3 29.4 36.9 41.6 42.6 43.7 43.1 
Source: Statec
30
 
 
The number of citizens is stagnating, and without naturalisation it would even have 
decreased.
31
 The statistics are telling the extent of this phenomenon: while in 1981, 268 800 
residents were citizens and 95 800 were foreigners, in 2010 the 285 700 residents were 
citizens and 216 400 were foreigners.
32
 The vast majority of these foreign residents have 
EU citizenship. It seems ironic that the creation of this EU citizenship, with ever increasing 
economic, social rights and pecuniary benefits which are almost undistinguishable from the 
rights of a citizen of Luxembourg, is one of the reasons why Europeans do not want to 
become citizens, even if they plan to stay for the rest of their lives in Luxembourg. 
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Furthermore, dual nationality only entered into force in January 2009. Currently there is 
only a slight majority of the residents who have citizenship- if it turns into a minority then 
the minority will rule over the majority. There is a real issue in the very near future for the 
democratic representativeness of the government if foreign residents continue to refuse to 
take up at least dual nationality.  
Since 1983, employment has been steadily on the increase, especially due to an increase in 
the number of frontier workers, who account for around 40 percent of total employment.
33
 
Unemployment had been marginal for a long time and centered on the 3 percent mark, but 
it has also been on a steady increase since 2002. In 2010, it has doubled to 6 percent.
34
 
 
Luxembourg has a relatively unusual language situation. While the national language is 
Luxembourgish, legislative instruments and their implementing regulations are drafted in 
French. French, German or Luxembourgish can be used in contentious or non-contentious 
administrative matters and in judicial matters. The three languages are used to varying 
degrees as working languages and for formal and informal communication.
35
 French turned 
out to be the major language of the public administration, of the justice system, of the 
political institutions and of high culture. German dominates in areas such as the press. Its 
geographical location has made it possible for Luxembourgers to ―understand the Germanic 
and the roman world, to borrow from these two rich cultural heritages and to produce a 
synthesis of them.‖36 The citizens of Luxembourg are characterised by a strong sense of 
social cohesion, national identity and a sense of vulnerability. It has been rightfully argued 
that the influence of public opinion is rather weak.
37
  
 
 
                                                          
33
 More details on Luxembourg‘s labour market are presented in the case study of the payment of 
unemployment benefits to frontier workers.  
34
 Statec, (2010) ‗Emploi et chômage 2000-2010‘.  21 September. Available at: 
http://www.statistiques.public.lu/stat/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=338&IF_Language=fra&MainT
heme=2&FldrName=5&RFPath=36 
35Council of Europe, (2007) ‗Initial periodical report presented to the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe in accordance with Article 15 of the European Charter.‘ 19 March, p. 2  
36
 Lorig in ‗Einleitung: Luxemburg- „Small, beautiful and successful?― in Hirsch M., Lorig W. H., (2008) Das 
politische System Luxemburgs. Eine Einführung. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, p. 33 
37
 Hey J.K.A. in ‗Luxembourg: Where Small works (and wealthy doesn‘t hurt)‘ in Hey J.K.A., (2003) Small 
States in World Politics, Lynne Riener Publishers, p. 87 
25 
1.2. The economy and the budget 
 
Luxembourg‘s economy is characterised by its openness towards trade in goods and 
services and its acceptance of exogenous talent and capital. While the iron and steel sector 
was the most important until the 1970s, it was less than 3 percent of value-added, while 
manufacturing was less than 10 percent in 2004.
38
 The economy experienced exceptional 
growth from 1985 to 2000 and a spectacular downturn in 2001. This growth is largely 
attributed to the financial sector, whose share in value-added rose from less than 5 percent 
in 1970 to over 20 percent in 2004.  
 
Luxembourg is only second to the USA in terms of investment funds in total volume.
39
 
However, its share of the total volume is only 6.4 percent, compared to the 60 percent of 
the USA. The UK, in comparison, owns only half of Luxembourg‘s share. If we look at 
direct investment per capita in 2000, Luxembourg occupies the first place with 59 563 USD 
per capita. But we can note a marked decline if banks are taken out of the equation, when 
the volume drops to roughly 20 000 USD. However, it is noteworthy that Luxembourg still 
occupies the first place before Ireland.
40
 
 
From 2001 to 2004, there was a sharp slowdown and a modest re-acceleration in the 
economy. Luxembourg‘s economic growth is extremely volatile and subject to major 
fluctuations, a characteristic common to open economies.  
―In the past twenty years, during periods of strong economic expansion (1985-1991 
and 1997-2000), growth in Luxembourg was over twice as high as average growth 
in the Eurozone: growth averaged 3 percent in the Eurozone compared to 7 percent 
in Luxembourg. (...) Even in periods of economic slowdown (1992-1996 and 2001-
2006), the Luxembourg economy grew at a pace more than double that of the 
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Eurozone: between 2001 and 2006 the average GDP growth rate in Luxembourg 
will in all likelihood amount to 3.5 percent, while in the Eurozone the average rate 
will probably be not more than 1.4 to 1.5 percent.‖41  
 
Turning to the budgetary situation, we can observe the following: that Luxembourg has 
been a model pupil in terms of budgetary surveillance. The various governments have 
always adhered to the principles of fiscal discipline and budgetary consolidation. In this 
case as well, Luxembourg‘s situation differs markedly from that of its neighbours. The 
following table illustrates this point.  
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Table2.2.: Luxembourg‘s budgetary situation from 1998-2010 in percentage of GDP: 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008a * 2008 b* 2008 c* 2009 2010 
 
average 
Deficit 
general gvt 
2.6 4.4 6.2 6.1 2.4 0.8 -2.3 1.0 0.7 3.2 2.3 2.0 2.5 -1.1 -3.9 1.7 
Deficit 
central gvt 
0.9 2.7 3.0 2.6 -0.2 -1.2 -1.2 1.5 -0.9 0.8 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 -2.9 -5.5 0.6 
Gross debt n/a n/a 5.34 5.3 5.7 5.3 6.6 6.1 6.9 7.0 14.4 14.4 13.5 14.9 18.3  
Sources: Luxembourg Ministry of Finance.
42
 
*Explanatory note: there are three columns for 2008, because the different updates provide conflicting statistics on the deficits of the general and the 
central government and on the levels of gross debt.  2008a: 10
th
 update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‟  2008b: 10th update of the 
Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme, ADDENDUM.‟ 2008c:  11th update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‟ The numbers 
from the 11
th
 update were taken to calculate the average. 
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Budget surpluses of the general government (which includes the budgetary situations of the 
local government and social security) were on average 1.7 percent over the past 12 years- 
including the period of 2008 to 2010 when the economic and financial crisis made its 
impact felt. High surpluses of 6.2 percent of GDP in 2000 were replaced by record forecast 
budget deficits of 3.9 percent of GDP in 2010. This increase stems not only from the 
economic downturn, but also from government support to stabilise the banking system. The 
government supported the banks Fortis and Dexia with 2.4 billion euro and 376 million 
euro in 2008.
43
  This is the first time that Luxembourg does not meet the SGP criteria of a 
maximum budget deficit of 3 percent. Budget surpluses of the central government were 
lower but still positive at 0.6 per cent over the same period. As regards the state‘s debt 
levels, they are remarkably low in times of economic crisis at 14.9 percent in 2009. 
However, it is triple the amount of the 2000 levels of gross debt.  
 
Compared with other member states though, Luxembourg‘s government is still in an 
enviable position- less so in terms of budget deficits, but still in terms of its public debt. 
Ireland has a public deficit in 2009 of 12 percent of GDP, while Germany has had almost 
identical levels to Luxembourg‘s deficits in 2008 and 2009.44 Luxembourg‘s levels of gross 
debt at 14.9 percent in 2009 are still well below the reference value of 60 percent of GDP 
foreseen in Article 126 in the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.
45
 
Germany‘s public debt is levelled at 68 percent in 2009.46 In summary, while Luxembourg 
had exceptional growth rates in the early 2000s, which were reflected in its budgetary 
surpluses, and low levels of gross debt, it can be said that the economic and financial crisis 
has had a negative impact on both, but not as devastating as in many other Eurozone (and 
non-Eurozone) countries. 
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1.3. Political parties  
 
The four traditional political parties were founded at the beginning of the 20
th
 century: The 
Christian Social People‘s Party (CSV), the Luxembourg Socialist Workers‘ Party (LSAP), 
the Liberal Party (DP) and the Communist Party (KP). The CSV has been the strongest 
political force and has almost always been in government (except for 1925-1926 and 1974-
1979), while the LSAP and the DP were variously the smaller coalition partner. During the 
1980s, the Green Party and the Action Committee for Democracy and Pension Justice 
(ADR) were founded and are nowadays established within the party system. The 
ideological distance between the political parties is quite low, as Luxembourg is 
characterised as a consensual democracy. No one party can hope to impose its views 
exclusively, not even in a coalition. Finally, not one of the major parties is questioning the 
benefits of EU membership, Euro membership or of further integration. There is a 
widespread agreement on international matters- ―politicians and the wider population are 
largely aware that any bitter division on foreign policy could further weaken the already 
small voice of Luxembourg in international politics.‖47 
 
The ADR (Alternative Democratic Reform Party- Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei) 
was created in 1987 as a lobby organisation for higher pensions in the private sector and is 
nowadays an established party. Since 1999, the party tries to own the themes of economic 
liberalism, which has been partly neglected by the DP. Even though the ADR officially 
stands for social justice, it also appeals to those who are disillusioned by the state and wants 
to reduce the competencies of the state to its core issues (on the national and European 
level).
48
 Its members and supporters are elderly people who feel left out and neglected by 
the other political parties. It argues that subsidiarity should be absolute- decisions should be 
taken at the lowest level possible. The ADR is a member of the Union of a Europe of 
Nations since 2003. The other parties regard it as a populist party, and have constructed a 
cordon sanitaire around it.  
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The CSV (Christian Social People‘s Party- Chreschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei) has always 
had a core position on Luxembourg‘s political system and is usually the pivotal party. It 
conducts a ―political programme based on the Christian and humanist principles of 
solidarity and of social progress‖.49 Its supporters come from the conservative middle class, 
civil servants, catholic workers and farmers. Due to its considerable influence on the civil 
service, it attracts people who are interested in a political career without necessarily having 
a catholic background. This is not without consequences to the programme and identity of 
the party. There are two camps within the party. The first is the social and technocratic 
camp which considers politics to be not only an arena for the confrontation between 
ideologies and parties, but should also aim to include as many social groups as possible. 
There is a wide democratic consensus on themes like the welfare state, the EU, the 
integration of foreigners into the party and the society and departs from the assumption of 
the disappearance of  ideological differences. This wing has dominated the party since the 
resignation of Pierre Werner in 1984.
50
 The second camp is liberal-conservative and plays a 
second role within the party. It argues that the involvement of the state is seen by the 
population as omnipresent, and underlines the importance of individual responsibility and 
supports a value system based on the family, the nation and European integration. 
However, these two camps rarely confront each other openly- the image of the CSV as a 
party of bridging the class differences and social harmony prevents this to a certain extent. 
Although the party describes itself as a centrist party, the majority of the population sees it 
clearly as a right wing party.
51
 Its economic policies are more left-wing than many other 
European Christian Democratic parties, thereby stealing votes from the LSAP. In the 
European Parliament, it is a member of the EPP. 
 
The DP (Democratic Party- Demokratesch Partei) has been a member of the coalition in 
seven governments since 1940. Its philosophy is mainly based on economic and political 
liberalism; however it has strayed from these principles during its participation in 
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government from 1999-2004, for which it was punished by the electorate in the elections of 
2004.
52
  When Gaston Thorn (DP) was Prime Minister from 1974-1979 in coalition with 
the Socialists, it managed to pass many important reforms, such as the abolition of the 
death penalty, several laws regarding divorce and abortion, the introduction of the 40 hour 
working week, and the creation of the tripartite, which was supposed to be an instrument 
for managing the economic crisis. Its most significant contribution however was the reform 
of the steel sector on the basis of a consensus between the social partners.  It is a member of 
ALDE in the European Parliament. 
 
The Green Party (Dei Gréng) entered the political arena in 1984, and was split and reunited 
several times since. Its original concerns dealt with environmental sustainability, 
subsidiarity to strengthen democracy, and pacifism, along with a fundamental questioning 
of industrial policies and the structure of society. It could therefore reunite different people 
under the common banner of criticising the structure of society: ecologists, Marxists, left 
Catholics, Third World activists, wealthy town dwellers in search of a more 
environmentally friendly lifestyle, and liberals. This ―social and cultural patchwork still 
constitutes the basis of its supporters, with the peculiarity that 70% of them in 2004 were 
civil servants.‖53 In order to break the isolation within the political system, the party has 
slowly transformed into an ecological party of the centre. 
 
The LSAP (Luxembourg Social Workers Party- Letzebuergesch Sozial Aarbechter Partei) 
is the second most popular party in Luxembourg, and was often the smaller coalition party 
of the CSV.  In the 1970s, the liberal wing of the party split and formed a new party, which 
disappeared after 1984. From 1984 until 1999, they governed the country together and 
carried out numerous social and economic reforms.
54
 In 1999, they were the big losers in 
the elections, and went into opposition until 2004. The LSAP has to fight sporadically in 
the South constituency, its major stronghold, against the Left Party, a former communist 
party and similar to the Left Party in Germany.  
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The party system is characterised by a certain weakness of the parties, for two reasons: first 
of all the election system which favours charismatic personalities through the system of 
panachage and secondly, a missing constitutional and legal framework for the parties and 
for the financing of party organisations. The ideological distance between the parties is 
quite small, which is related to the fact that Luxembourg is a consensual democracy.
55
 The 
three parties (CSV, LSAP, DP) can be called ‗staatstragend‘, which has led to a great 
political stability, but has also given momentum to the creation of opposition parties, such 
as the Greens and the ADR. Under the leadership of Jean-Claude Juncker, the CSV has 
renewed its party membership and taken on a hegemonic position within the system, which 
exceeds its connections to the civil service and to the trade union movement. All this plus 
the election trends (or lack of them) over the past two decades show that the cliché of 
Luxembourg being a stable democracy with little electoral volatility is far from misleading.  
 
 
1.4 National elections 
 
Luxembourg‘s history in the second half of the 20th century has been characterised by a 
remarkable political and social stability.  
―The last five Prime Ministers‘ average period of office was over 23 years with over 
10 years as head of government! Similarly, ministers of foreign affairs tend to 
exercise for more than one five-year mandate.‖56   
Three aspects distinguish Luxembourg from other countries‘ elections and electoral 
systems: its compulsory voting, the voting system and the low turnover in political 
personnel. First of all, voting is compulsory for anyone between the ages of 18 to 75. 
Participation is therefore very high- around 90 percent in the last two national and 
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European elections (2004 and 2009).
57
 Secondly, the voting system is one of panachage. 
There are two ways of voting: either one votes for a party, crossing the circle of the party 
list, thereby agreeing with the ranking order of the candidates established by the party, or 
one can choose ―panachage”, which means that one can give up to two votes per person of 
any party until all the votes are distributed. Constituency seats are allocated by the 
Hagenbach-Bischoff method. The number of votes polled by each list is then divided by the 
electoral quota, and the result is the initial number of mandates allocated to the list; unfilled 
seats are then allocated in each constituency according to the largest average method, also 
known as the D'Hondt rule. List seats are assigned to the candidates with the largest vote 
totals within each list.
58
  National elections are divided into four constituencies: the less 
populated East and North constituencies (7 and 9 MPs) and the bigger South and Central 
constituencies (23 and 21 MPs). Members of Parliament are elected for 5 years.  
 
Table 2.3.: National election results from 1989 until 2009 in terms of percentage and seats: 
Party 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
CSV 31.7 (22) 31.4 (21) 30.1 (19) 36.1 (24) 38.0 (26) 
LSAP 27.2 (18) 24.8 (17) 22.3 (13) 23.4 (14) 21.6 (13) 
DP 16.2 (11) 18.9 (12) 22.4 (15) 16.1 (10) 15.0 (9) 
Gréng 8.9 (2) 10.9 (5) 9.1 (5) 11.6 (7) 11.7 (7) 
ADR 7.3 (4) 7.0 (5) 11.3 (7) 10.0 (5) 8.1 (4) 
Lénk - - 3.3 (1) 1.9 (0) 3.3 (1) 
The first number indicates the percentage of the valid votes, the second number indicates the seats allocated 
to the party out of 60 
Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.de
59
 
 
Since the Second World War, no party has been able to ―go it alone‖ in Luxembourg, but 
simultaneously the system is characterised by an extraordinarily high level of stability and 
continuity. The centripetal tendency of the political spectrum has always favoured the CSV. 
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Coalition governments resulted mostly in either a coalition between the centre-right CSV 
and the centre-left LSAP- or with the liberal DP. Only once since the 1950s, a coalition was 
able to form without the involvement of the CSV: in the 1970s, the DP provided the Prime 
Minister (Gaston Thorn, later to become EU Commission President) and was in a coalition 
with the LSAP- a time in which significant social reforms were pushed through.  
 
 
1.5. Culture of corporatism 
 
 ―What natives refer to as the ―Luxembourg model‖ combines continuous, 
institutionalized dialogue among industry, unions, and the government to produce 
low inequality, an adequate redistribution of the fruits of economic growth, and 
‗industrial peace‘‖.60  
 
The ―tripartite” constitutes the forum in which the government, the trade unions and the 
business organisations negotiate substantial elements of labour market regulation and wage 
policies, but also discusses fiscal policy, public finance and the overall competitive 
situation of the country. 
 
Three big trade unions represent the workers: the Independent Trade Union (O-GBL) which 
is informally close to the LSAP and the Christian Trade Union (LCGB) formally linked to 
the CSV, while the trade Union of the Civil Servants (CGFP) is politically neutral. Trade 
unions ―understand that their interests are tied to the success of private international 
business and generally support foreign policy decisions on that basis.‖61 Business groups 
are generally in very close contact with the government, and have therefore considerable 
influence before a decision is taken in cabinet. There are six professional chambers (3 
business chambers and 3 employment chambers).
62
 The mission of the Professional 
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Chambers is to defend and promote the interests of the professional groups they represent. 
They have the right to make proposals to the government in their area. After the 
government has examined them, it can choose whether it passes them on to Parliament. The 
opinion of the relevant professional chamber is required for every law project and 
regulation which falls in its competences.  
 
The Economic and Social Council (ESC) is a consultative body of the government. It is 
composed of representatives of businesses, liberal professions, of agriculture and 
viticulture, and of representatives of employees of the private and public sectors and of 
members directly appointed by the government. It studies economic, financial and social 
problems, either in specific sectors or in the whole national economy. Furthermore, it 
evaluates the national implications of European framework agreements between trade 
unions and business groups.
63
  
 
Until the financial crisis hit Luxembourg, the tripartite model worked well and was very 
influential, and concerns that it undermined the legislative powers of Parliament were 
(often but not by everyone) brushed aside.
64
 However, the failure of gaining the approval of 
the trade unions on the Stability and Growth Programme, which included considerable cuts 
in public expenditure, exposed the weaknesses of the system in April 2010. Trade unions 
are still threatening to strike at the end of 2010, which again is something unheard of in a 
country used to social harmony, and is still regarded as a nuclear option. While agreement 
has since been found on some aspects, it is clear that the wounds, both of the trade unions 
and the business organisations, run deeper and thus may still threaten this unique system of 
corporatism. Hirsch goes so far as to label Luxembourg‘s system a ―fair weather model‖.65  
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2. Luxembourg and the European Union 
 
Looking at Luxembourg‘s political system in isolation does not paint a complete picture; 
instead we also need to take into account its relations not only with the European Union 
institutions, but also with its immediate neighbours in order to fully understand both levels 
in the ‗two-level games‘ that governments have to play in EU negotiations. Moving on to 
the specifics of its European policy strategy, the geopolitical environment in which 
Luxembourg finds itself will be presented first. Its slightly uncomfortable location between 
France and Germany and the mixed fate of the Benelux union are then considered. Next, 
the main principles of the European policy strategy, such as multilateralism and 
internationalism, but also the goal to ‗keep punching above its weight‘ are essential in 
understanding what Luxembourg wants. Finally, I focus on the strategies which 
Luxembourg employs to achieve these goals, acting with selectivity and through low-key 
diplomacy.  
 
 
2.1. Geopolitics: relations with France, Germany and the Benelux 
 
2.1.1. France and Germany 
 
Relations with France and Germany condition Luxembourg‘s very existence. 
Luxembourg‘s governments have always considered that excellent relations with these two 
countries are of fundamental importance. Intense personal involvement by its politicians 
has often borne fruit, be it at party political level or at governmental level. Indeed, if we 
look at personal or party political visits over the past 5 years, we can note an intense 
number of visits, especially to Germany, by Luxembourg‘s foreign minister Jean 
Asselborn. Jean-Claude Juncker also regularly visits Germany and receives private visits 
from former chancellors, be it Helmut Kohl or Gerhard Schröder.  
 
37 
Attacks by the highest government levels in France and notoriously, Germany, on 
Luxembourg‘s banking secrecy have recently disrupted the- usually polite- relations.66 The 
German SPD chairman Franz Müntefering had briefly considered the solution that ―in the 
olden days we would have sent our soldiers there- but we can‘t do that nowadays‖.67 The 
Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück (SPD) made some comparisons between Luxembourg 
and Burkina Faso‘s capital Ouagadougou in the context of banking secrecy, and made 
references to the times when the US cavalry could intimidate the Indians. These attacks 
have left a lasting impression on the domestic population, and led to a public outcry of 
indignation. Luxembourg‘s foreign Minister Asselborn (LSAP) answered publicly, stating 
that ―just a millimetre of arrogance by high German authorities unleashes feelings in 
Luxembourg which we‘d rather not feel.‖68 However the change of government in 
Germany, along with Luxembourg‘s abandonment of the banking secret, has assuaged 
largely these animosities. 
 
2.1.2. The Belgian- Luxembourg Economic Union (UEBL) and  Benelux  
 
Belgium has been Luxembourg‘s closest ally. The economic union between Luxembourg 
and Belgium was created in 1922 and they still have privileged ties through the economic 
union (UEBL). Luxembourg‘s smallness has also led to it being represented at consular and 
ambassadorial level by either Belgium or the Netherlands. Because it simply cannot afford 
an embassy in every capital, its citizens can go to the embassies of one of those countries, 
depending on the agreement, to have their concerns addressed. This presupposes detailed 
arrangements and close contacts between different levels of governments and 
administrations. 
 
Benelux is an historical entity: the exiled governments of the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg signed the Benelux Union Treaty in London in 1944. While the treaty is based 
on interstate collaboration without delegation of national competencies, the customs union 
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nevertheless proved effective. The trade between Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg increased by 50 percent between 1948 and 1956. The increase in external 
trade lifted Benelux to fifth place in the world economic league behind the United States, 
the United Kingdom, West Germany and Canada.
69
 Collaboration followed in other areas, 
notably police and judicial cooperation and border control. Campbell writes that 
 ―Government leaders in all three Benelux countries appear to have recognised that 
by speaking with a common voice, the Benelux national will carry more weight in 
the Common Market. (…) As small states with full, though lesser, voting rights in 
the European Community, those nations can believe in the exercise of real influence 
here.‖70  
 
The Benelux treaty was renewed in 2009, and common memorandums and positions, such 
as on the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon are still produced in an effort to 
consolidate their positions within the EU. The Benelux also has contacts with the Visegrad 
group and the Baltic States, which are designed to harmonise positions in the EU.
71
  
 
However, Erik Jones argues that even though the customs union was a success,  
―as a union, the Benelux has been something of a disappointment. (…) The 
elaboration of common Benelux political institutions had little if any success. As a 
symbol or aspiration, the proposal to deepen the institutions of the Benelux in the 
1960s may be said to have encouraged greater enthusiasm via the European 
Community. But as a practical venture it offered few tangible results.‖ 72  
The ongoing political crisis in Belgium could affect the coordination of positions and 
speaking with a united voice in the Council.   
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2.2. Past and present: how these relations pan out  
 
The relations with its neighbours are of vital necessity for a small country such as 
Luxembourg. Considering its geopolitical location, the government and its administration 
need to invest their resources wisely in cultivating their relations with these states. A 
reasonable proposition is that a table showing the volume of these bilateral meetings would 
indicate the extent of bilateral relations. 
 
 
Table 2.4.: Number of official visits to and from Luxembourg to Belgium, the Netherlands, 
France and Germany: 
 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009a 2009b total 
BE 7 3 4 n/a 5 2 3 3 8 2 37 
NL 2 5 3 n/a 3 1 3 1 5 1 24 
FR 1 0 3 n/a 3 4 6 3 2 2 21 
DE 1 2 3 n/a 3 8 3 4 4 4 29 
Source: Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Ministère d‟Etat73 
 
This table indicates the official visits of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, the Minister for 
European Affairs (if there was one), of the Minister for Development (if there was a 
specific post created), and the Minister of Defense, and the visits they received. The row 
2009a refers to the visits to and from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, and of 
Development. The row 2009b, which shows the official visits to and from the Prime 
Minister, is unfortunately the only year where an online activity report is available. 
Therefore the PM‘s visits are absent for the other years. The year 2004 is unavailable, as 
the only activity report available online is from the Ministry of Development.  
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Over the past nine years, Luxembourg‘s Foreign Ministers have had the most intense 
relations with Belgium, followed by Germany. Considering that Luxembourg has intense 
formal relations through the Economic Union (UEBL) and Benelux, this table confirms that 
Belgium is an important ally and partner for Luxembourg and that those relations are 
strong. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that due to the political turmoil in 
Belgium, no bilateral meetings at governmental level have been held between Luxembourg 
and Belgium since February 2007.
74
 Relations with Germany are intense as well, and most 
of those visits were actually from the German government to Luxembourg. The relations 
between Luxembourg and the Netherlands are mostly based on Benelux meetings, 
indicating that relations rarely go beyond that. Relations with France seem to be contingent 
on political events. The doubling of visits in 2007 by and to France is related to the 
elections which produced a high number of visits from presidential candidates. 
Luxembourg also forms issue-specific alliances with those four countries, but not 
exclusively so. Frentz argues that  
―in matters relating to the liberalisation of transport, Luxembourg votes with France 
and Belgium, reflecting a cautious approach to the privatization of public services, 
whereas when it comes to financial markets, Luxembourg has a more liberal view 
and usually votes with the UK against a potentially protectionist approach.‖75  
Hence, Luxembourg‘s coalitions are based on strategic reasoning and will be examined 
closely in the case studies.  
 
2.3. The results of the European elections: a country of euro-enthusiasts? 
 
The European elections are held in a single constituency in Luxembourg. Since the entry 
into force of the Nice Treaty, Luxembourg has the right to 6 MEPs. National and European 
Parliament elections have been held simultaneously since 1979. This means in practice that 
all European elections in Luxembourg are second-order elections. Until the 2009 elections, 
candidates could stand in both national and European elections, which has been changed in 
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order to give more prominence to European issues in the EP elections. There is still an 
ongoing debate about whether to separate the timing of both elections in order to have a 
true European Parliament election. The support for EU integration of the public is one of 
the highest among all the member states. But Luxembourg has followed the declining trend 
of other European societies, as seen in the very narrow approval by the citizens of the 
Constitutional Treaty. Hirsch makes the following assessment: ―It has lost some of the aura 
of a model pupil. A certain dose of realism and a keen awareness of the country‘s intrinsic 
vulnerability have taken over of late.‖76 
 
 
Table 2.5.: Luxembourg‘s European Parliament election results from 1989 until 2009 in 
terms of percentage and seats: 
 
Party 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 
CSV 34.9 (3) 31.5 (2) 31.9 (2) 37.1 (3) 31.3 (3) 
LSAP 25.4 (2) 24.8 (2) 23.2 (2) 22.1 (1) 19.4 (1) 
DP 20.0 (1) 18.8 (1) 20.8 (1) 14.9 (1) 18.7 (1) 
Gréng  10.9 (1) 10.7 (1) 15.0 (1) 16.8 (1) 
The first number indicates the percentage of the valid votes, the second number indicates the seats allocated 
to the party out of 6. Source: http://www.parties-and-elections.de 
 
There was no change compared to the 2004 European elections. The distribution of the 6 
seats was as follows: 3 seats for the Christian Social People‘s Party and 1 each for the 
Democratic Party, Luxembourg Socialist Workers‘ Party and the Greens. We can see that 
apart from the Christian Social People‘s Party decrease, not much has changed from 2004 
to 2009. The ADR, which could be classified as a ‗soft Eurosceptic‘ party, did not succeed 
in gaining representation.
77
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European issues were not highly prominent. The Christian Social People‘s Party, and the 
Luxembourg Socialist Workers‘ Party to a lesser extent, mentioned Europe as a solution to 
the crisis, rather than a problem, and that Luxembourg has an important role to play in the 
EU. These two parties also played heavily the ―competence card‖, in the sense that they 
argue that the EU is too important for Luxembourg to vote for anyone who has no 
experience at the EU level and is not well versed in the issues that arise at EU level. This is 
confirmed by one of the campaign managers, who argued that the citizens vote for 
candidates ―knowing how to represent Luxembourg in the EU‖ rather than for a European 
political ideology.
78
  
 
Luxembourg therefore followed the trend in Europe in voting for centre right parties, as the 
LSAP faced, like many other social democratic parties, a certain scepticism by the citizens 
that it would be able to deal with the economic crisis and keep its promises of providing 
jobs in the face of the economic and financial crisis. Where Luxembourg has never 
followed other European publics is in voting for Eurosceptic parties. Nevertheless, this does 
not conceal the fact that European elections are second order elections, which is not only 
because they are held simultaneously as national elections.  
 
 
2.4. The broad principles and strategies of European policy 
 
The government realised, after being invaded twice, that neutrality did not prevent anyone 
from marching into Luxembourg. It consequently chose the path of international 
cooperation and integration after the Second World War. It became a founding member of 
the UNO, of the OEEC, of the Council of Europe, and of NATO. The principles of 
Luxembourg‘s foreign policy are multilateralism, the rule of law and solidarity. 
Traditionally, the explanations for Luxembourg‘s commitment to further integration relate 
to its status as a small state in a dangerous and unstable international environment.
79
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Luxembourg was one of the six founding member states of the European Coal and Steel 
Community and of the European Economic Community. It was clear from the start that the 
country had no option but to become a full and participating equal member in any 
integration process after the survival of the country had been threatened so many times 
since its independence. Frentz goes so far as to state that ―for Luxembourg relational 
smallness is a raison d‘être of EU membership.‖80  
 
However, there are also responsibilities that come with EU membership; namely to 
negotiate agreements and to comply with EU legislation. Peter Katzenstein argued that the 
disadvantage for big states is greater coordination problems at the domestic level.  
―In other words, diverse national interests make it more difficult for large states to 
act from a domestic generally agreed stand-point. Regardless of size, domestic 
coordination and consensus-building affects influence capacity for all states.‖81  
Luxembourg only becomes active in negotiations when its domestic interests are being 
discussed. Because of its small administration and diplomatic service, the efforts of foreign 
policy are mostly concentrated on the EU level. Luxembourg does not even have its own 
embassy or consulate in most EU member states, but is represented either by Belgium or 
the Netherlands. Even then its officials are not able to attend every meeting in Brussels. 
Because the resources are scarce, Luxembourg has to select carefully in which issues to 
invest its resources. Luxembourg has a very small administration numerically compared to 
other member states, but in terms of the percentage of people working in public 
administration, it is very high.  
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Table 2.6.: The size of public administration in EU member states 
 
state Population in 
millions 
Size of public 
administration 
Percentage of people 
working in admin. 
compared to total 
pop. 
Luxembourg 0.4 18.934 (2001) 21.09 % 
Cyprus 0.8 32.069 (2000) n/a 
Malta 0.4 30.839 (2001) n/a 
Netherlands 16 n/a 12.2% (1999) 
Germany 82 n/a 12.3% (1999) 
Source: Das politische System Luxemburgs. Eine Einführung
 82
 
 
Panke has demonstrated that Luxembourg is nevertheless one of the most active 
governments, preceded only by Denmark. Its most frequent strategy is institutionalised 
coordination, followed by bilateral partnerships to big countries.
83
 By institutionalised 
coordination, she refers to the Benelux cooperation. This shows the centrality of its strategy 
of building alliances. It does not come as a surprise that Luxembourg seeks partnerships to 
big countries if we refer back to the above section on the frequency of visits to and from 
France and Germany. Fretz has also noted an increase of partnerships with those two 
countries since Juncker became Prime Minister, while at times it opposes the Netherlands.
84
  
 
It also prioritises issues:  
―It has developed a pick-and-choose approach. In general, representatives of 
Luxembourg will attend a working group only when ‗interesting dossiers‘ are on the 
agenda. (this does not apply to COREPER where all member states are present all 
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the time.) When national interests are threatened, Luxembourg has a very firm 
position that it will not allow to be watered down because it is a small state.‖85  
Luxembourg‘s governments and its diplomats have a reputation of being good, honest 
brokers and mediators- a quality often attributed to negotiators from small states because of 
the scarcity of their national interests.
86
  
 
Defending Luxembourg‘s economic interests often coincided with the goal of furthering 
EU integration over the past fifty years. The promise of open markets and no tariffs suited a 
small export-led economy perfectly, as most of Luxembourg‘s exports are geared towards 
neighbouring France, Belgium or Germany. Concerning the European Union more 
specifically, there are several objectives: the strengthening of the Commission, the 
continued use of the Community method, and being open to alliances.
87
 Luxembourg is, in 
principle, in favour of strengthening the Commission‘s prerogatives and competences: 
―Luxembourg trusts that the Commission as the ‗guardian of the treaties‘ and with its ‗right 
of initiative‘ will facilitate a fair balance of interests between large and small members.‖88 
The Commission has not only been described as the guardian of the Treaties, but also as 
‗the best friend of small states‘.89 Furthermore, Luxembourg staunchly believes in the 
Community method and advocates its continued use.
90
 The following rules of thumb apply 
as guide to EU policy: that only the Commission has the right of initiative, a widespread 
use of qualified majority voting in the Council, an active role for the European Parliament 
and uniform interpretation of Community law by the Court of Justice.
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2.5. Objective: to keep on punching above one‟s weight 
 
Although it is still overrepresented, the proportion of Luxembourg‘s weight in the total 
number of votes has steadily declined with successive enlargements. This phenomenon is 
not unique to Luxembourg: after every enlargement, each member state has lost voting 
weight and some of the bigger member states have always been and still are 
underrepresented. At the beginning of the EEC, Luxembourg had one vote out of 17 
available (around 6 percent of the total votes), while Germany, France and Italy each had 
almost 25 percent of the total votes. In an EU of 15, they had 11.5 percent of the total votes 
and 7.5 percent under Nice in an EU of 27.
91
 Therefore, successive enlargements can 
potentially ―jeopardise its protected status and limit room for special arrangements that suit 
the country.‖92 
 
Luxembourg seeks to maintain the balance between big and small member states in the EU 
institutions. Concretely, that would be the case if Benelux had the same voting weight as 
any of the big member states. Under the Treaty of Nice, that was achieved- the Benelux 
have combined 29 votes, just like France or Germany. Finally, Luxembourg had fiercely 
fought against a rotation of Commissioners, which it eventually lost during the negotiations 
of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Luxembourg‘s political system is characterised by the following attributes: budgetary 
discipline, political stability, small politics, consensual decision-making and institutional 
corporatism. Furthermore, it has a highly supportive relationship with the EU and is very 
selective in the way it acts on the European stage. A high performing economy and 
budgetary discipline have led to Luxembourg‘s status as one of the richest countries in the 
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world. Political stability and long-serving ministers have been conducive to having 
experienced politicians representing Luxembourg effectively in the EU. Furthermore, the 
number of ministerial departments usually exceeds the number of government members- 
which leads to better knowledge of transversal issues. Hirsch pointedly states ―unlike its 
bigger partners, a small country cannot afford the luxury of changing its key political 
personnel continuously.‖93  
 
Luxembourg is still a small, stable, wealthy and harmonious country, all of which makes it 
―easier to achieve national consensus in the policy-making process.‖94 However many 
experts warn that several important challenges lie in the not so distant future which, if not 
tackled, could shake these foundations: the integration and even the assimilation of non- 
national residents is becoming an acute issue for the state. The dependence of frontier 
workers in the overall economy and the fact that most citizens would rather work in the 
public administration than in the private sector is not a problem as such, but could generate 
a culture in which citizens work for the state, while ‗foreigners‘ dominate the economy. 
Like many other European countries, Luxembourg will have trouble paying for its generous 
pension schemes and social security and lose its competitiveness on the international 
stage.
95
 Furthermore, the fact that banking secrecy will slowly phase out and information 
will be shared from 2015 onwards is a big challenge for Luxembourg‘s financial centre. 
While Luxembourg has ventured into the hedge funds market, the financial crisis and 
current proposals for further regulation by the EU mean that the government cannot afford 
to stand by and be idle. In sum, the current and the future government have to be proactive 
in order for the country‘s residents, its society, economy and political system to ―stay as 
they are‖, as one of the great songs of national pride, ‗de Feierwon‘ by Michel Lentz, goes. 
Pursuing the current ―politics of the small steps‖ may prove to be ineffective.96  
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The geographical space that Luxembourg occupies within Europe conditions its identity, its 
relations and ultimately its policy effectiveness. Its strategy is to be increasingly active on 
specific issues, to form alliances both in the framework of the Benelux and with its two big 
neighbours, in order to remain an over-equal member state in the enlarged EU.
97
 The 
various Luxembourg governments have often acted as skilled mediators between the other 
member states in negotiations. Its once potentially dangerous geographical location 
between France and Germany and the resulting trilingual peculiarity of its culture and 
society have turned into a considerable advantage in the EU context for assuming the role 
of translator and even broker in Franco-German relations. Luxembourg‘s policy style is 
characterised by a permanent search for consensus and therefore willingness to 
compromise.  
―In Thorn‘s view, leaders of small countries had their use, particularly in the 
European set-up, as honest brokers: fluent in languages and able to interpret the 
different cultures, idioms and sensibilities of their colleagues because their own 
culture overlapped frontiers.‖98  
Indeed, the culture of consensus and corporatism provide the government with an excellent 
training ground for developing the skills of a mediator, of searching for compromises and 
of developing an attitude of constructive bargaining. The objective to ‗stay what we are‘ is 
deeply ingrained in the minds in Luxembourg. Considering how overrepresented the 
country is, it comes as no surprise that Luxembourg wants to remain an ―over-equal 
member state of the EU.‖99 I would argue that there is no contradiction between the goals 
of compromise and being overrepresented; instead I would argue that one can only look for 
compromise if one feels valued and respected in the first place. Before turning to the 
framework on member state policy effectiveness in the EU, we shall investigate the 
literature up to date on how member states can get their preferences included in EU 
legislation.  
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Chapter 3: Member state policy effectiveness 
 
 
1. Member state power in the EU: how should it be defined? 
 
The question of how governments can be powerful or policy effective in the European 
Union‘s institutions over time has always attracted attention, but there is as yet no 
agreement on how to conceptualise or operationalise this variable. Max Weber‘s definition 
of power- the possibility to realize one‘s will even against the resistance of others- is still 
popular, but many scholars apply and analyse this concept in very different ways.
100
 
Intergovernmental explanations of European integration have postulated that national 
governments retain the power in the EU when it comes to decision-making and integration 
in general. However, how to measure power is contested:  
―Intergovernmental explanations often speak of Germany, France or Britain as 
‗powerful‘ or ‗influential‘ in negotiations, but such claims are rarely demonstrated 
by specifying what resources convey ‗power‘ or which outcomes demonstrate that 
one country has been influential.‖101   
We shall look at the different studies of power or similar concepts in turn and discuss if 
they could be applied to the present research. 
 
As Helen Wallace states,  
―there are no agreed definitions of the forms of influence- or power- available 
within the EU and the ways these are exercised, nor of how to measure their 
impacts.‖102  
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Even the terminology to describe largely the same thing differs: some talk about power or 
more specifically bargaining power, others about influence or negotiation success, still 
others about leadership. There are several reasons why none of these concepts are used in 
the context of this research, which are addressed as the definitions come along. 
 
Influence is often used as a synonym for power in pluralist approaches, as in Dahl‘s Who 
governs? Dahl first defines power or influence as ―A has power over B to the extent that he 
can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do.‖ 103 Lukes notes that  
―a little later in the same article he describes his ‗intuitive view of the power 
relation slightly differently: it seems, he writes, ―to involve a successful attempt by 
A to get B to do something he would not otherwise do. Note that the first statement 
refers to A‘s capacity (‗...to the extent that he can get B to do something...‘) while 
the second specifies a successful attempt- this, of course being the difference 
between potential and actual power, between its possession and its exercise. It is the 
latter- the exercise of power- which is central to this view of power.‖104  
This distinction seems quite useful and is replicated in the definition of this thesis, where 
the focus is on the exercise. Baillie‘s study on small state influence describes influence as 
―the desired effect on outcomes in which it has an interest.‖105  
 
Barry has tried to disentangle the relation between having power and getting the outcomes a 
government wants. He defines success as the probability of getting the outcome you want, 
and that success = luck + decisiveness.
106
  
―Luck is the probability of getting what you want without trying and decisiveness is 
the increase in the probability of getting what you want that occurs if you try. Power 
cannot be defined directly in terms of any of these because it is a capability rather 
than a probability. An actor has more power the greater the range of unfavourable 
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distributions of preferences within which he is decisive, in other words the more 
opposition he can overcome.‖107 
Closely associated to luck is the concept of free rider: ―provided your policy preferences 
are like those of people have power you will finish up with no less than they get, even 
though you have done nothing to bring about the outcomes that are mutually desired.‖108  
These statements throw up some very interesting questions. It is clear that this definition of 
success relates to getting what one wants, and that power is something inherent to the actor 
in question. Secondly, the distinction between luck and decisiveness is useful in the sense 
that there is an emphasis on the actions of an actor. The free rider concept emphasises the 
importance of the other actors‘ preferences and how the actor in question can be positioned 
in relation to them. It also underlines the importance of actor coalitions, and that success 
can be contingent upon other actors‘ preferences.  
 
State power is a classic concept of International Relations, where the notion of interest in 
the outcome and inter alia, the salience of an issue is taken into account. The natural 
sources of power are geographic size and position, natural resources and population. Power 
can also be measured by the level of industrial development, or in terms of GDP output.
109
  
Intangible sources, such as national image, public support, or ‗leadership‘ can increase or 
diminish a state‘s power. Nye defines state power in international relations: 
―power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want. One can 
affect others‘ behavior in three main ways: threats of coercion (―sticks‖), 
inducements and payments (―carrots‖), and attraction that makes others want what 
you want.‖110  
This last aspect of power is called soft power and he argues it stems from three resources: 
culture (which can be attractive to others), political values and foreign policy.
111
 However, 
it is debatable whether the distinction between hard and soft power is of much use in the 
daily policy-making process of the EU.  
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The difficulties with applying any International Relations definition of state power to the 
context of EU negotiations are several, ranging from effectively excluding some states to 
undervaluing the importance of the unique decision-making procedures in the EU. Firstly, 
actors are classified according to their size. This implies that the bigger the state‘s 
resources, the more power it has. State power is relatively static in terms of the traditional 
(economic) indicators in which it is measured. This approach does not consider small states 
to be able to be policy effective at all. A different approach looks at case studies of small 
states, who often conclude that small states are not necessarily weak or powerless in 
specific issues.
112
 This does not take into account the unique decision-making processes or 
the norms and values that are applied in the EU. The European Commission as agenda 
setter for legislation, and the enforcement mechanism operated by the European Court of 
Justice, make the EU fundamentally different to other international organisations where 
states negotiate freely. These definitions of power ignore the reality of the ―multilayered 
EU negotiating system: ‗interaction‘ and ‗coordination‘.‖113 Because a substantial part of 
sovereignty is vested in EU institutions, states  
―have lost most of their ‗freedom to decide‘ in negotiating certain issues. In other 
words, ‗best alternatives to negotiated agreements‘ (BATNAs) are often absent: if 
matters are on the agenda, then the alternative of non-negotiation is no longer 
present. Here ‗classic‘ theories do not hold, and only active pre-negotiation can 
provide states with something like a BATNA instrument. But even this is hardly 
true anymore.‖114  
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Beach and Mazzucelli have produced a comprehensive account of which EU institutions or 
member states played a ‗leadership role‘ in the ‗big bangs of European integration‘. They 
define leadership as  
―any action undertaken by an actor in order to attempt to solve collective action 
problems through the use of leadership resources (..) and as any action by one actor 
to guide or direct the behaviour of certain other actors (be they the whole group or 
only a smaller coalition) toward a certain collective goal.‖115  
Their study contributes to existing research in that it takes into account the fact that 
institutions such as the Council Secretariat could also influence constitutional negotiations. 
Furthermore they found that it mattered who provided leadership in Treaty negotiations for 
the efficiency and the distribution of gains in the final agreements. Leadership as defined 
by Beach and Mazzucelli is a concept which is not specifically including national 
preferences and policy objectives; instead the goal is to ―solve collective action 
problems.‖116 Solving a collective action problem however does not tell us whether a 
member state was able to get what it wanted. A government can decide to provide 
leadership for forging a consensus (to advance the common interest); it does not follow 
from this that it managed to include its policy preferences in the final agreement. It may 
have been overruled by the other member states‘ extreme preferences, or it may not have 
found enough allies for a blocking minority. While their theory of leadership can be applied 
to any EU institution and also to a specific member state, it does not aim specifically to be a 
theory of a member state‘s policy effectiveness or one that can explain European 
integration. 
 
Tallberg meanwhile looks at the ‗bargaining power‘ of a member state in the European 
Council, which he defines as  
―the capacity of the chief executive to secure a favourable distributional outcome 
for the member state he or she represents – an agreement that as closely as possible 
reflects the interests of the particular member state.‖117  
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In this definition, the accent is on capacity of the chief negotiator on the one hand and on 
the ‗interests‘ of the member state on the other.  This definition is valuable as the final 
agreement is compared to the interests, but why should it only apply to the European 
Council and the chief executive? Furthermore, the paper does not elaborate on how the 
‗interests of the member state‘ were established and computed, and unfortunately it does 
not tell us how the eventual outcome (bargaining power) has been assessed. In the context 
of the EU, we need a more precise concept, as we are dealing with legislation. It is not only 
about relationships with other states, but about negotiations on directives or regulations 
which have direct consequences on the daily lives of the citizens.  
 
Finally, Bailer has variously used the concepts of power, bargaining power and negotiation 
success to analyse how member states get the outcomes they want in the European 
Union.
118
 In this case, negotiation success or bargaining power is an outcome, while power 
resources can lead to that outcome. Negotiation success seems to be too vague a concept as 
it refers to the outcome of negotiations. In this thesis, the focus of the analysis is on the 
final legislative outcome and not just the political agreement. We can see that there is no 
agreement on how these terms should be defined. 
 
Having presented the various definitions of power, we now review how scholars have 
measured outcomes. In this case, establishing state preferences is necessary to establish to 
what degree the member state has been policy effective. Moravcsik defines state 
preferences as  
―an ordering among underlying substantive outcomes that may result from 
international political interaction. Here it is essential- particularly given the 
inconsistency of common usage—to avoid conceptual confusion by keeping state 
‗preferences‘ distinct from national ‗strategies,‘ ‗tactics,‘ and ‗policies,‘ that is, the 
particular transient bargaining positions, negotiating demands, or policy goals that 
constitute the everyday currency of foreign policy. State preferences, as the concept 
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is employed here, comprise a set of fundamental interests defined across ‗states of 
the world.‘ By contrast, strategies and tactics—sometimes also termed ‗preferences‘ 
in game-theoretical analyses—are policy options defined across intermediate 
political aims, as when governments declare an ‗interest‘ in ‗maintaining the 
balance of power,‘ ‗containing‘ or ‗appeasing‘ an adversary, or exercising ‗global 
leadership‘. Liberal theory focuses on the ―consequences for state behavior of shifts 
in fundamental preferences, not shifts in the strategic circumstances under which 
states pursue them.‖119  
 
Firstly, Moravcsik is right to underline the importance of establishing what the state 
preferences are in a particular area. Secondly, it is constructive to distinguish between 
preferences and strategies, as they are not the same thing. However, those ‗shifts in the 
strategic circumstances‘ cannot be ignored in studying the negotiation process and in 
evaluating policy effectiveness. These may impact on the negotiation strategy: for example, 
if one member state threatens to leave the negotiation table, the member state under 
scrutiny has to consider if it wants to make substantial concessions or not. These may not 
necessarily be completely in line with the state preferences. This is why negotiation 
strategies and the existing literature will be presented in more detail after presenting the 
factors which could cause policy effectiveness.  
 
A systematic step-by-step guide on how to establish whether a member state has been 
powerful, or policy effective, would be a major contribution to research in the area. This 
guide would need to consider the multi-faceted decision-making procedures in the EU, and 
consider the actors involved. The European Commission and its proposal, the different 
levels of the Council and the progress of negotiations and the potential involvement of the 
European Parliament all need to figure in such an analysis. Some scholars have studied 
intensively the European Council, where the Heads of State and Government negotiate on 
the important issues. Bailer argues that instead one should focus explicitly on negotiations 
in the Council of Ministers, which she rightly describes as more crucial for EU legislation 
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and less investigated.
120
 The present study hopefully manages to fill this gap in the research 
on policy effectiveness by taking all the different levels of the Council into account.  
 
 
2. The sources of policy effectiveness 
 
Before turning to the sources of policy effectiveness, one needs to identify when and where 
a member state has opportunities to be policy effective. The three stages of the 
development of policies are those of policy design, negotiation and implementation. 
Research variously focuses on one of these stages.
121
 Over the past decade, the focus of 
analysis has shifted from EU integration theories to the impact of the EU upon the domestic 
level through studies of ‗new governance‘ or ‗Europeanisation‘:  
―The policy-oriented literature which has developed under the banner of new 
governance has clearly been an attempt to break away from intergovernmentalism 
and to give more importance to non-state actors involved in policy networks. In 
doing so, it has probably neglected the intergovernmental dimension of EU policy-
making, which remains relevant.‖122  
 
The literature provides a series of competing explanations on the successful exercise of 
policy effectiveness. Voting power or the lack of it is the most obvious indicator of the 
chance of being policy effective. The value of such an indicator is critically discussed, as it 
is not only an indicator, but also a result of policy effectiveness; furthermore, the problems 
of computing the data are presented. Secondly and intimately linked to voting power is the 
size of the economy of the member state. Institutional power, such as holding the 
presidency, has also attracted much scholarly research, and will be briefly introduced and 
copied to a certain extent in the framework. Individual-level factors, such as personality, 
experience and expertise are much less researched, but some studies treat this indicator as 
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well. Some political scientists have investigated whether party ideology plays a role in 
European Council negotiations or other fora, or whether domestic politics favours or 
hinders policy effectiveness.  
 
2.1. Domestic politics 
 
The idea that what happens at national level can influence a government‘s capacity to 
negotiate at international level has been covered extensively. Bailer notes that  
―Schelling (1960) was among the first to illustrate the central role of strategies by 
demonstrating that the ‗voluntary sacrifice of freedom of choice‘ of a government 
leader can lead to an unexpected strength in negotiations, because negotiation 
partners might thus be forced to make concessions. There is ample evidence of this 
strategy during EU negotiations: the already traditional pleading of the French 
government for the French farmers or the British and Danish eurosceptic public 
have all successfully been used to gain concessions and exemptions for national 
interests.‖123  
Putnam has also suggested that the so-called paradox of weakness has implications for 
policy effectiveness in international negotiations.
124
 Bailer however rejects that hypothesis 
in her research stating that ―domestic constraints, measured by institutions or the 
preferences of the domestic level, are not related or associated with the power of a EU 
government.‖125 Domestic constraints can however shape the bargaining behaviour, the 
strategy of the government in EU negotiations. Moravcsik finds that domestic politics is an 
important element in determining member states‘ behaviour. Indeed, domestic politics 
shape the preferences of the state in the first place- so in order to find out what the 
government wants, we need to analyse the domestic level.
126
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An influential study by Simon Bulmer provides a framework for analysing the behaviour of 
member states and how it affects EU policy-making. The basic unit of analysis is the 
member state. He argues that the relationships between domestic politics and EU policy-
making can be linked to the policy-making structure and the attitude towards the EU in the 
member states. The concept of policy style is defined as  
―the interaction between (a) the government‘s approach to policy-making and (b) 
the relationship between the government and other actors in the policy process.‖127  
The scale of differing policy styles could range from a coherent, single policy on one end to 
a sectorised European policy at the other. Differing national policy environments shape the 
way in which a minister can negotiate at the EU level, be it by taking into account other 
societal actors or sub-national actors. The concept of policy style is a means to ―structure 
the examination of a member state‘s behaviour in the EC.‖128 Bulmer recognises that the 
complexity of his approach make it a burdensome one for analysing policy-making from an 
EU perspective.
129
 However, this does not mean that an approach should be discarded, but 
only that it needs to be simplified. Heipertz and Verdun argue that there is  
―no neat automaticity or continuity of domestic influences on the European 
integration process. One of the few regular phenomena that to some extent structure 
domestic issues is the national election cycle, which, in some cases, can become 
crucial for explaining government behaviour at the European level.‖130  
Hence, a case by case study is necessary in order to generate further data on the influence 
of domestic politics.   
 
Some aspects of this approach are very useful for the research design of the framework 
employed in this thesis. In a sense, it acknowledges and internalises Bulmer‘s statement 
that member states significantly shape the integration, and builds on his approach by trying 
to find the link between domestic politics and policy effectiveness. Like Bulmer‘s, this 
approach not only focuses on factors which favour or impede policy effectiveness at the 
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European level, but also looks at factors which play a role at the lower tier- the domestic 
politics level. Thus, certain elements of his approach are incorporated into the framework 
of this case study research: the importance of the policy style and the differing domestic 
policy environments have to be taken into account in Luxembourg‘s negotiation strategy. 
Furthermore, a description of the domestic policy environments within the member states 
provides important clues in explaining the outcomes of these interdependent negotiations.  
 
Of course, some aspects of Bulmer‘s approach have to be cast aside for the purpose of this 
study. The attitude towards European integration may be a necessary factor in explaining 
why certain member states were in favour of a particular decision, but it is doubtful whether 
a pro- or anti-European stance affects policy effectiveness. Indeed, it may condition the 
negotiation strategy, but it may not necessarily determine whether a member state is policy 
effective. Furthermore, Bulmer and Lequesne consider the implementation phase and the 
effect of the EU on national institutions and policies.
131
 The implementation of policies is 
disregarded in this approach because it is a phase which does not give us any indications of 
whether a member state was policy effective or not. Instead, it only demonstrates how 
member states adapt to the domestic sphere what has been decided at the European level. 
Furthermore, the implementation phase can only be analysed in case studies of directives, 
not in the case of regulations. The Europeanisation of the dimensions, the mechanisms and 
outcomes of domestic change is left out as well; again because it is of little analytical value 
in terms of policy effectiveness- after all it purports to account for the impact of Europe on 
the member state.
132
  
 
2.2. Voting power  
 
Because the voting weights of member states are not equal in EU institutions, voting power 
is one of the most dominant explanations of power in the EU. Voting power can be 
measured by calculating the expected power of a member state by the number of votes it 
holds in majority voting situations.  
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―The number of votes of a negotiator influences his probability to be the last 
necessary state to form a blocking minority in the qualified voting system or to 
build a winning coalition.‖133  
The assumption is that more votes confer more power. When voting weights are discussed 
during Treaty negotiations, population is often invoked as an indicator to determine them.  
―However, the vote distribution within the European Union also shows that not only 
measurable resources such as population play a role when distributing votes but also 
that norms like the protection of small states need to be considered in order to 
explain an overproportionally high share of votes of countries like Luxembourg.‖134 
 
Jonathan Slapin, in his quantitative analysis of who is powerful during the negotiations of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, provides some very interesting findings.
135
 He tests the following 
five hypotheses: all member states are equal; large member states have more power than 
small states; member states with ratification pivots sceptical of EU integration are more 
powerful than all other actors; member states whose preferences are closer to the status quo 
are more powerful and informal agenda-setting confers power to supranational actors. His 
findings are that not all members have equal power and that size does not matter in 
negotiations- indeed large member states do not have more bargaining strength than the 
average member state; instead domestic ratification constraints seem to confer power. 
―States preferring less integration appear to outperform states desiring more integration. 
Supranational actors, as expected, have little power.‖ 136 Denmark, Austria and Sweden are 
the most powerful members, while Germany is not very powerful and Italy has least power 
in influencing outcomes. Member states which are close to the status quo and member 
states that experience domestic constraints are more powerful than others. Neither the 
Commission nor the EP is powerful in the negotiations, although his data is limited to the 
negotiations themselves, so preparatory work before the IGC is not included. His analysis 
has, as he himself is ready to admit, two important drawbacks: he assumes that all issues 
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included in the treaty were of the same salience to all the member states, and he cannot 
account for logrolling across issues.  
 
Hosli, using the Shapley-Shubik Index, finds that the shares in overall voting power differ 
when members act individually, or within ‗voting blocs‘.137 Depending on which countries 
form a bloc, their voting power increases or stays stable. If countries such as the Benelux 
vote together, as a collectivity they do not win by forming an alliance alone.  
―The axis Paris-Bonn, however, gave Germany and France a higher share in voting 
power than they would have combined individually. More strikingly, when these 
two countries together are assumed to hold an (informal) veto within the Council of 
the EU, their individual share in relative voting power in the present constellation of 
members, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik Index, is about twice the power of 
other states with 10 votes (the UK and Italy).‖138 
 
There have been a multitude of quantitative studies on Council decision-making, especially 
on Treaty negotiations. It would be far too time-consuming to present them all, even if their 
results differ widely.
139
 One considerable obstacle to the analysis of voting has been the 
fact that most Council decisions were taken by consensus, leaving explicit voting a very 
rare procedure, as Hayes-Renshaw et al. point out.
140
 Indeed, data on voting has only been 
available since 1994, while for the period from 1994-1998, detailed data on QMV were not 
available. 30% of the decisions were taken under unanimity procedure, while 75 to 80% of 
QMV decisions were not explicitly contested at the Ministerial level. The data set was thus 
indeed very small, as only 20 to 25% of the decisions taken were explicitly contested. 
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While this is a useful first step in the analysis of policy effectiveness, it fails to produce a 
comprehensive picture due to the consensual decision-making in the Council of Ministers.  
 
Hayes-Renshaw, Van Aken and Wallace argue that consensus is the norm:  
―ministers generally endorse collective decisions by consensus, even in those cases 
(some 70 per cent of the total) where they could activate qualified majority voting. 
To the extent that voting takes place in these latter cases, it occurs implicitly rather 
than explicitly, operates mostly at the level of officials rather than ministers, and is 
not recorded systematically in publicly accessible form.‖141  
Furthermore, the majority of the decisions over three months in 2004 were taken without 
discussion in the Council of Ministers, which means that they have all been agreed at a 
lower level. Member states vote explicitly in order to indicate either to the other member 
states or to their domestic constituencies that they have some concerns about the decision, 
even if there is no blocking minority. However, the votes in the Council were made public 
in 2006, so it is finally possible to conduct some major research in this area.  
 
Another major problem with quantitative studies is that they do not take into account the 
policy preferences of the member states or agenda-setting rights in evaluating their power 
in negotiations. While some studies on non-cooperative game theory such as Widgrén 
include them in their models, they nevertheless paint an incomplete picture of the result of 
negotiations and policy effectiveness.
142
 Firstly, some decisions are taken by unanimity- 
thus the voting weights are, theoretically at least, of little value in the analysis of the 
outcome. While practically, unanimity always carries a price and the veto is something akin 
to nuclear option, it nevertheless urges member states to find a solution acceptable to all 
before deciding to put it to the vote. The other critique is that only in depth qualitative 
studies can really establish firstly the salience of the issue and secondly the preferences of a 
member state in a given negotiation context. Furthermore, as Hayes- Renshaw et al. note:  
―Further work is needed on how the shadow of the QMV rule influences behaviour, 
whether to encourage implicit voting or to flush out where the potential blocking 
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minorities may impede an agreement. In qualitative interviews (both those 
conducted by us and those reported in case studies by others), insiders mostly 
concur that the swing factor – in particular in the working parties and senior 
committee deliberations that precede ministerial sessions — is whether there is a 
determined blocking minority. If there is, the proposal is stalled. If there is not, then 
marginal dissenters tend to switch their efforts to extracting rewards or concessions 
in return for withdrawing their opposition. An unexplored dimension here is 
whether blocking minorities are mainly construed in a mechanical and numerical 
count of votes, or whether opposition from a ‗critical proportion‘ of larger Member 
States is functionally equivalent.‖143 
 
Heisenberg argues in no uncertain terms on the use of quantitative analysis of member 
states‘ powers in the EU that  
―it may be time to admit that formal modelling of informal processes is not 
appropriate to analyse the complex and multifaceted workings of the EU.‖144  
All this does not mean however that voting power should be entirely dismissed as a 
contributor to policy effectiveness. Instead, the angle should be adjusted in the analysis. 
Instead of a quantitative assessment of the effect of the voting power or the decision-
making procedure, qualitative research could circumvent the problems identified above 
(consensual decision-making, no data on votes cast, no information on preferences, and 
taking the procedure and negotiation context into account). Interviews or expert surveys 
can help establish the degree of salience of an issue, and give information on the detailed 
preferences and also importantly, the negotiation strategy.  
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2.3. Economic weight 
 
Turning to the other elephant in the room, Wallace argues that ―economic weight also 
affects the influence that a member government can wield in the development of EU 
policies.‖145 Germany is the prime example- it is not only the largest economy, but also the 
first trade partner of all the other countries, and is one of the highest contributors to the EU 
budget. Therefore, Germany is listened to when it has concerns about trade- that is the 
assumption. Moravcsik argues that the  
―broad lines of European integration since 1955 reflect three factors: patterns of 
commercial advantage, the relative bargaining power of important governments, 
and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments. Most 
fundamental of these was the commercial interest.‖146  
Moravcsik provided the world with a valuable theory on European integration based on 
member states‘ preferences. According to him, ―bargaining power based on asymmetrical 
interdependence explains bargaining outcomes.‖147 Because the focus is on bargaining 
power based notably on the economic weight of a state, he focuses only on the ‗big‘ 
member states who are the most important in economic terms- Germany, France, the UK 
and Italy. This has been widely criticized and is a further drawback to using his theory as a 
foundation for an analysis of member state‘s power.148  
 
Both qualitative (by Tallberg) and quantitative studies (by Bailer) find a positive correlation 
between economic power and EU negotiations. Tallberg finds firstly that the main factor of 
power in the European Council is aggregate structural power, defined by its territory, 
population, economic strength, military, capabilities, stability in the political system, 
administrative capacity, and secondly issue-specific power, defined by its resources, 
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commitment and alternatives in a particular area.
149
 As in the context of voting power, it is 
assumed that more economic power resources result in more power in EU negotiations. But 
Council negotiations do not facilitate an exchange of power resources, as they are divided 
into different policy areas. Bailer divides the concept of power into exogenous resources 
and endogenous dimensions.
150
 Voting and economic power (GNP value) are not the only 
factors experts considered in her study when judging the power of the governments in EU 
negotiations. Germany is judged to be less powerful than the UK. She then includes skill 
and information as well and finds that there is a North-South distinction, with Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands being considered in general more powerful than Greece 
or Portugal or even Italy.  
―The results also show that the first dimension comprising the exogenous power 
resources is by far the more dominant one. The second dimension explains a lot less 
than the economic power or the voting power of the EU member states. 
Nonetheless, the second dimension which considers more psychological and 
behavioural negotiation aspects adds a quality of negotiators which would be 
ignored by merely looking at votes or economic size.‖151 
Along the same lines, Beach and Mazzucelli argue that material leadership resources (such 
as ―material wealth or the ability to change other actors‘ dependence upon an agreement‖) 
are vital in providing leadership in negotiations.
152
  
 
However, while Tallberg argues that aggregate structural power is central to bargaining 
power in the EU, he also concluded that there are exceptions: ―even in this 
intergovernmental forum, strong states do not always prevail and weak states do not always 
suffer.‖153 Rostoks argues along the same lines that  
―various aspects of power may be disconnected from each other, and state 
capabilities may vary depending on which elements of power are under 
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consideration. Military power may transform into economic power, but it doesn‘t 
have to. Economic power cannot be regarded as a given that can be used by the state 
to advance its interests. Economics, more often than not, is an autonomous sphere 
that is beyond direct state control and acts according to its own logic. Private 
businesses act as profit-seeking actors, and using them as instruments for enhancing 
state power may create adverse consequences both for the company and the 
state.‖154 
 
One of the fundamental problems with using economic indicators is that ―the analysis of 
voting power versus economic size also suffers from the fact that these two concepts are so 
strongly correlated that it is difficult to distinguish them in practice.‖155 Furthermore, 
―endogenous power resources are necessary to translate votes or economic strength into 
power and to make them effective.‖156 It could therefore be argued that for the sake of 
parsimony, voting and economic power could be conceptualized in a different way. If we 
look at the decision-making procedure, voting power and economic size are inherent in the 
conceptualization of such a variable. Furthermore, it would make more sense to look at 
whether the preferences of the member states are widely distributed or not, and whether 
these preferences are intense or not. This would give a better indication on whether a big or 
a small member state needs to put all its weight behind a certain proposal or not; after all, if 
France, the UK and Germany do not have strong, intense preferences on a Commission 
proposal, they will not waste their resources and will be more inclined to make concessions 
to a state which has intense and extreme preferences due to domestic constraints.  While 
such a strategy complicates the analysis considerably, it nevertheless should provide a 
better explanation of policy effectiveness. On the other hand, if the biggest and strongest 
member states have intense and extreme preferences, it would impact negatively on the 
policy effectiveness of other states. By using these two different ways of measuring both 
economic size and voting power through 1) the decision-making procedure and 2) the 
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distribution and intensity of preferences within the Council, the framework is more 
parsimonious and at the same time more complete.  
 
2.4. Institutional power  
 
Scholars have also focused on the institution of the presidency of the Council of the 
European Union as a factor which gives a member state an additional and temporary 
resource to exercise power.
157
 Every six months, a different member state has the 
opportunity to lead the Council of the EU. It was created as a response to the increasing 
complexity of issues presented to the member states and to the increasing mistrust of the 
Commission as leader of the negotiations. The member state that holds the presidency is 
expected to be a business manager, a mediator, a political leader and the external and 
internal representative. These should be exercised in an impartial, effective and efficient 
manner.
158
 Quaglia and Moxon-Browne have undertaken a comparative case study of 
Italy‘s and Ireland‘s presidencies of 2003 and 2004. They argue that the roles of business 
manager and mediator have become more important since the enlargement, and the 
opportunity for showing political leadership has diminished. They find that  
―intangible assets, such as knowledge of EU affairs (process expertise, content 
expertise and information); political credibility and reputation; and general attitudes 
towards European integration, are crucial in performing the roles of president-in-
office effectively and legitimately.‖159  
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Holding the presidency presents a country with two important power resources: 
asymmetrical access to information and asymmetrical control over the negotiation 
procedure. ―Within the EU, the presidency is expected to be the liaison point for EU 
institutions and national governments and other political authorities.‖160 
 
The presidency is also a platform for political influence. It manages the agenda, permitting 
to assign priority to competing political concerns.
161
 The brokering of intergovernmental 
agreements permits EU presidencies to select from multiple equilibria and steer 
negotiations towards outcomes they privately prefer. Tallberg found that institutional power 
factors, such as the threat of veto and the control of the presidency matter as well but are of 
secondary importance. Tallberg‘s proposed theory is very interesting and is worth further 
investigation and research. The fact that he restricts it to the European Council is not 
readily understandable, since at first sight it could easily be applied to the Council of 
Ministers as well.  
 
Elgstrom finds that small countries tend to make more successful presidencies than large 
ones.
162
 This is so because small countries have fewer interests to defend, and thus are more 
likely to act as impartial mediators than bigger states. The small size of their public 
administration also induces a close collaboration with the General Secretariat, and to a 
lesser extent the Commission. They are also more likely to search for consensus, as they are 
more aware of national sensitivities and are less likely to undertake unilateral initiatives.
163
 
This strand of the literature serves as one of the bases of the present thesis, and some 
elements are further put to the test here, albeit sometimes in slightly altered form. These 
are: issue-specific power and institutional sources of power (the power of the veto and the 
presidency, the participation by supranational actors).  
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2.5. Individual-level factors 
 
―Too often it is the structures of EU negotiations that are emphasised in studies, 
which strengthens the tendency to underestimate the influence of individuals and 
social processes on their outcome.‖164  
 
Individual-level factors are difficult to measure, to categorise and to generalise; this is 
probably one of the reasons why they are often mentioned, but never presented in a 
systematic way. Instead, anecdotal evidence abounds in those works who mention the 
importance of individuals, their ‗charisma‘, their cunning, their ‗reputation‘ or their 
clumsiness.
165
  
 
Wallace notes a catalogue of factors of member states‘ power in the EU and argues 
interestingly that social and economic practice and the ability to deploy arguments 
grounded in observable practice confer an advantage.
166
 Persuasive ideas are also a means 
of power, as many of the principles of EU jurisprudence are borrowings from the 
experience of one member state. She further argues that due to the consensus-seeking 
culture in the institutions compelling demands on critical issues of domestic concern are 
usually met with accommodating decisions. Bailer also notes that the level of negotiation 
skill of a diplomatic delegations matters in terms of policy effectiveness:  
―Negotiation skill describes a ‗party‘s virtuosity in the bargaining process, its skill 
in making threats, commitments, or concessions, in deception or clarification, in 
gaining information about the opponent‘.‖167  
This seems plausible and will be investigated further in this thesis.  
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Beach and Mazzuccelli suggest that reputation can also increase leadership. This reputation 
would be based on recognition of the utility of the actor‘s contributions, the legitimacy 
and/or reputation of the actor. They distinguish between the acceptability and the neutrality 
of an actor, arguing that sometimes a mediator who does have certain definite preferences 
can nevertheless be accepted to broker a deal.
168
 Tallberg also includes individual-level 
factors, which he defines by the personality and personal authority, the level of expertise 
and standing in domestic politics of the chief negotiator. Individual level factors do not 
exclusively play a role at the highest levels, such as the European Council, but can also 
matter in COREPER.
169
  
 
Recently, Panke has argued that: 
―states can influence in EU negotiations through three mechanisms: (1) they can use 
explicit or implicit threats in order to push for concessions (bargaining power); (2) 
they can seek to convince others to change preferences in the wake of compelling 
claims (argumentative power); and (3) they can use their reputation or draw on the 
reputation of others to pursue their self-interests (power of reputation). Bargaining, 
arguing and reputation-based influence differ not so much in the associated speech 
acts, but in the underlying mechanisms that cause other actors to adapt their 
preferences. Positional adaptations can be based on threats (bargaining), on high 
quality arguments (arguing), or on the reputation of a speaker qua institutional 
affiliation (such as a particular office or belonging to a certain state; reputational 
power). Reputational power is related to argumentative power since it influences 
whether other actors will adapt their preferences in the wake of a compelling 
argument. Yet it is not the same as argumentative power, since the acceptance of 
claims is not based on the quality of arguments, but on the reputation of the speaker. 
It is also related to bargaining power, since reputation also influences whether 
addressees adapt their preferences in the wake of threats. Yet reputational power is 
not the same as bargaining power, since addressees do not adapt their initial 
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preferences owing to the size of the threat, but owing to the reputation of the 
initiator on carrying out the issued threats.‖170 
These different dimensions of power are all related to various extents to individual-level 
characteristics and are in need of simplification. However, it is useful to distinguish 
between bargaining power and reputational power. This avenue of investigation needs to be 
explored further. 
 
While most researchers such as Tallberg, Wallace and Beach and Mazzucelli focus on the 
higher levels, officials in the COREPER and national experts in the working groups should 
also be considered. After all, they do negotiate as well and take decisions which will 
become EU legislation. This is why individuals and their resources (expertise, experience 
and longevity) are considered in this thesis as influencing policy effectiveness. 
 
 
2.6. Party coalitions and alliances at the European level 
 
―Christian Democratic parties have been more closely associated with the founding 
of the European Union than any other party family. Each of the countries that joined 
the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) and the European Economic 
Community (1958) had influential or governing Christian Democratic parties, and 
all but one of the countries where such parties were strong (Austria) were part of the 
integration process.‖171  
It is therefore possible that parties and party ideologies matter in the European integration 
process, as Aspinwall has concluded in his study of the European Council. Hix tests 
whether party competition has an impact on the European Parliament‘s legislative 
behaviour and finds that  
―legislative behaviour in the EP is mainly along left—right lines, transnational party 
group affiliation is more important than national affiliation for determining how 
MEPs vote, different majority-commanding coalitions form on different issues, and 
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the difference between the simple majority and absolute majority rules has no effect 
on the voting behaviour of the two main party groups.‖172  
It is a reasonable proposition to suggest that even in the Council of Ministers, party 
ideology matters and ministers are more likely to have the same visions as their party 
political counterparts from other member states, and thus find it easier to form coalitions 
with those than with others.  
 
Hix has also studied the EU political space and identifies two dimensions: an Integration-
Independence dimension, coming from the different identities and interests of national and 
territorial groups and a Left-Right dimension, emerging from the different interests of 
socio-economic groups.
173
 Mattila has found that left-wing governments tend to vote less 
against the Council majority than right-wing governments, but that it matters more where 
the government stands on the independence versus integration dimension.
174
 Tallberg 
proposes coalition building in the European Council as a strategy for pooling power 
through three layers of cooperation: country groupings, party networks, and issue 
coalitions.
175
 A subsequent article in collaboration with Johansson on the impact of party 
politics in the European Council in two broad case studies however establishes that 
―negotiations along party divides are relatively rare in the European Council, where issue-
specific, interest-based coalitions constitute the most prevalent form of actor alignment.‖176 
But two case studies are not enough to disconfirm this hypothesis, and therefore the 
hypothesis that the more member state governments belong to the same party family as the 
government studied, the more likely it is policy effective cannot be entirely disregarded.  
 
Aspinwall has found that left-right ideology and financial transfers from the European 
Union to member states can explain government support for European integration in the 
Council of Ministers from 1994 to 1999. During the negotiations of the Treaty of 
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Amsterdam, he found that experience in the Second World War and financial transfers 
explained why governments chose cooperation within the EU.
177
 This reinforces the idea 
that party alliances between individuals and coalitions within the Council based on parties 
are worth further investigation.  
 
2.7. The negotiation strategy 
 
Having established what the literature considers as state power in negotiations and the 
resources a government may use to get what it wants, we turn to the strategies, an 
understanding of which, some claim, is essential to any explanation of the outcomes of 
negotiations.
178
 They can vary depending on the institutional context in which negotiations 
are carried out, the phase of the negotiation, on the level at which negotiations take place, 
and on the issue under consideration.
179
 Zartman has divided negotiation processes into 
three phases: in the diagnostic phase actors prepare their positions and sound out the other 
actors; in the second phase they look for a formula or principle to conduct the third phase of 
negotiations, dealing with the details.
180
 Hopmann has identified two paradigms of 
negotiation as either problem solving or bargaining. Bargaining, as negotiations are often 
defined by realists, is seen as a process in which unitary actors with fixed preferences are 
competitive, issue threats and promises, and would rather not have international institutions 
involved in the implementation of agreements. The goal of the problem solving approach to 
international negotiations (- a liberal view),  
―sees obstacles to agreement arising not only because of abstract state interests but 
also because of the perceptions and interests of important political and economic 
actors within the state, so that negotiations must be sensitive to the needs of 
important domestic actors in other states.‖181 
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Constructivist scholars such as Risse argue that ―negotiators offer arguments to persuade 
others to change their thinking and agree on a course of action.‖182 When negotiators 
deliberate, they seek the most efficient and effective outcome through persuasion and are 
willing to change their preferences to achieve that goal.  
 
While much has been written on the classification of tactics, here we will look closer at the 
hard and soft bargaining tactics as discussed by Duer and Matteo. Soft bargaining is 
defined as 
―the use of friendly tactics and hard bargaining as the reliance on conflictual or 
aggressive tactics. (…)Tactics such as signalling flexibility, making a conciliatory 
statement, praising the other side, seeking partners for compromise, and making a 
proposal for compromise can be characterised as soft bargaining. Among the 
equivalent tactics on the hard bargaining side are taking an explicit stance at the 
beginning of the negotiations, making a commitment not to compromise, criticising 
the other side, forming a defensive coalition, and issuing a threat. Hard and soft 
bargaining are ends of a continuum with an infinite number of intermediary 
strategies.‖183  
 
Identifying these strategies, not only in the member state in question, but also in the 
member states who are showing an active interest in the negotiations, could help explain 
the final outcome of the negotiations, and also policy effectiveness. The effectiveness of 
these strategies depends greatly on the level of information of the others‘ actual intentions 
and bottom lines. The more information a negotiator has about the others, the fewer 
opportunities they have to act strategically.
184
 However, Duer and Matteo also argue that  
―Actors do not choose their tactics independently of the tactics chosen by others: 
they are likely to make such choices in response to or anticipation of the tactics used 
                                                          
182 Odell J. (2010) Three Islands of Knowledge about Negotiation in International Organizations. Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 17, Issue 5, p. 627 
 
183
Duer A., Matteo G., (2010) ‗Choosing a Bargaining Strategy in EU Negotiations: Power, Preferences, and 
Culture.‘ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, Issue 5 , p. 686 
184
 Thibaut, Kelley (1959) in Bailer S., (2006) ‗The Dimensions of Power in the European Union.‘ 
Comparative European Politics, Vol. 4, No.4  p. 362 
75 
by other actors in the negotiations. More precisely, actors engage in a sequential 
rather than simultaneous game, which means that they take account of the strategies 
chosen by the other actors.‖185  
 
This statement can be linked to Putnam‘s ‗two-level games‘, where he identifies both the 
national and the international level of negotiations at which preferences are formed and 
strategies developed.
186
 This has several implications for the study of policy effectiveness: 
firstly, the negotiation strategies of the most vocal member states have to be presented and 
taken into account. Secondly, if a change in negotiation tactic has been detected, it needs to 
be explained. Why does a government suddenly give in after negotiating hard for months? 
Why does a government suddenly issue threats? These questions have also implications on 
the outcome of policy effectiveness. If the member state in question moves from a hard 
bargaining stance towards a softer stance, does this indicate it ―lost the game‖? Has the 
pressure been too hard? Which factors drove this change?  
 
 
3. Small states and their policy effectiveness in the EU 
 
Musing on the power of small states in the European Union, Paul Meerts stated once that 
they  
―have the power of innocence...and the power of the mosquito. The power of 
innocence lies in the fact that they are non-threatening, which may foster a good 
atmosphere and a readiness by the bigger member state to concede more than 
necessary. The lines of communication within the small country are shorter 
(coordinative power) and the number of issues at hand might be smaller 
(transparency power) than in the big country. This will enhance the effectiveness of 
the smaller party. The smaller party might be willing to invest more, especially if a 
central priority is at stake, and could therefore be more successful in the end.‖187  
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Several authors argue that the Community method, which accommodates national concerns 
and interests and also tends to create consensus oriented outcomes, ensures that small states 
interests are considered.
188
 They juxtapose this method to formal voting, where small states 
are more easily overruled. The Community method allows a member state- which has 
intense preferences on a particular issue- to continue negotiating until its objectives have 
been met.
189
 However it could also be argued that the opposite is true for small states- that  
―while small states can demand compensation for their minority position, their 
rights are less protected under a system of consensus-decision-making than in 
voting (with the exception of very intensely held preferences).‖190  
Therefore, this aspect needs to be investigated further through case studies. 
 
Panke has analysed how small states can overcome their structural disadvantages and be 
active in EU negotiations.  
―Small states are most active in negotiations if they have non-interrupted 
administrative work environments, motivated staff, balanced systems for the 
development of national positions, and have experienced a learning curve through 
long membership durations and through holding the office of the presidency.‖ 191  
In another paper she tests whether the resources of bargaining, arguing and networking help 
small states lead to negotiation success for small states, even though they still face 
structural disadvantages which limit each of those resources. Members of COREPER and 
of working groups were asked to assess their own success in shaping and changing policies 
in three areas: environment, agriculture and economic policies.
192
 She found that the 
duration of EU membership is a significant factor, as being longer a member of the club 
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means that negotiators are more experienced in using different strategies and resources. She 
also found that overall, big states are more successful than small states, but the size is less 
significant than duration of membership. Furthermore, small states tend to prioritise their 
issues more than big states, which is compatible with many other findings.
193
 Small states 
also use less bargaining strategies and instead focus on argumentative and networking 
strategies. 
 
Baillie, in her preliminary study of Luxembourg, has put forward three factors which she 
expected to influence the desired effect on outcomes: the historical context, the institutional 
framework and conflict-avoidance negotiation behaviour.
194
 She argues that being a 
founding member, having a strategic location between France and Germany and special 
resources which determined entry conditions such as steel production were giving 
Luxembourg the opportunity to take part in the negotiations of the ECSC as a skillful and 
resourceful partner:  
―If a state finds itself in a strong position on entry as a result of particular and 
relevant circumstances or resources, it can negotiate special arrangements that place 
it in a favourable position, regardless of other factors which in theory would 
relegate it to a minor position.‖195  
Once such behaviour has been institutionalised in one area, it has implications in other 
areas. The second explanation relates to institutionalist theory, procedures and principles. 
Firstly, quasi-federalist notions of decision-making and the acquis communautaire, through 
the strength of the status quo and institutional entrenchment give a small state some 
advantages in being influential. A small public administration may make decision-making 
more efficient and effective through  
―a consensual policy style, generalists rather than specialists, personal relations and 
informal structures, natural co-ordination, limited hierarchical distances, autonomy 
of sub-units, and motivation.‖196  
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Actor-related explanations are based on negotiation theory and linked to non-competitive 
behaviour, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, low-profile approach, and the role of 
honest broker. All of these explanations are observable in the case of Luxembourg. 
However, some of them can only be applied to Luxembourg- such as historical context and 
the particular negotiation behaviour. Thus, while this theory has some interesting aspects, 
such as path dependency, it can only really be applied to older and smaller member states, 
which restricts its generalisability. The aim of the present research is to find factors which, 
derived from the case study of Luxembourg, could potentially be applied to any member 
state, big or small, old or new, pro-European or not. 
 
The small state literature provides a framework for analysis and adds a further dimension to 
the research which is relevant as many of the new member states could be qualified as 
small member states and face challenges similar to Luxembourg. Having identified both the 
advantages and challenges small states face in the European Union, with a particular focus 
on Luxembourg, we can observe that the literature still has quite an International Relations 
orientation to it. It applies some of these particular assumptions to the context of the EU, 
thereby neglecting to a certain extent the unique and complex structure of EU decision-
making and changed realities.  
One can stipulate without much controversy that the legal framework of the EU favours 
small states disproportionately, as it is not based on the principle that the largest member 
state can impose its views on the others. The underlying assumption is that size matters, but 
policy effectiveness in the European Union is not only based on the country‘s size. The 
power of a country in international relations theory is traditionally determined by its size. 
Size will indeed not be ignored by this study. It will always be in the back of our minds and 
brings certain modesty to this study. However this is not another contribution to the 
international relations‘ sub-division of the small state literature and theories. Small state 
concepts are not that easily applicable in a European Union context. The anarchy of the 
international system of states, its lawlessness, its confrontation-based negotiations and its 
realist notions of power and influence cannot be transposed to the EU‘s system. The 
weakness of small states (lack of natural and material resources, of administrative 
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capacities, of self-determination) does not preclude the basic principles of proportional 
equality and recognition of sovereignty that the European Union is based on.  
 
In this chapter, the concept of member state‘s power in the EU has been critically analysed, 
but rejected for the purposes of this research. Instead, the term policy effectiveness has 
been chosen for reasons of clarity. Moravcsik‘s contention that state preferences should 
constitute one level of analysis is a valuable one. The resources of potential power have 
also been identified and discussed, and several of those are retained for further investigation 
in this thesis. The resources that deserve particular attention are the following: the decision-
making procedure, the distribution and intensity of preferences, institutional resources such 
as holding the presidency, individual-level factors and domestic politics. Some of these will 
have to be slightly adapted to fit the dependent variable of policy effectiveness and are 
explored further in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4: The analytical framework  
 
 
1. Policy effectiveness 
 
1.1.Assumptions of this framework 
 
The previous chapter has presented the current state of the art in analysing and defining 
power and the conclusion was that it was a matter worth further investigation. This research 
is based on certain assumptions which frame the rest of the model. Measuring policy 
effectiveness in EU negotiations is a complex task. First, it is vital to establish whether the 
issue was salient for the member state in question. It seems logical that the selection of case 
studies should be based on whether the member state actually had an interest in the 
outcome at all, that the issue was affecting the member state in some way. Not every policy 
negotiated at the EU has the same political or economic impact in every member state. 
Luxembourg would have very little interest in policies to promote olive oil production, for 
example, but has a considerable interest in policies regulating financial services. On the 
other hand, policies to promote olive oil production are a very salient issue for Italy and 
Spain, and although they might be interested in policies regulating financial services, it is 
probably a less pressing concern as it is for Luxembourg.   
 
After establishing a sufficient degree of salience of a potential case study, it is necessary to 
gauge the preferences of the government. How to determine what outcome a government 
prefers is one of the core tasks of this research- only if it is clear what the government 
wants is it possible to measure the final agreement against the preferences of the 
government. Sometimes this is very easy to establish: the government makes its preferences 
public in a statement, in interviews, in publications. However, more often than not, the 
preferences are kept secret from the public and, more importantly, from the other member 
states‘ negotiators. Often governments find this strategy necessary in order to be able to 
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negotiate freely from public pressure. In that case, the only way to find out what the bottom 
lines were, is to talk directly to the participants in these negotiations.  
The term ‗policy preference‘ contains several assumptions, which influence the rest of the 
model.  
―Preferences are by definition causally independent of the strategies of other actors 
and, therefore, prior to specific interstate political interactions, including external 
threats, incentives, manipulation of information, or other tactics.‖197  
While most quantitative studies assume that preferences are fixed, Peters finds that 
―preferences are unstable and uncertain and the decision that something needs to be done 
often creates the preferences rather than vice versa.‖198 Government preferences are indeed 
fluid, albeit only to a certain extent, and adapt necessarily to the political context in which 
the negotiations take place.
199
 However, the basic premises of these preferences do not 
change; instead it could be argued that they are adapted to fit reality.  
 
Another point in question is that some policy preferences may be more important than 
others for a government.  Ranking the salience of preferences held could be considered a 
legitimate way to establish the priorities of a government. However, in the course of 
negotiations a member state may realise that it needs to readjust this ranking; if one policy 
preference is rejected outright by other member states, it may well be futile to pursue trying 
to get that preference included in the final legislation. Instead it must then focus on the 
other outcomes it would like to see included, and these become then a priority. Successive 
rounds of negotiation can also modify the zone of agreement and some issues may suddenly 
surface which were not anticipated at the start of negotiations. New proposals by other 
member states can lead the negotiations in very different directions and preferences have to 
be either created on the spot or adjusted.  
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The factors which are expected to lead to policy effectiveness can vary in intensity and 
relevance from case to case. Tallberg equally argues that bargaining power is unequally 
distributed, varies across cases, and may come in several forms.
200
 Again, Luxembourg 
may have more clout in the area of financial services than in maritime matters. It therefore 
depends on the policy area and the case selection should be conducted based on the 
(economic) salience of the issue for that member state. 
 
 
2. The concept of policy effectiveness  
 
How member states can be policy effective in EU negotiations is the central research 
question of this thesis. I propose that the concept of power should be replaced by another 
term which better reflects the context of EU decision-making. In the previous chapter, the 
various definitions of (bargaining) power, negotiation success, or influence have been 
analysed at length.
201
 Instead of talking about power of a member state, could the concept 
of policy effectiveness be more appropriate?  
 
In the context of new modes of governance, policy effectiveness is defined by Héritier as 
―the use of particular policy instruments, in such a way as to increase the chance to achieve 
the defined policy target.‖202  However, this refers not to the policy effectiveness of a 
member state in terms of getting what it wants. While it may be a little unorthodox, we can 
nevertheless tweak this definition to fit the purpose of this study. A member state‘s 
government also has certain ‗defined policy targets‘, i.e. preferences and objectives it wants 
to see included in the final legislation. A government equally has certain ‗instruments‘ 
(strategy) at its disposal which it can employ in order to see its preferences included in the 
final legislation. In simple terms, we can thus propose the following: getting the right 
policy (for the member state concerned) accepted at the EU level is being policy effective. 
Using a straightforward definition, policy effectiveness is successful exercise of a member 
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state‘s ability to get its policy preferences included in the final legislative outcome. It is the 
successful exercise of that ability which constitutes the challenge for member state 
governments.  
 
This definition focuses on the outcome of negotiations: the final legislation, as approved by 
the Council of Ministers (and sometimes also the EP in the case of co-decision or 
cooperation) and published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ). Therefore, 
one should not only look at the political agreement, but at the final legislative text- because 
member states‘ civil servants translate those political agreements into a legal text. Member 
states‘ experts can still interpret political agreements during the drafting of the legislative 
text. I would suggest the term ‗policy effectiveness‘ is preferable to ‗negotiation success‘ as 
it spells out clearly that policies are the focus of analysis, not negotiations. Furthermore, it 
has the advantage of talking about effectiveness, implying a possibility to measure the 
outcome- i.e. if a government has managed to include x amount of its preferences in the 
final legislation, it has been effective. ‗Power‘ does not seem to capture that element, but 
focuses on the ability to realise one‘s will even against the resistance of others.203 
 
The use of the term ‗member state‘ is in this case not a nod of acknowledgment to the study 
of classical international organisations- it is used here for its simplicity. Wallace suggested 
using the more specific term ―member governments‖, which makes sense as  
―much of the focus is on the Council and the European Council, including national 
preparations for Council negotiations, and on the ways in which member 
governments seek to influence what happens in other EU institutions, for example, 
by efforts to influence the work of the Commission, or of members of the European 
Parliament.‖204  
However, many of the subsequent case studies in that book referred to the member state 
itself (―Britain, France, the Benelux countries‖) or to the specific actor in question (―the 
British civil service‖, ―Mitterrand‖), so I decided to stick with the more familiar and 
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popular use of the ‗member state‘, while taking some aspects of Wallace‘s definition of the 
‗member government‘. The term designates the representatives of the member states, i.e. 
the elected serving politicians, the officials or civil servants who negotiate on behalf of the 
member state. When talking about a member state, in the context of this research, the 
government, the officials and/or civil servants are referred to. Therefore, when there is a 
reference to a member state, I refer to the whole government and its officials who are 
involved in the decision-making process: the heads of government and/or state, the 
ministers, the officials from the Permanent Representation and the members of the other 
sub- Council of Ministers formations such as the Economic and Financial Committee, the 
civil servants and experts of the working groups, who are often coming from national 
ministries.  
 
I assume that most policy preferences are relatively fixed and they are adapted to fit reality. 
However, the policy preferences of the other actors may force a member state to change its 
strategy or behaviour. As officials and ministers find out more about the positions of other 
member states, and of the limits of an emerging consensus, they have to take these into 
account when they devise and (possibly have to) adapt and change their position and 
strategy.  
―National leaders must always think systemically about their position within a 
structure composed of the preferences of other states. Since the pattern of and 
interdependence among state preferences, like the distribution of capabilities and 
the distribution of information and ideas, lies outside the control of any single state, 
it conforms to Waltz‘s own definition of systemic theory, whereby interstate 
interactions are explained by reference to ‗how [states] stand in relation to one 
another.‘ Hence the causal preeminence of state preferences does not imply that 
states always get what they want.‖205   
While the strategy or behaviour is included in the description and analysis of the case 
studies in order to make sense of changing positions, the policy preferences are primarily 
compared to the outcome in the final legislation. 
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The research process is divided into the following steps: Once the preferences of the 
member state in question are established, the Commission proposal is presented. The 
Commission proposal is an important element in the study of policy effectiveness, because 
it already delimits the innovations that are possible- including some options and excluding 
others. In some policy areas, the Commission proposal has considerable weight, but not 
that much in others- for example in matters concerning the Stability and Growth Pact its 
proposal weighs less than in Research and Development Policy. The final legislative 
outcome has to be juxtaposed to the member states‘ policy preferences, and one needs to 
establish what the similarities and the differences are in detail. 
 
What are not included in this framework are the first and the last stage of negotiations: the 
stage of policy design and the implementation phase. At the stage of the policy design the 
Commission draws on a wide range of sources in developing policy proposals. While 
Wallace argues that ―after all, one of the skills of successful negotiations is the ability to 
shape the foundations of the proposal on the table‖, in the context of this thesis the costs of 
analysing this stage would be prohibitive: the Commission draws on policy ideas not only 
from the member states‘ governments, but also from other experts of various 
organisations.
206
 Disentangling these inputs from member state‘s inputs and measuring 
their impact on the final Commission proposal would be far too time-consuming and 
expensive for the purpose of this thesis. Indeed, there is a whole subdivision of EU studies 
on the participation of organised interests in forging policy ideas.
207
 Maybe in a subsequent 
elaboration and testing of the framework presented here, the stage of policy design could be 
included in the analysis. 
 
The implementation stage is irrelevant for the purposes of this analysis, as all the case 
studies are Regulations and directly applicable in each member state. If directives were 
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amongst the case studies, the implementation process would reveal the policy preferences 
of the member state, as it can shape the national legislation within the parameters set by the 
directive. The detailed implementation could also reveal preferences and could be used as a 
cross-check for the policy preferences expressed in interviews and public statements. I shall 
not elaborate on that point in this thesis, but it certainly is a valid area of research and if a 
directive were one of the case studies, it would have had to lean on the extensive literature 
on the implementation of directives.
208
 
 
The focus of this research is therefore restricted to the negotiation process, specifically in 
the EU Council, where member states are the most involved and policy effectiveness is 
most easily measured. The negotiations take place in working groups, in the COREPER, 
the Council of Ministers and, if it is a contentious issue, even in the European Council. 
During the negotiation process, a zone of agreement usually emerges and changes amongst 
the member states.  
―A simple comparison between position and outcome runs the risk of 
overestimating a country‘s negotiation success, since a government could 
theoretically have chosen a median negotiation position in order to be on the 
winning side. In order to study actual negotiations and informal exchange processes, 
it is necessary to have negotiation position data from the beginning of each 
bargaining round and to compare them with the final bargaining result.‖209 
It is, then, necessary to study the strategy and behaviour of the member government. While 
this complicates the matter considerably, it is vital to include these for a simple reason: 
after all, the zone of agreement concerns only what is politically and realistically possible. 
Outlandish policy preferences and minority positions are more often than not modified in 
the course of negotiations. The degree of such change is important, as is the political will to 
come to an agreement. If the government does not change its preferences at all, this 
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indicates that its preferences are extreme and intense; there is a political will to let 
negotiations fail if these preferences are not reflected in the final legislation. A change in 
strategy therefore has to be taken into account, as ignoring it would skew the outcome.  
 
Furthermore,  
―three particular isolation-avoiding practices have developed. The first, and perhaps 
the most obvious, is to put the onus on the Commission and the Council presidency 
to do their utmost to accommodate reasoned and apparently reasonable differences 
of position. Frequently, the accommodation is achieved through declarations in the 
Council minutes, and often attached to decisions taken in the end by consensus. 
Declarations in the Council minutes often also record points on which dissenting 
member governments have failed to achieve accommodation of their concerns.‖210  
 
The material available on the Council‘s website could be examined to explore this point 
further. A second practice is to use differentiated rules, exceptions, derogations or delays of 
implementation or transition periods. A third option is to include protocols and declarations 
to the treaties in order to ―ring fence a possible minority position.‖211 These three strategies 
were included in this research to give a better picture of whether a member state was policy 
effective, at what stage of the negotiations and to what extent. A mention in the Council 
minutes is only possible during the negotiation process, and shows that the member state is 
not happy about the directions the negotiations are taking. An attachment to a Council 
decision, a declaration or a protocol often shows that the member state was not policy 
effective, as this strategy is generally used to show disapproval. The inclusion of 
differentiated rules, exceptions or derogations should show that a member state was 
partially policy effective, as its preferences did not make it into the final legislation, but it 
still managed to get a special treatment. 
 
In summary, measuring policy effectiveness is therefore conducted in five stages: 1) 
establish the policy preferences of the member state 2) examine the Commission proposal 
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3) establish the strategy and the goals of the member state in the negotiations 4) present the 
final legislation 5) compare and contrast the final legalisation to the policy preferences and 
to the strategy and goals.  
 
 
2.1. The categorisation of policy effectiveness 
 
A simple categorisation of the degrees of policy effectiveness facilitates the understanding 
of the outcome and will be employed in this dissertation. High policy effectiveness is 
achieved when a member state manages to include all or most of its policy preferences 
(objectives) in the Council agreement and subsequently approved by the European 
Parliament, if necessary, in the final directive or regulation. 
Medium policy effectiveness is achieved when a member state manages to include around 
half of its policy preferences in the final Council agreement and subsequently approved by 
the European Parliament, if necessary, in the final directive or regulation.  
Low policy effectiveness is achieved when a member state manages to include only a few 
of its policy preferences in the final Council agreement and subsequently approved by the 
European Parliament, if necessary, in the final directive or regulation. 
The simplicity of this categorisation has the advantage of being applicable to any case 
study- be it history-making, or meso-level, to any member state, big or small and any 
decision-making procedure.  
 
 
 
3. What influences a member state’s policy effectiveness? 
 
3.1. Domestic politics 
 
Scholars who focus their research on the influence of domestic politics in EU integration 
note that, ―in order to understand state preferences, one would want to analyse internal 
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dynamics of the state and appreciate the importance of the domestic political context.‖212 
The expectation is that flexible, efficient coordination will help achieve policy 
effectiveness.  
 
3.1.1. The approval procedure 
 
Unlike international treaties, which have to be ratified by the national Parliaments in order 
to come into effect, some legislative acts decided at the EU level by the Council (and 
sometimes the European Parliament as well) do not require explicit approval by the 
national Parliament. Each case study on policy effectiveness has a specific legislative basis, 
whether they are Regulations, Directives or Decisions. All of these take precedence over 
national law and are binding on national authorities. Because this thesis only deals with 
regulations, the others are omitted in this presentation.  A Regulation is similar to a national 
law and is directly applicable in all EU countries. A Regulation is passed either by the 
Council and the EP, or it can be passed by the European Commission alone. National 
governments or Parliaments are not involved in the implementation.  
 
The policy preferences of a member state are shaped by its approval procedure:  
―In some member states there is a kind of contract between the national government 
and the national political class that EU policy positions should be explicitly 
negotiated and ratified through a formal political process in some way (...) In other 
cases , however, the management and incorporation of EU decisions into the 
domestic process rests rather in the hands of the European specialists, consulting as 
and when appropriate with specialised interests, and often with very little regular 
engagement of national parliaments.‖213  
Except for Directives, national parliaments are not required or even allowed to vote on any 
Regulation or Decision. However, it does not follow from this that national parliaments are 
completely excluded from the decision-making process in the EU. National parliaments still 
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play a minor role in the national EU negotiating, but the involvement varies from country to 
country. The constitutional structure and political tradition and practice can all impede or 
favour the involvement and the participation of national parliaments in the EU.
214
  
 
Besides taking the involvement of the national parliament into account, governments also 
need to seek agreement of the coalition parties, the other societal actors, such as trade 
unions, business organisations, the central bank, bureaucratic agencies and even public 
opinion.
215
 Within the government, the coalition partners have to agree on a position and 
yet have to be flexible enough to be able to negotiate. Strong party discipline increases the 
win-set by widening the range of agreements for which the negotiator can expect to receive 
backing. Even if formal ratification was not required, the negotiators of the member states 
have to take those stakeholders‘ views into account when dealing with other member states 
on EU laws. As Putnam argues,  
―the possibility of failed ratification suggests that game theoretical analyses should 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary defection. Voluntary defection refers 
to reneging by a rational egoist in the absence of enforceable contracts- the much-
analyzed problem posed, for example, in the prisoner's dilemma and other dilemmas 
of collective action. Involuntary defection instead reflects the behavior of an agent 
who is unable to deliver on a promise because of failed ratification. Even though 
these two types of behavior may be difficult to disentangle in some instances, the 
underlying logic is quite different.‖216 
The implication is that the more difficult the domestic approval procedure, the more likely 
the member state will be able to argue that it is constrained by these actors, and 
consequently can get more concessions and a deal closer to its preferences. As Schelling 
argued, ‗the paradox of weakness‘ is the  
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―paradox that the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind 
oneself; that, in bargaining, weakness is often strength, freedom may be freedom to 
capitulate, and to burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent.‖217  
Complaining about the domestic constraints in which the negotiator is working is (in the 
words of one experienced British diplomat) ―the natural thing to say at the beginning of a 
tough negotiation.‖218  
 
On the other hand, the greater the autonomy of the decision-maker from domestic 
pressures, the weaker is its relative bargaining strength internationally.
219
 Therefore, the 
degree of coordination of EU affairs with the other organisations, be they institutions such 
as the Central Bank or the social partners, need to be evaluated. If they are on the same line 
as the government, the member state is more likely to be policy effective. ―Credibility (and 
thus the ability to strike deals) at Level II is enhanced by a negotiator's (demonstrated) 
ability to "deliver" at Level 1.‖220  
 
In terms of finding out how the approval procedure impacts on policy effectiveness, the 
type of legislation analysed determines whether formal ratification by Parliament was 
necessary or not. If there was no formal ratification by Parliament necessary, then the tacit 
or explicit approval, or at least not public disproval, of the other societal actors has to be 
established. Establishing this approval is done by analysing press statements by the various 
actors (Central Bank, trade and business unions) on the proposed legislation, and by 
interviews with those actors.  
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3.1.2. Institutional coordination 
 
An efficient coordination of the institutions involved in the negotiations is expected to lead 
to increased policy effectiveness.
221
  
―The very precondition for active engagement in the European policy-making 
process is to develop national positions and negotiation instructions in due time.‖222  
A close link between the Permanent Representation and the national Ministries is expected 
to play a positive role. The Permanent Representation does not only work between Brussels 
and the country, but also within a set of EU institutions. Does the staff of the Permanent 
Representation and the Technical Committee have the same policy preferences? It has often 
been noted that because  
―France and the UK have a relatively centralised, decisive systems often allow them 
to steal a march on Germany, with its traditionally decentralised, occasionally 
chaotic system.‖223  
Therefore, having all the institutions involved in the decision-making process toeing the 
same line is an important factor to be policy effective. Good effective communication 
between civil servants and ministers, clear yet flexible mandates for the negotiators at the 
Technical Committee and the COREPER, short communication channels between the 
negotiators, all contribute towards achieving the common goal. Under time pressure to 
come to an agreement in the last phase of negotiations, institutional coordination is vital:  
―in only a few days the working group and the COREPER may meet several times 
to clear up the last outstanding issues. Documents with the latest compromise 
proposals may be handed out by the presidency or by delegations only hours before 
a meeting or even during meetings. It is a major challenge for national coordination 
processes to keep up with the latest developments and to deliver a coordinated 
national point of view on time. Capitals may lose track of events and have to depend 
fully on their negotiators in Brussels. Member states who have given their 
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negotiators too little flexibility will lose considerably in the last phase of 
negotiations.‖224  
Flexible mandates of the negotiators are therefore thought to increase policy effectiveness. 
An often cited counterexample is Denmark, with its strong Committee on EU Affairs, 
which ministers have to ‗phone home‘ to get further instructions on how to proceed in 
negotiations. 
 
Kassim et al. have also found that across the EU, Prime Ministers 
 ―play an increasingly central role in EU matters, a tendency reflected in growing 
institutional support for the office, foreign ministries retain an important role, 
though in all member states they are in a position of relative decline, and specialist 
bodies for cross-departmental coordination have been established.‖225  
It is expected that this ‗meddling‘ of the Prime Ministers in individual ministries‘ affairs 
has a negative impact on the overall coordination of institutions, as the authority structure 
will become increasingly blurred at the expense of the ministers. The negotiators at lower 
levels may receive conflicting instructions from their department minister, and then from 
their Prime Minister or even President. Moreover, the coordination with the national 
Members of the European Parliament is expected to influence positively or negatively the 
final outcome. If the national MEPs are in close contact with the government, it is more 
likely that they can be counted on trying to upload the national interests to the EU within 
the EP, especially within Committees.   
 
 
3.2. The negotiation context 
 
Decisions are shaped and framed by a multitude of actors, but they are taken by the Council 
and sometimes in conjunction with the EP. In the context of this analysis, the term 
―negotiation context‖ is understood purely in a formal legalistic sense (i.e. the applicable 
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rules as defined by the treaties) and does not cover informal negotiation procedures. The 
Commission usually has the right of initiative, although in some areas such as justice and 
home affairs, individual member states can also introduce policy proposals. Member states 
are involved in almost every stage of the legislation process; at the stage of policy design, 
the negotiation of the policy, and at the implementation stage.
226
 They decide in one of the 
various levels of the Council, the COREPER or working group, and the level of ministers 
and increasingly even heads of state, what the shape and final outcome of the policy will 
be. The voting procedure is expected to play a role predominantly in the final stages of the 
negotiations. That does not mean however that the voting procedure is not at the back of the 
minds of negotiators at any other point of the discussions. The voting procedure is 
supposed to matter more, the higher the level in the Council is at which the decision is 
taken. This is so simply because if agreement has been found at the level of the working 
group or the COREPER, then it is likely that the issue was not highly controversial 
politically and rests on a broad consensus. If the EP has some say in that policy area, the 
national representatives are voting on the proposal or Common Position of the Council- to 
which we turn below.  
 
3.2.1. The decision-making procedure 
 
The first factor relates to the formal voting power of the member states: the voting 
procedure. Within the EU, decision-making procedures are often complex, reflecting both 
the relative political sensitivity of the issue at hand and the relative weight of a member 
state within the Council. The votes in the Council are distributed according to some sort of 
proportional representation, although the weighing is neither strictly proportional nor 
entirely logical.
227
 The voting weight of member states is both an outcome of policy 
effectiveness and a starting point for the evaluation of policy effectiveness. The voting 
procedure significantly conditions a member state‘s ability to achieve that all the policies it 
wants to be transposed at EU level are actually transposed at that level.  Voting in the 
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Council of Ministers can be classified under two headings: Qualified Majority Voting and 
Unanimity. QMV is calculated in different ways, depending which Treaty was in force at 
the time of the vote. Enlargements and the successive changes to the voting weights of 
member states potentially alter significantly relationships between the member states, and 
even the involvement of the European Parliament. Following the 2000 Inter Governmental 
Conference and the Nice Treaty, the number of votes allocated to each Member State has 
been re-weighted, in particular for those States with larger populations.
228
 Because the case 
studies range from 1996 to 2005, these changes in voting weights are expected to matter. 
Unanimity essentially entails that all member states either have to agree or at least not voice 
their disagreement through a veto; however they are perfectly entitled to voice their 
concerns over some particular issue that is included in the agreement and final 
regulation/directive.  
 
Member states are able to defend their national interest through a veto. A member state can 
oppose a Community decision adopted by the majority if it considers its national interests 
to be seriously threatened. It is not so much the explicit use of the veto, but the implied 
threat to use it, which can lead the other member states and the Commission to search for 
ways in which that specific national interest is accommodated before negotiations start and 
even during negotiations. The Ionannina Compromise of 1994 and the emergency brake of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam have met the same fate as the Luxembourg Compromise and have 
hardly been used. 
 
Many scholars have found that most decisions taken in the Council of Ministers are reached 
consensually, necessitating no explicit voting. Hayes-Renshaw et al. showed that the vast 
majority of decisions reached in the Council were not voted on, and that where there was a 
vote depends often on the issue area.
229
  If there is very little explicit voting, why does the 
decision-making procedure matter then?  
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―From the perspective of interpreting consensus in the Council, it is important to 
recognize the common understandings that facilitate negotiations, such as the 
historical importance of the European project, the necessity of having either 
Germany or France supporting an initiative and the lack of an exit option or the 
threat of force.‖230   
The ‗shadow of the vote‘ and the existence of a blocking minority go some way towards 
explaining the potential relevance of this factor in policy effectiveness. This nevertheless 
leaves the problem of measuring its validity in specific case studies. How can we know that 
the voting procedure, and more specifically the voting weight of the member state in 
question, played a part if there was no vote?  
There are several ways to identify whether this variable played a part in QMV: firstly the 
voting weight is presented in relation to the other member states, and then calculated as a 
percentage to the qualified majority and the blocking minority. If it is possible to estimate 
the coalitions amongst the member states and calculate their combined voting weight, then 
the shadow of the vote and a potential blocking minority are sufficient to get the negotiators 
back on the table to try and accommodate the member state in question. If there is not a 
determined blocking minority, ―then marginal dissenters tend to switch their efforts to 
extracting rewards or concessions in return for withdrawing their opposition.‖231 It seems 
therefore reasonable to expect, that even though a culture of non-voting and consensus-
finding prevails in the Council, the voting procedure may influence policy effectiveness. 
Therefore the following propositions should be examined. Under unanimity, the member 
state is more likely to be highly policy effective. Secondly, I want to see whether, if the 
member state belongs to a blocking minority or is the decisive vote, it is more likely to be 
highly policy effective. 
 
As a second step, the different possibilities of involvement of the European Parliament in 
negotiations will be presented (co-decision, consultation and cooperation- those used in 
these case studies). This is followed by a tentative appraisal of how the EP could influence 
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a member state‘s policy effectiveness. The co-decision procedure was introduced in the 
Treaty on European Union and strengthened by the Treaty of Amsterdam. It makes 
provision for a division of legislative power between Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union. In practice, co-decision has become the most important legislative 
procedure and was expanded to many policy areas under the Lisbon Treaty. It develops in 
three stages and gives Parliament a right of veto.
232
 The threshold for an absolute majority 
is 369 votes out of 736. Under the co-decision procedure, an absolute majority is necessary 
for the vote on a second reading in order to reject the Council position at first reading or to 
adopt amendments.
233
 
 
In the consultation procedure, Parliament is asked for its opinion on proposed legislation 
before the Council adopts it. In the cases laid down by the Treaty, the Council consults 
Parliament before taking a decision on the Commission‘s proposal and makes sure that its 
opinion is taken into account. The Council is not legally obliged to take account of 
Parliament‘s opinion but cannot take a decision without having seen it.234 
 
The cooperation procedure was introduced in the Single European Act. The EP received 
more influence through being able to hold two readings instead of one. This procedure 
applies now only to the field of economic and monetary union. In the first reading, 
Parliament issues an opinion on the Commission proposal.  
―The Council, acting by a qualified majority, then draws up a common position, 
which is forwarded to Parliament. (...) The Parliament examines this common 
position at a second reading, and within three months may adopt, amend or reject 
the common position. In the latter two cases, it must do so by an absolute majority 
of its members. If it rejects the proposal, unanimity is required for the Council to act 
on a second reading. The Commission then re-examines, within one month, the 
proposal upon which the Council based its common position and forwards its 
proposal to the Council; at its discretion it can include or exclude the amendments 
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proposed by Parliament. Within three months, the Council may adopt the re-
examined proposal by qualified majority, amend it unanimously or adopt the 
amendments not taken into consideration by the Commission, also unanimously. In 
the cooperation procedure, the Council may still exercise a veto by refusing to 
express its opinion on the amendments proposed by the European Parliament or on 
the amended proposal from the Commission, thereby blocking the legislative 
procedure.‖235  
 
The European Parliament, depending on the decision-making procedure applied in the case 
study in question, can yield significant power over the final shape of legislation. There are 
several prominent and highly politicised cases where the EP voted against a Common 
Position of the Council under co-decision- the SWIFT directive being one famous example. 
The EP cannot be relied upon to just nod and agree. Theoretically, it can also propose 
significant amendments which would potentially undo all the work a member state‘s 
representative has achieved in the Council. Under co-decision especially, but also under the 
cooperation procedure, it will be an advantage for the government in question that its MEPs 
belong to the same political party or coalition and therefore are more likely to support its 
position. Member states with only a small representation in the EP are expected to have 
MEPs toeing the same line as the government. Therefore, it could be expected that no 
involvement of the EP makes a member state more likely to be policy effective. Another 
possibility is that the member state‘s preferences are close to that of the EP or the 
Commission; in that case it is more likely to be policy effective.  
 
3.2.2. Time pressure 
 
Time pressure is another factor and can originate from several sources: upcoming European 
Parliament elections and the election of a new Commission, the upcoming presidency of the 
Council, an approaching deadline of implementation of a certain policy; even domestic 
elections may create time pressure to find an agreement.  
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In the aftermath of EP elections the formation of committees leads to delays and 
inexperienced MEPs must familiarise themselves with the new material. Time pressure to 
pass a directive or regulation before the election could be a factor for reaching an 
agreement. Under co-decision, the EP has the power to reject a carefully-bargained 
agreement of the Council and can send it back to be re-examined. Under consultation, a 
favourable opinion of the European Parliament can strengthen the agreement‘s credibility. 
Similarly, the time around the election of a new Commission body increases pressure on 
the Commission, the Council and the EP to reach agreements. A new Commission college 
has to learn the ropes in the different policy areas before its members can effectively 
participate in and help shape the legislation process.  
 
Time pressure to find an agreement within the Council before an upcoming presidency can 
come up for several reasons: the new presidency is hostile to any progress in that policy 
area, or it is not a member of the increased cooperation in that policy area (such as in 
monetary union, or in certain areas of justice and home affairs). If the issue under 
negotiation is part of a larger body of legislation, such as monetary union, there is often a 
date of implementation by which the issue has to have been negotiated, approved by all the 
relevant institutions and published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Those 
deadlines are often a stimulus for making certain options suddenly more attractive to the 
negotiators than they would otherwise have been. Finally, Heipertz and Verdun have 
argued that domestic elections in one of the member states may play a part as well.
236
   
 
Time pressure can work both in favour and against a member state in being policy 
effective.
237
 The effect is more pronounced under the decision-making procedure of QMV 
than under unanimity. ―The less time is available, the easier it is in a system of majority 
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voting for leading majorities to win.‖238 The member state is less likely to be policy 
effective if it is under time pressure to find an agreement under QMV. Time pressure can 
affect policy effectiveness negatively if the member state finds itself in a minority position 
due to extreme preferences under QMV. If the member state finds itself in a minority 
position and there is time pressure, then it is unlikely that its concerns would be fully 
addressed. Conversely, if the member state finds itself in the majority, time pressure can 
have the positive effect of persuading a recalcitrant member state to give in to the 
majority‘s demands.  
But even in a situation of unanimity voting, member states may be urged (informally by 
others) to stop dragging their feet to find an agreement because of time pressure. In that 
case, the effect of the pressure exercised on the member state depends on whether it is 
directed against a big or a small state. Smaller states, which have a smaller number of 
votes, are expected to feel this pressure more keenly than bigger states. Time pressure is 
measured firstly by objective factors, such as those mentioned above, and secondly by the 
qualitative appreciation of the negotiators themselves. If they felt under pressure to find an 
agreement, it is likely that this would have had an impact on their negotiation behaviour. 
 
In short, institutions matter. This study does not ignore the decision-making procedure and 
the relative weight each member state has in the institutional set-up of the European Union. 
It is expected that the bigger the voting weight of a member state, the better it will be able 
to be policy effective. The voting procedure is expected to have a negative impact when it 
is QMV and co-decision with the EP. Furthermore, time pressure is expected to have a 
negative impact on policy effectiveness, as it leaves some options unexplored and leaves 
less time to find a consensus solution acceptable to everyone. 
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3.3. Distribution and intensity of preferences 
 
Any member state‘s power, whether big or small, is naturally constrained by the policy 
preferences of the other member states in EU negotiations.
239
 A domestic politics approach 
is useful in determining member states‘ preferences. Public opinion, the general economic 
and political climates determine their negotiation behaviour. Their negotiation behaviour, 
depending on the intensity of the preferences held and on the strategy they choose, be it 
accommodating or radical, will condition the member state‘s power relative to the other 
players. The preferences of the other 14, 24 or 26 member states intervene in a member 
state‘s power to steer EU negotiations towards the preferred outcome. Therefore the 
number of actors, the distribution of preferences, and the intensity with which these 
preferences are held, need to be taken into account in a study of policy effectiveness. 
 
3.3.1. Number of actors 
 
Firstly, the number of actors in negotiations is supposed to have an impact on the policy 
effectiveness of a member state. As Wallace stated, with successive enlargements,  
―the core characteristics of member states as such differ over time, altering the 
range of policy needs and objectives, and (...) the relationships among member 
states alter, changing coalition politics and patterns of influence within the EU.‖240  
To put it simply: If there are two actors in a negotiation, then their vote weighs half. In an 
EU of 27, the voting weight of every member state is significantly reduced. ―The smaller 
the unit of decision-making, the more the preferences of the participants count.‖241  
 
Furthermore, as an increasing number of small member states joined the EU and small 
states are now in the majority, it has been suggested that there are two consequences to 
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these last enlargements: the first consequence relates to the attitude of big member states 
such as France, Germany, the UK, and to a lesser extent Italy and Poland. Big member 
states are afraid of losing influence in the EU institutions (tyranny of the weak- or the 
―Lilliput syndrome‖242). An illustration of this point is when French President Chirac told 
Central and Eastern European countries before their accession to the EU to hold their 
tongues in the context of the Iraq invasion.
243
  
 
The big member states attempt increasingly to coordinate their positions and take charge of 
the integration process. This in turn leads to fears of the small member states of a directoire 
of the big member states, who are afraid of being sidelined in the negotiation process and 
being presented with a fait accompli by the big member states in the Council, as during the 
Convention negotiations.
244
 More recently, in the negotiations of a tougher Euro stability 
package in Deauville, Luxembourg‘s prime minister was ―furious about Merkel‘s and 
Sarkozy‘s attempt to shape policy without consulting other leaders first. ‗The style is 
simply impossible,‘ said Juncker.‖245 The implication is that smaller member states were 
more likely to be heard before the last enlargement, and that the new small member states 
have more difficulties in finding a sympathetic ear of a big member state. Because there are 
more actors, the individuality decreases; it is more difficult to argue that one‘s domestic 
politics are unique and one needs different rules. The understanding, and the willingness to 
understand and accommodate is also expected to decrease in a bigger Union. Therefore, 
small member states could be less likely than big member states to be policy effective in an 
enlarged EU. 
 
The case studies of the present research happened in 1996, in 2003 and in 2005. Two case 
studies consisted of 15 member states in 1996 and 2003, while there were 25 member states 
in 2005. If the number of member states affects policy effectiveness negatively, 
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Luxembourg should have been more effective in two case studies (the SGP in 1996 and EC 
Reg. 883/2004 in 2003) than in the case study of the reform of the Pact in 2005.  
 
 
3.3.2. Distribution of preferences 
 
Not only has the number of actors increased and so the heterogeneity of preferences; the 
policies and cultures of the different member states‘ governments change over time. This 
means that the decision-making bodies become more heterogeneous and the zones of 
agreements become narrower. Research suggests that being closer to the Commission‘s 
preferences and proposals increases a member state‘s ability to get what it wants.246 In that 
sense, building an alliance with the agenda-setting Commission is still essential to success 
in negotiations. It has also been suggested that being closer to the alliance of France and 
Germany, if there is one, is almost a guarantor of policy effectiveness.  
―In the EC‘s past (...), it has been observed that decisions were virtually never taken 
in practice against an alliance of two very crucial states: Germany and France. In 
quantitative terms, this basically implies that these two members shared a kind of 
informal veto power.‖247 
The Franco-German axis and its strength and cohesiveness could therefore be crucial in 
understanding whether a member state is policy effective. If the member state in question 
has preferences which are close to both France‘s and Germany‘s, then it is more likely to be 
policy effective. For example, when France and Germany joined forces in cracking down 
on banking secrecy, it was difficult for other member states to resist. 
  
Coalition-building in the Council would be a way to overcome a wide distribution of 
preferences and could be an attempt to narrow the gap. However, apart from issue-specific 
coalitions, no stable coalitions across issues have been recorded.
248
 Bal argues that as a rule 
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the factual interests of a member state are decisive for its choice of coalition, and that 
―normally two (coincidental) coalitions appear at each end of the spectrum (...) in the 
middle there is a large group of indifferent member states.‖249 If there is a wide distribution 
of preferences, then the member state in question is less likely to be policy effective. In 
order to find out if there is a general, widespread consensus or diverging preferences 
amongst member states on a specific policy proposal, several options are available to the 
researcher. Firstly, if available official statements and press interviews by ministers or 
officials are analysed on their references to the details of the policy proposal. Secondly, 
interviews with participants in the negotiations give an insight into the distribution of 
preferences, and they also indicate which governments had the most extreme preferences. 
Council minutes often record if a particular member states has specific issues with the 
proposed legislation, and where disagreement is exposed by one or several member states.  
 
 
3.3.3. Intensity of preferences 
 
This factor relates to the degree of salience of an issue in other member states. The political 
context, in particular the other member states‘ policy preferences and their intensity and the 
range of competing interests has an immediate effect on how a member state can ‗impose‘ 
their policy preferences upon the final legal act. If there are polarised competing interests 
and ideological coalitions within the Council, a state‘s policy effectiveness is negatively 
affected. 
 
 ―Broadly at the EU level the European Council has emerged as the forum through 
which strategic choices are made and highly political bargains are struck. Specialist 
groups of ministers in the regular Council sessions are often not able to reach solid 
agreements without reference to heads of government.‖250  
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It could therefore be the case that the higher the level at which the decision is taken, the 
more intense the preferences are of at least one member state, if not more, depending on the 
voting procedure. Salient issues on a domestic level are likely to produce a less cooperative 
behaviour. Case studies abound where the intense preferences of one member state override 
any other preferences and the negotiations shift their focus onto that issue.
251
 One of the 
most prominent ones would be the discussions of the EU budget in 1984, which turned into 
lengthy negotiations on the UK rebate demanded by Prime Minister Thatcher. A more 
recent example would be subsidising the German car industry, which could be considered 
against EU competition rules.
252
 
 
If the preferences of one or more member states are intense and extreme, the member state 
in question is supposed to be less policy effective. On the other hand, if the other member 
states have no significant economic or political interest in a given matter, then the intensity 
of their preferences is assumed to be low. The member state in question is then more likely 
to be highly policy effective, as political concessions are easier to obtain if no one cares.
253
 
Hence, it is expected that the intensity of other member states‘ preferences will influence 
policy effectiveness.  
 
The intensity of a member state‘s preference can be gauged in several ways. Firstly, if a 
member state has extreme preferences, it often adopts a radical and non-accommodating 
attitude in the negotiations. The indicators of preference intensity by a member state‘s 
government are: official press statements, references in official Council documents to the 
problems a member state has with the legislation proposal, and through interviews. 
Derogations, exceptions, delays of implementation in the final Council agreement also 
often indicate that the member state did or could not budge on its behaviour. The more a 
specific member state is mentioned as having a problem, the more likely it is that its 
preferences were intense. It is relatively easy to measure the absence of intense preferences: 
if a member state is not mentioned by the interviewees when they talked about the 
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negotiations, it is assumed that that member state was not actively involved in the process 
and therefore its preferences were not intense. Furthermore, it is assumed that the higher the 
level of the Council at which the decision is taken, the more intense the preferences of at 
least one of the member states is under unanimity and QMV. Hence, the institution in 
which a decision is taken is an indicator of intense preferences and political salience.  
 
 
3.4. The presidency 
 
Chairing the presidency of the Council of the European Union offers a member state 
several resources it can use to be policy effective.
254
 The institution of the presidency has 
been created as a response to the increasing complexity of issues presented to the member 
states, to the increasing mistrust of the Commission as leader of the negotiations.  
―Owing to its formal position, the presidency possesses a set of informational and 
procedural resources that can be used to encourage concessions and achieve 
convergence in EU governments‘ negotiating positions.‖255  
Through the management of the agenda and the search for viable compromises, the 
presidency acquires an expertise in the dossiers under negotiation. The presidency has 
access to privileged information about member states‘ preferences through bilateral 
encounters and the Council Secretariat. The member state that holds the presidency is 
expected to lead and manage EU negotiations, but not to defend its national interests 
simultaneously. It is expected that the member state that holds the chair is guiding the 
negotiations and brokering deals. 
 
However, Tallberg has shown that some presidencies use the office to pursue private gains. 
Holding the presidency presents a country with two important power resources: 
asymmetrical access to information and asymmetrical control over the negotiation 
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 These resources, added to other resources the member state holds, can bring 
about policy effectiveness. Indeed, Tallberg argues that it is not enough to hold the 
presidency, and notes two caveats:  
―first, the presidency‘s brokerage efforts may be superfluous, to the extent that the 
bargaining parties themselves can identify a viable compromise, or redundant, if 
preferences are sufficiently divergent to prevent a zone of agreement from arising. 
Second, the individuals that perform presidency functions on behalf of their national 
governments may be more or less apt for their duties. Like other institutional 
platforms, the office of the presidency can offer individuals opportunities for 
influence, but cannot guarantee that these individuals at all times act skilfully on 
these opportunities.‖257  
Hence the inclusion of the following factor on individual-level factors. 
While every member state held the office of the presidency roughly every 8 years before 
the enlargement to 27 member states, the importance of the presidency has been 
significantly reduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. There is now more formal coordination of 
the trio of three presidencies in devising a common political programme, leaving less 
autonomy to each presidency to construct the agenda. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty 
separates the European Council from the Council of the European Union, and the High 
Representative is now the Chairman, rather than the foreign minister of the member state 
that holds the presidency. It remains to be seen whether holding the presidency is still a 
coveted asset after a few experiences with this new arrangement. Nevertheless, as the case 
studies of this research are dated before the entry into force, it is still a factor worth 
exploring.  
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3.4.1. Asymmetrical information 
 
The General Secretariat of the Council provides the presidency with the preferences and 
negotiating positions of the member states, with advice on the decision-making procedures 
and the instruments available to the presidency and tactical and legal advice on negotiation 
procedures and possible courses of action. The confidential Notes au Président contain 
information on the background of the proposal, its legal basis, the voting procedure, the 
state of play in the negotiations, governments‘ negotiating positions and room for 
concessions, tactical brokerage advice, and alternative compromises.
258
 The second source 
of information is the confessionals, the confidential bilateral talks between the presidency 
and a member state.
259
 The sharing of information is the most important function of the 
confessional, but it also provides an opportunity to put additional pressure on reluctant 
ministers, and to offer unofficial side payments. The tour des capitales is another means of 
collecting information and exercising pressure. These bilateral talks allow ministers to 
inform the presidency about their bottom lines without sharing them with the other 
bargaining parties. As Beach argues, in order for a presidency to effectively supply 
leadership, it must possess ―a combination of informational resources and the 
trust/acceptance of other governments.‖260 The presidency is also a platform for political 
influence. The brokering of intergovernmental agreements permits EU presidencies to 
select from multiple equilibriums and steer negotiations towards outcomes they privately 
prefer. Having access to information on other member states‘ preferences and red lines 
should enable a member state to steer negotiations towards an outcome it prefers; if those 
preferences are not too widely distributed. 
 
How the member state in question managed to use this resource effectively for policy 
effectiveness is measured in the following way: press statements indicate how many times 
the presidency has met informally with the other participants at ministerial level. 
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Unfortunately, it is more difficult to establish the degree of contact between the presidency 
and other negotiators at the lower levels of the Council. Furthermore, in elite interviews, 
the participants in the negotiations were asked about their assessments of the presidency‘s 
involvement.  
 
 
3.4.2. Asymmetrical control over the negotiation procedure 
 
The second resource is the asymmetrical control over negotiation procedure and sessions 
through a range of procedural instruments. The presidency manages the agenda, permitting 
to assign priority to competing political concerns. It can shape the political priorities to a 
certain extent and determines the pace of Council negotiations by setting the schedule. It 
can determine the number of formal and informal negotiation sessions. It also sets the pace 
of the negotiations by deciding how often the meetings take place and how long they last. 
The longer a meeting is, the more a sense of urgency arises to find a solution to the problem 
at hand. Therefore, it can be stipulated that the control over procedure leads to more policy 
effectiveness. The presidency also has control over the method of negotiations (competing 
proposals or a single negotiating text). Choosing to present a single text for negotiation 
enables a member state that holds the presidency to include its own preferences in the 
policy proposal and effectively supplants the Commission proposal.
 261
 
 
The pace of the negotiations can be easily established by looking at how many ministerial 
meetings were conducted on the policy issue in question under the presidency. If there are 
meetings which follow in quick succession, it can be argued that the presidency is creating 
time pressure to persuade recalcitrant member states to compromise and move towards a 
zone of agreement. Furthermore, the presidency can decide whether it uses a single text or 
several proposals. By choosing a single text, it has more control over what is included and 
what is not, and it can exclude certain options which it does not favour and include options 
which it does.  
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3.5. Individual level factors 
 
Another issue to consider is how and to what extent differences in individual attributes 
affect the policy effectiveness of heads of government and the officials and negotiators. As 
Bal states so eloquently, ―a dark forest of procedures hides the importance of the human 
factor.‖262 Even if the heads of government may try to function as efficient and detached 
servants of the national interest, their negotiation behaviour and influence over outcomes 
may be shaped by factors such as experience, culture, personal visions, and trust. These 
individual-level factors include past relations, belonging to the same political family, 
experience and longevity, and being included in the small circle of actors who are delegated 
by the other member states to hammer out a compromise. We will explore each of these in 
turn. 
 
 
3.5.1. Past relations 
 
The importance of reputation and personal authority is a recurring theme in the 
participants‘ own assessments of power and influence in the European Council. In 
particular, they underline the differences between individuals in terms of personal 
authority, respect, or trust. These are seen as attributes to be won and earned, rather than 
given by birth or appointment.
263
 Meerts‘ research suggested that:  
―character differences among negotiators have a greater impact on negotiation 
relationships and processes than culture. But for those who represent the states at 
the highest levels, personal characteristics may even be more relevant than for other 
representatives.‖264  
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If the negotiators have previous relations, then the member state is more likely to be policy 
effective. Examples would be the positive relations between Kohl and Mitterrand, who 
managed to find agreement on many very delicate topics. Negative examples would be 
Berlusconi‘s chairing of the presidency, where he was held ―in rather low esteem‖ by 
several European governments and has been cited as one of the reasons why Italy could not 
broker an agreement on the Constitutional Treaty.
265
 
 
 Past relations can only be measured by the personal assessment of the negotiators 
themselves and of their assessment of the relations between other negotiators. While it is a 
very subjective measure and almost impossible to falsify except by the assessment of other 
people, it cannot be denied that the presence of ‗chemistry‘ between individuals can 
significantly influence their willingness to find agreements and help each other out. 
Similarly, negative experiences of dealing with an individual can make the negotiator in 
question apprehensive and unwilling to compromise and give in. 
 
 
3.5.2. Same political family 
 
As presented in the literature review, party ideology has been proven to matter in the 
European Parliament. Is this the case as well in the Council? Aspinwall found a significant 
relationship between party ideology and the resulting ideology of the governments and their 
preferences regarding European integration.
266
 If the ministers from the same political 
family have similar preferences towards or against European integration, does this mean 
that they also have similar preferences in every policy area?
267
 Research has been relatively 
sparse on this aspect. This factor is applied only to the ministerial level, where it can be 
measured. Moreover it remains to be seen if this is still the case after the last two 
enlargements. In general, an increasing heterogeneity can be observed within party 
                                                          
265
 Quaglia, L. and Moxon-Browne, E., (2006) ‗What Makes a Good EU Presidency? Italy and Ireland 
Compared.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, Issue 2, p. 357 
266
 Aspinwall M., (2006) ‗Government Preferences on European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five 
Theories.‘ British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, pp 81-111 
267
 Marks G., Wilson C. J., (2000) ‗The Past in the Present: a Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European 
Integration.‘ British Journal of Political Science, Vol.30, No. 3, p. 433-459. 
112 
families. In Central and Eastern Europe, Christian Democrats did not manage to break 
through as a significant force in the political spectrum; furthermore, the few Christian 
Democratic parties that do enter government in these countries often have diverging ideas, 
visions and policies to the established Christian Democrats in Western Europe.
268
 Europe‘s 
Socialist parties have a different legacy and therefore a different ideological starting point, 
but are still more coherent. Right wing parties in Western and East and Central Europe are 
probably more similar than the previously mentioned party families. More research needs 
to be done in order to determine whether this relationship between party ideology and 
preferences regarding European integration is still valid. It could be that the more parties in 
government belong to the same political family as the member state in question, the 
member state in question then has more chances of being policy effective. 
 
By counting how many ministers belong to the same political family, a first assessment can 
be made whether the minister in question could be in a minority position or not. If the 
minister in question belongs to the same political family as one of the important member 
states, such as France and Germany, then it can be assumed that they have the same 
preferences. In cases of high domestic political sensitivity, it is expected that nationality 
plays more of a role than political affiliation for MEPs and that they play an active role in 
persuading other MEPs of the importance of their government‘s position. They will try 
actively to shape the decision of the EP according to their government‘s strategy. The 
involvement and influence of national MEPs is measured by their interventions, role in 
committees, and by their vote on the particular case study. It is therefore possible that 
member state governments who belong to the same party or coalition party as a majority of 
their MEPs are more likely to be highly policy effective.  
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3.5.3. Expertise and longevity 
 
The time spent in government or in administration by the negotiators is reasonably 
expected to have an impact on the expertise of the negotiators, as the negotiators know how 
past negotiations and outcomes came about.  They also know more about the positions and 
preferences of the other negotiators. Beyond the formal voting in the Council, which in 
practice is rarely used, ―one must not forget that Europe has always been steered by 
diplomacy, negotiation and vision.‖269 This means that each member state must present its 
arguments in a logical, consistent and clear fashion. One implication is that seniority in the 
club and earlier performance are perceived to matter.  
In their comparison of the Italian and Irish Presidencies in 2003-2004, Quaglia and Moxon-
Browne refer to ―intangible resources‖, like political credibility, expertise in EU affairs and 
attitudes towards EU integration as influencing a ―good‖ presidency.270 They argue that 
these intangible resources facilitate the activities of a presidency. Tallberg refers to 
individual sources of power, namely personality and personal authority, expertise, and 
standing in domestic politics as sources of bargaining power in the European Council.
271
 
Personal authority is seen as an attribute to be earned, and seniority and earlier performance 
matter. As Philippe Schoutheete, a former Permanent Representative from Belgium 
testifies:  
―Because participants are relatively few in number and personal relations important, 
the balance of power in the European Council is influenced by seniority. 
Newcomers will not be able to pull their full weight at first meetings. Heads of 
government of smaller member states can expect to exert more influence after 
several years of being present, particularly if they led a successful presidency.‖272 
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Content expertise refers to technical knowledge of the issues under negotiation.
273
 The 
levels of technical knowledge by individual ministers depend on the duration of being in 
government and are a function of the other governments‘ trust. Moreover, those parties that 
possess superior knowledge of are also better positioned to identify potential agreements 
and to shape outcomes in their own favour. Content expertise is deemed very important, 
indeed a prerequisite for influence, by the heads of government.
274
 Particularly small 
countries have greater incentives to be well informed, since they cannot rely on structural 
power. This level of information extends to the preferences of the other member states as 
the possession of such is a condition for building coalitions and negotiating agreements. 
Process expertise refers to knowledge of the institutional framework of negotiations, 
including legal provisions and procedures. Preference information, finally, refers to 
knowledge of other parties‘ interests and domestic political constraints.275 Finally, it is 
expected that a low turnover will increase the levels of expertise of the negotiating staff 
employed.  Panke argues that  
―while small states face fewer financial resources, have fewer personnel in 
ministries, and carry lesser political and economic leverage; their hands are not tied 
by these size-related disadvantages. They can nevertheless successfully influence 
outcomes of international negotiations for issues on which they put priorities, if they 
use argumentative and networking strategies instead of bargaining strategies. This is 
especially effective if a small state can draw on experiences accumulated by being a 
member of the negotiation setting for some time and can use the gathered insights in 
the development of good arguments and the activation of broad networks.‖276 
Measuring longevity is very easy: one counts the number of years the official or minister 
has been in office. The assumption is that the longer s/he has been exercising that mandate, 
the more ‗reputational advantages‘ s/he has. Experts and ministers acquire an ‗institutional 
memory‘ if they have been in the same position over years. They know if and why 
                                                          
273
 Beach, Mazzucelli in ‗Introduction‘ in Beach D., Mazzucelli C., (2007) Leadership in the Big Bangs of 
European Integration. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 11 
274
 Tallberg J., (2003) ‗The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU 
Negotiations‘ Paper prepared for presentation at the EUSA‟s 8th International Conference, Nashville, p. 30 
275
 Beach, Mazzucelli in ‗Introduction‘ in Beach D., Mazzucelli C., (2007) Leadership in the Big Bangs of 
European Integration. Palgrave Macmillan, p.2 
276
 Panke D., (2009) ‗Being Small in the Big, Wide World: The Power of Small States in international 
negotiations.‘ Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, 
p. 22 
115 
something did or did not work in the past, they are more informed about the environment in 
which the legislation is to be applied and they know the legal procedures better. These 
assets are invaluable to negotiators in complex negotiations. By contrast, if a minister has 
just taken up his post, it often is difficult for him to actively participate in negotiations 
without the help of his advisers. An expert or COREPER official will also first have to fight 
his turf in these tightly knit communities.  
 
 
3.5.4. The inclusion in the delegation of negotiations 
 
The extent of the reputation can be easily measured in a common phenomenon in EU 
negotiations, which happens usually in the final phase of negotiations: the shift of the 
negotiations to a more restricted format and to secluded areas. Within the Council, not 
every member state has significant interests in every issue that is being negotiated. A 
member state can also decide that another member state is better placed to voice the same 
concerns it has. Member states can decide to form ad hoc alliances, and informally 
designate one member state to be the speaker for their entire group. The ‗real‘ negotiations 
then take place within a small circle of member states, who try to reach a compromise. It is 
implicit in this task that if the members of that circle find an agreement, the whole group 
will accept it, as the members of that circle represent the different preferences (plus 
sometimes a broker/mediator). Héritier and Mair are studying a shift of decision-making 
from open, public areas to secluded areas in their SIEPOL project.
277
 Another possibility is 
that the member state stands alone with its extreme preferences and therefore has to be 
included in any discussions on solutions. Being included in the final phase of negotiations 
when only a few actors are charged to find an agreement gives a member state more 
opportunities to shape the final outcome. Being designated to be the speaker for an allied 
group, being designated as broker or being the member state with extreme and intense 
preferences, gives a member state a significant opportunity. With enlargement, it is 
expected that this phenomenon will be more pronounced, as it is more difficult to discuss 
issues and arrive at a common solution at 27 than at 15, 12 or 6. This phenomenon is 
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expected to occur not only at the higher levels of the Council- indeed it is expected that it 
can also happen in the COREPER, but not in the working groups. The reason for this is 
simple: if no agreement can be found at the level of working groups, it is usually because it 
is a politically sensitive issue and so the negotiators have no mandate to negotiate further 
and have to pass it onto the COREPER level.  
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
In order to strengthen my research findings I use methodological triangulation, as using 
several techniques to get the same information helps validate the findings and make them 
more reliable.
278
 The main methods of investigation include interviews and document 
analysis. This section presents the research design of my thesis, starting with the methods 
employed. Process tracing and interviews will be presented, along with the advantages and 
challenges that are inherent in these methods. 
 
 
4.1. Interviews  
 
Interviewing is an appropriate research strategy in Political Science and is used in 
qualitative and quantitative research. Elite interviews usually pursue to fulfil three 
objectives, as Goldstein notes:  
―1) gathering information from a sample of officials in order to make generalisable 
claims about all such officials‘ characteristics or decisions; 2) discovering a 
particular piece of information or getting hold of a particular document; 3) 
informing or guiding work that uses other sources of data.‖279  
In the context of this research, the second and third reasons fully justify the use of 
interviews- indeed, as Council negotiations are not made official, it is almost impossible to 
find out about the development of these negotiations any other way. Considering the 
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delicate nature of my case studies, especially those on the SGP, interviews were indeed the 
major source of information. Furthermore, interviews constituted one major source of 
information on the positions of the governments, how they negotiated, what the 
compromise proposals were and how the final agreement came about. Finally, the 
information obtained through interviews is informing work that uses process tracing as 
well.  
 
The target population was the Luxembourgish and European political elite. Their evaluation 
of Luxembourg‘s policy preferences, its performance in influencing EU negotiations and 
decision-making were the primary goals of investigation. Quota sampling was one of the 
techniques used to select the potential interviewees. The members of the group were not 
selected randomly, but they had to fulfil a set of characteristics which should be relevant to 
the topic.
280
 The main selection criterion was to include leaders from the institutions with 
political importance. In the case of Luxembourg‘s national elite, the characteristics of a 
potential interviewee could be:  
 
 The person is or was a representative of its government or its people ( Minister, 
MEP) 
 The person has to work or worked in the national administration and his work 
must be linked directly to EU matters ( national experts, members of the 
COREPER) 
 The person has to be or was a representative of a national organisation at 
European level, or deal with European issues (trade unions, chambers of 
commerce) 
 The person has to have worked for a Luxembourgish presidency (temporary 
staff) 
 person is an official or has a political office within a national ministry 
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Concerning the European elite, the selection process was based on one major 
consideration: were they identified in official Council documents, press statements or 
by other interviewees as being key actors in these particular negotiations? It was 
therefore dependent on the following characteristics: 
 
 The person is or was a representative of its government or its people ( Minister, 
MEP) 
 The person has to work or worked in the national administration and his work 
must be linked directly to EU matters ( national experts, members of the 
COREPER) 
 The person is an official or had a political office within an EU institution 
 
Considering that Luxembourg is a country of half a million people, the domestic political 
elite is very small and any sampling technique has to take into account the constraints of the 
real world and be adaptable to the circumstances. This obviously posed some challenges to 
the validity of some of the findings, but could not be redeemed in any way. For example, 
Luxembourg‘s Finance Minister had only five civil servants to cover all the different policy 
areas, and only two of those dealt directly with one particular case study, the SGP. I 
managed to get an interview with one of those two officials, who was very helpful and 
informative, but he made it clear that the other official would not speak to me. However, I 
managed to interview most people I asked in Luxembourg, apart from the Prime Minister, 
who referred me to his official.  
 
It was a different case in getting access to people at the European level. One of the 
problems was that the Council is a sort of ‗black box‘ as it meets most of the times in 
secret. It was therefore difficult to gauge member states‘ preferences and behaviour and the 
negotiation process. While there were more people I could potentially ask for interviews, 
several factors were not playing in my favour: the political sensitivity of the case studies in 
question and the time elapsed since the negotiations were concluded. The 2005 reform of 
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the SGP and particularly the policy preferences and strategies of some member states‘ 
governments were still considered so sensitive in 2007, 2008 and to a lesser extent still in 
2009 that I was denied interviews by some people (5) who had been directly involved in 
these negotiations. This was notably the case in the political elite in Germany where my 
repeated requests were either directly refused or simply ignored. This was also the case 
when asking for interviews on the EC Regulation 883/2004, where 2 crucial potential 
interviewees did not reply at all. This posed certain challenges to researching and validating 
certain strategies, but in those cases I managed to have recourse to other people who, while 
not directly present at the negotiations, had intimate and insider knowledge of the 
negotiation process.  
 
The disadvantages of interviews are well known. The reliability of unstructured or semi-
structured interviews can be put into question, as they were not standardised. There may 
also be a lack of comparability as the order of the questions may have changed. However, it 
seems appropriate to use this format, rather than as a classic interview of short questions 
and answers in order to inspire confidence and structure the interview as a conversation. 
Interviews can also be time-consuming and costly.
281
 After I conducted two phone 
interviews, I realised that this was not an appropriate and effective way to get the 
information I needed. The interviewees did not share their frank assessments of the 
situation with me, and only gave me the ‗sanitised‘, official press statement version of the 
events. My suspicion is that phone interviews do neither create sufficient ‗intimacy‘ nor 
induce confidence in the interviewee to ‗confide‘ and give their true analysis of what 
happened and why it happened. Indeed, my face-to-face interviews were much more 
successful in gauging sensitive information than my two phone interviews. I therefore 
decided not to use phone interviews anymore and focused on face to face interviews. This 
meant I had to travel to Belgium, to the Netherlands, to Luxembourg and to Germany on 
several occasions. 
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The time elapsed since the negotiations took place proved to be quite a challenge in 
validating some of the statements or evaluations made by the interviewees. This was 
especially the case in the SGP in 1996 and the third case study on the EC Regulation 
883/2004, where negotiations started in 1999 and finished in 2003. There were manifest 
(and hopefully no unspotted) moments of confusion by the interviewees on dates, specific 
elements of the proposals and of names. I counteracted these concerns by cross-checking 
these statements with other interviewees and press statements or other public documents 
where available. The interview techniques were semi-structured interviews. I found this 
necessary again for reasons of political sensitivity, as the case studies were either politically 
sensitive at the domestic level in Luxembourg, or they were particularly sensitive in one of 
the other major actors‘ constituencies. In total, a number of 18 interviews were conducted 
for this research. They have been given a random alphabetical letter in this thesis, starting 
with A. For the first two cases I have used the same interviews- so there was no need to 
give them a separate letter in both cases. I have given the interviewees of the third case 
study also a random alphabetical letter, starting with A. It has to be said that those 
interviewees were all either directly involved in these negotiations at an EU level, or were 
important national actors, and therefore the value and quality of these interviews was very 
high. This is why academic expert surveys would not have provided an accurate picture: 
they would have supplied information on public opinion or on the debates between political 
economists. Public opinion did not have a great influence in any of these case studies; the 
subject of monetary union is very complex, while frontier workers are just not a salient 
issue in most member states. Hence, public opinion is only mentioned when considered 
relevant to domestic politics and when it was mentioned by the actors themselves as a 
(potential) constraint. 
 
4.2. Document analysis  
 
One of the techniques used was the analysis of primary and secondary sources, and 
documents. Commission documents and official national positions, government speeches, 
and Council minutes provided efficient means for carrying out research. Press statements 
from the Presidencies offered valuable insights into the progress of the negotiations. To be 
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fair, there were not many official national positions available to the public, which 
complicated the matter of determining policy preferences of individual member states. 
Official statistics, both from the Luxembourg Institute of Statistics (STATEC) and Eurostat 
provided some quantitative data on the attitudes towards European integration and other 
issues which preoccupied Luxembourg residents.  
 
The European Parliament was involved to different extents in the decision-making process 
of every case study. The EP Committee reports, publications and the transcriptions of the 
debates were also a source of information on the role its Members played in the process. 
The debates in the EP gave insights into the party positions and of national differences.  
 
Internal validity was sometimes difficult to establish as negotiations in the Council of 
Ministers were held in secret. Specific proposals of amendment rarely reached the public 
domain, except for the press statements of the presidency which shed a veiled light over 
them. Therefore measuring the policy effectiveness of a member state through the amount 
of amendments it proposed and those that got accepted could not be applied here. However, 
official Council documents such as the Minutes provided an important source of 
information, notably on which particular person was negotiating, or whether one member 
state had concerns it wanted to voice expressly in the Minutes. The first clue led to 
potential interviewees, and identifying whether an issue was salient or not to that member 
state in question (if it is salient, the highest person in rank will attend). The second clue 
provided important information on what the sensitive points in the negotiations were for at 
least one member state. Usually those statements referred to the reluctance or downright 
opposition of a member state on a particular issue. From those statements it could then be 
inferred the details and intensity of that member state‘s policy preferences, and, by 
extension, its negotiation strategy. Finally, in combination with the interviews, a more 
complete picture of the policy preferences, the negotiation process and the final outcome 
could be established and Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness could be evaluated through the 
use of mainly primary sources.  
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I used secondary sources in most stages of my research, as I needed a lot of information on, 
for example, the modalities of the SGP and its economic or political rationale, or the 
importance of economic and political ties between Luxembourg, France and Germany or 
between the Benelux countries. Secondary sources were useful as they involved 
generalization, analysis, interpretation, or evaluation of the final legislation in question, or 
of the issues surrounding it. Furthermore, I needed to do a lot of background research on 
the debates that were raging on the policies in question. So for example on the SGP, I 
initially had to compose a literature review on the modalities of the SGP before I could start 
the interview process. I had to familiarise myself with the concepts and consequences of 
budgetary coordination, of the debate between political economists on the usefulness of 
strict or lax rules of fiscal discipline, and its consequences on monetary union before I 
started asking questions to my interviewees. I felt that only if they would realise I was 
familiar with the issues under negotiation, they would be prepared to share their views and 
engage in the interview. This was not wasted time, as many of my interviewees actually 
asked me questions to find out my level of knowledge on the legislation under discussion! 
Newspaper articles, with their political bias, were also an object of the study, as they still 
gave an insight into how the media portrayed the Luxembourg government‘s performance 
at the European stage, and sometimes had insider information of the negotiation process.  
Using these sources was essential to find out the context and the issues of a particular case 
study, and helped both to prepare the interviews and to give a better description within the 
case study chapters. On the other hand, there is a dearth of secondary sources and political 
science analysis on the issue of frontier workers. It was difficult to find even primary 
sources (statistics, official ministerial documents) on the number of frontier workers in the 
member states! The primary sources of information in that case are therefore mainly 
European Commission, Council and EP documents, newspaper articles and regional 
government statistics. Secondary sources are few and far between- which shows that this 
case study fills a gap in the research on the legislation of the coordination of social security 
systems. 
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5. Contribution to the literature 
 
Various methods of investigation enable both a deeper understanding of the phenomena at 
hand and enable one to cross-check data gathered from different sources. In this section I 
have presented the rationale for the different methods, such as interviewing elites and 
document analysis. While the challenges of this particular research method have been 
openly acknowledged, the resources at my disposal and the constraints of the institutions 
under investigation hopefully excuse the imperfections. 
 
This framework aims to explain how we can analyse and assess a member state‘s policy 
effectiveness in the EU. The definition focuses on the outcome of negotiations: the final 
legislation, as approved by the Council of Ministers (and sometimes also the European 
Parliament in the case of co-decision or cooperation). It identifies several factors which 
condition policy effectiveness: domestic politics, the decision-making procedure, the 
distribution and intensity of preferences of the other member states, the office of the 
presidency, several individual-level factors. The framework suggests that a combination of 
several of these factors is necessary in order to be policy effective. Just like the domestic 
approach, it can be argued here that this framework  
―might be accused of having somewhat mixed intellectual parentage but it is 
arguably more embracing and/or more realistic as a device explaining Community 
negotiations than the alternatives on offer.‖282 
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Table 4.1: The framework for assessing policy effectiveness 
 
 
Negotiation 
context 
Distribution 
and intensity of 
preferences 
Presidency Individual-level 
factors 
Domestic 
politics 
Decision-
making 
procedure 
Number of 
member states 
Asymmetrical 
information 
Past relations Approval  
procedure 
Time pressure Distribution of 
preferences 
Control over 
procedure 
Experience, 
longevity 
Institutional 
coordination 
 Intensity of 
preferences 
 Inclusion in the 
delegation to a 
small circle of 
actors 
 
 
 
In order to manage expectations, it has to be made clear what this framework does not do: it 
does not pretend to be a general theory of EU integration, or of member states‘ actual 
power. This framework postulates that policy effectiveness is relational and conditional, 
and that it varies from case study to case study. Indeed, the variation in the degrees of 
policy effectiveness is a permanent feature of EU negotiations. No member state can expect 
to be highly policy effective in every negotiation. It cannot be expected that every member 
state‘s resources matter in every case to the same extent- simply because the environment 
in which decisions are taken changes. This framework does not assume that all the 
conditions under which outcomes come about are stable all the time.  
 
My research fills the gap between research on intergovernmentalism which focuses on big 
states, Tallberg‘s study of the power of member states when it chairs the presidency, and 
Beach‘s model on leadership in high profile constitutional negotiations. It hopefully 
complements Bailer‘s research on member state power in the EU. It tries to find out how a 
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country is able to shape outcomes in its favour, while not necessarily being a leader in 
negotiations. Too often, the focus of research has been on how member states provide 
―leadership‖ in high politics issues or Treaty negotiations- ignoring all the other cases of 
legislation which are equally important and may even affect citizens more. Indeed, a lot of 
research analyses how Treaty negotiations change the balance of power (i.e. the decision-
making procedures and the voting weights) between member states. This is a valuable area 
of study as these voting weights are an indication of the policy effectiveness of each 
member state at that point in time. But this sort of research ignores that these voting 
weights and procedures are only the starting point of analysis of policy effectiveness in any 
policy area. Indeed, it would be preposterous to assume that because Spain managed to get 
more votes than Poland during the Nice Treaty negotiations, it will always and in every 
case study be highly policy effective and more effective than Poland. The other gap this 
research intends to fill is one of case studies: Luxembourg is an understudied case, an 
academic omission which should not condoned because of its small size. The choice of 
using Luxembourg as a case study has other reasons as well: if a tiny member state such as 
Luxembourg can be policy effective then, arguably, any member state can. Luxembourg 
has extremely limited administrative resources, and while ―being wealthy doesn‘t hurt‖, it 
still suffers from structural disadvantages which it has to try and overcome.
283
 With the 
arrival of two other very small member states, Malta and Cyprus, and the possible 
accession of Iceland, it seems a long overdue subject of analysis of how these member 
states can get what they want. Finally, the choices of cases in which Luxembourg was or 
was not policy effective reflect both everyday legislation and high politics. 
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Chapter 5: The Negotiations of the Stability and Growth 
Pact in 1996, 1997 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This first case study treads on sensitive and highly political grounds: the budgetary policies 
of governments. It deals with how much governments should spend and, inter alia, how 
much say EU institutions should have over these policies. Luxembourg‘s policy 
effectiveness in the negotiations of these issues is the focus of this case study. The Treaty 
on Economic and Monetary Union organised the coordination of economic policies through 
different measures, and among them was the control of excessive public deficits. The 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was going to complete the Treaty in terms of the 
operationalisation of the surveillance of public deficits and of the strengthening of the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP).
284
  
 
This case study argues that Luxembourg was highly policy effective in these negotiations, 
as it managed to shape the compromise it proposed to France and Germany according to its 
own preferences. The case of the creation of the SGP was selected for this study because it 
throws up several intriguing questions. Why was Luxembourg‘s young Prime Minister 
hailed as the ―hero of Dublin‖ when those who called the shots in these negotiations were 
clearly German Chancellor Kohl and French President Chirac? It was widely argued that 
the PM successfully played the role of broker between Chirac and Kohl.
285
 The question is 
whether Luxembourg was able to influence the outcome according to its preferences. 
Finally it was also a case of high politics- an area where small countries usually are not 
expected to play a role and be policy effective.  
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 The first part of this chapter explains the context in which the SGP came into being, 
followed by the Commission proposal. Then the final outcome of the negotiations will be 
presented. We then turn to the discussion of the results: Was Luxembourg policy effective 
in these negotiations? The following sections deal with Luxembourg‘s domestic politics, 
the decision-making procedure and the diverging preferences of the member states on the 
usefulness and on the functioning of the SGP. The next section analyses whether the Irish 
presidency had an influence on the negotiations, or whether individual-level factors played 
a role. The findings suggest that institutional factors like holding the office of presidency of 
the Council of the European Union is not sufficient to be automatically designated as leader 
in sensitive negotiations, but that other structural and individual factors come into play, 
such as a government‘s reputation on the issue at hand. Finally, a careful assessment will 
show that reputation was the major factor for Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness, combined 
with the unique factors of institutional coordination that existed at the domestic politics 
level. 
 
 
2. Issue and context 
 
2.1. The build- up to the negotiations 
 
The Maastricht Treaty did not specify the modalities of the coordination of fiscal policies 
among the prospective Eurozone members after the Euro would be the single currency. 
Until the summer of 1995, actual implementation of the convergence criteria was not yet 
satisfactory in every respect. The degree of convergence reached varied among member 
states: while 11 of the 15 member states were in acceptable distance from the price stability 
and interest rate differential criteria, the fiscal positions of the public sector did not look so 
good. Only two member states fulfilled the convergence criteria: Luxembourg and 
Germany. From an economic perspective, it seemed necessary to provide better budget 
coordination for several reasons: 1) a need for consolidation 2) concerns about externalities 
3) the credibility of the European Central Bank 4) the need for a more coherent framework 
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of economic policy coordination.
286
 The need for consolidation of state budgets resulted 
from the expansionary fiscal stance of most member states since the welfare state started to 
grow. High inflation rates at the time caused rising interest rates, which in turn induced 
underemployment, reduced investment and weak growth. Furthermore depreciation due to 
fiscal profligacy would affect the whole currency zone. The credibility of the ECB 
independence and the ―no bail-out clause‖ were causes for concern if one member state 
should follow an unsustainable fiscal stance. The no bail-out clause stated that neither the 
ECB nor the EU would provide funds to or buy bonds of a national government that 
became insolvent. However, the ECB would eventually be forced to buy government 
bonds, thereby causing eventually the price levels to rise. Finally, the last concern was 
about economic policy coordination.  
 
Politically, there were two options to prevent fiscal profligacy of member states. One was 
to make the rules legally binding through a Treaty modification or through a Protocol 
annexed to the Treaty; and the other was to keep the modalities as voluntary agreements, 
thereby risking their not being followed by all the member states.
287
  
 
 
2.2. Setting the stage for the idea of a Stability Pact from 1995 to 1996: a German idea? 
 
Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and the Nordic States favoured a clear and rules-based 
system that would contain quantified budgetary deficits. The German government was 
concerned that the independence and monetary policy of the European Central Bank would 
be undermined by the unsound fiscal policy practices of the member states and the ECB 
would have to assume the burden of price stability on its own.
288
 The need grew for 
Germany to obtain clear modalities for enforcing at least the deficit criterion.  
―The sanctions became the subject of a public debate orchestrated by Bundesbank 
President Hans Tietmeyer. The debate picked up during autumn 1995. (…) Waigel 
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and Kohl were now under severe political pressure for several reasons. Public 
opinion was becoming very negative towards EMU in Germany. The SPD 
opposition party was making populist remarks on the dangers to stability stemming 
from the EMU project and demanding stricter rules, thereby literally mirroring 
Bundesbank statements.‖289 
 
The German Finance Ministry started to sound out major member states‘ responses to its 
ideas, which were then floated under the name of ―fiscal policy Schengen agreement.‖290 
The main problem seemed to be getting an agreement between the executive branch and the 
Parliament to agree to a modification of national budget law and of the budget 
implementation process in accordance with the consolidation requirements of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Waigel‘s proposal recommended that government deficit should not 
exceed 1 % of GDP (as opposed to 3 % for accession) and that, should a Member State 
exceed this threshold, the sanctions laid down in the Treaty would be applied automatically. 
Furthermore, a ―European Stability Council‖ would review the main features and goals of 
the Stability Pact, report on the implementation of the commitments and decide on 
exemptions from the observance of the upper deficit limit in the case of extreme 
exceptional circumstances. Reasons would be given for such divergence and a special 
convergence plan would have to be presented for its correction. The Commission‘s role 
would be restricted to presenting the deficit data.  
―The cornerstones of a common approach to national fiscal policy would be: 
 Sustained support for ECB monetary policy through spending discipline and 
consistency in the public sector policy; 
 Sparing use of financial markets; 
 A ceiling on the government share in order to provide the public and private 
sectors with room for manoeuvre; 
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 Greater preponderance in public expenditure of general government investments 
operating under near-market conditions and the promotion of private 
investments‖291 
Waigel‘s proposal was timely as some sort of secondary legislation was necessary to lay 
out the sanctions mechanism of Article 104 of the Treaty of Maastricht. Therefore an 
opportunity arose to develop a preventive part in parallel. The southern member states 
(especially Italy) were the cause for concern for the Germans in a monetary union, not only 
with respect to their important public debts, but also the Italian political tradition of using 
inflation to overcome internal difficulties.
292
 The Benelux states and Denmark, on the 
contrary, and even to a certain degree France with the U-turn of Mitterrand‘s policies of 
1983, had effectively abandoned their monetary policies and associated with the 
Bundesbank. They had learned to live with stable prices and a stable currency and to use 
other instruments of adaptation if necessary. The position of Germany, then, was very clear: 
it wanted to establish a Stability Pact according to its own vision- but how did the 
Commission react to a proposal which effectively sidelined it? 
 
3. The Commission proposal 
 
In a note to the Monetary Committee, the Commission positioned itself on the German 
initiative of a Stability Pact in March 1996. It considered the 1 percent of GDP deficit 
target as arbitrary, and that once a medium term budgetary target well below the 3 percent 
of GDP was retained at the national level, there would be no need for additional constraints 
on the public debt-GDP ratio.
293
 The Commission also considered that, in view of the 
differing degrees of real convergence and demographic outlooks among member states, 
there were different constraints that member states face. Small countries additionally would 
need more budgetary manoeuvre in order to deal with cyclical developments. Furthermore 
it included an increased role for itself in the surveillance of budgetary positions- that it 
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could make a report and adopt an opinion on the risk of an excessive deficit. While there 
were more notes from the Commission to the MC, the general thrust of its suggestions was 
that automatic sanctions would not be appropriate for economic and political reasons.  
 
The Commission, prompted by the Council, released its own proposal in October 1996.
294
 
It developed the preventive arm of the SGP as a device for economic policy coordination. It 
believed that 3 percent of GDP should be the reference value maintained without the 
automatic application of sanctions, and instead advocated that the decision to impose them 
should be taken by the Council of Ministers. The Commission, together with some 
countries, felt that the Council should be left with some degree of discretion. It stated that 
the legislative basis for the commitment to apply rigorously the procedures of the Treaty 
should be a Declaration by the European Council.
295
 It suggested that the vote on imposing 
sanctions on a noncompliant member state should be taken by unanimity. Sanctions should 
not exceed 0.5% of GDP. Finally, it suggested that it should make a recommendation to the 
Council as to the existence or not of an excessive deficit on the part of a member state.  
 
4. The timeline of the negotiations 
The negotiations on the creation of the SGP were held in the Monetary Committee, the 
Ecofin Council, and the European Council and at Franco-German meetings. The MC had 
already settled most of the issues apart from the EDP.
296
 While member states agreed to the 
German demands on the principle of mutual surveillance and prevention of excessive 
deficits, the triggering of automatic sanctions, the definition of a ‗severe recession and 
exceptional circumstances‘ were hotly disputed.297 The MC presented three possible 
definitions of a ―severe recession‖ to the ECOFIN in Dublin:298 These were the proposals 
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that the Finance Ministers (and later on, the heads of state and governments) were asked to 
work on.  
At the informal Council of Finance Ministers and the European Council in Dublin on 12-13 
December 1996 the main point of contention was the automatic imposition of sanctions. 
The German government called for a clear definition of, and restriction on, extenuating 
circumstances which were countered by a (French) insistence on the discretionary powers 
of the Council. It was also clear to Germany that  
―the Stability and Growth Pact would be the main protection for small states from 
the bad behaviour of the large member states. If a small state makes a mistake, the 
big states do not feel the consequences as much. But if a large member state makes 
a mistake, we have a different situation in the monetary union and all the member 
states feel the consequences, with possibly higher interest rates
299‖.  
Germany adopted again the traditional role of protector of the small states in the EU. 
Meanwhile, the talks were interrupted several times both to give the Irish ECOFIN 
chairman Quinn an opportunity to work out a compromise proposal and to attempt to 
reconcile French and German demands. Waigel argued it was no longer possible to turn 
away from the resolutions of Verona and Florence without sacrificing credibility.
300
  
 
In the first phase of the negotiations, the Finance Ministers tried to clarify the 
implementation and acceleration of the EDP.  
―The chairman proposed that, as a matter of principle, the Commission treat a 
deficit ceiling violation as exceptional in its mandatory report only if it were 
accompanied by a decline in real GDP of at least 1.5 per cent. If the decline in GDP 
lay between 0.75 per cent and 1.5 per cent the Council was to decide whether it was 
possible to justify the deficit in terms of exceptional circumstances.
301‖  
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This proposal met with considerable opposition, especially by France who insisted on more 
discretionary leeway for the Council irrespective of the decline in GDP. The French were 
particularly intransigent and it has been suggested the Finance Minister Arthuis had no 
leeway in the negotiations.
302
 Indeed, Chirac held a national television interview on the 
proposed Stability and Growth Pact (among other issues) that evening and Arthuis had been 
instructed that he should not make any concessions or let the negotiations progress until 
Chirac came to Dublin. Chirac was furious about the automatic sanctions proposal and saw 
it as an attack on French sovereignty. During this interview, he said :  
―The Stability and Growth Pact, as devised by some German technocrats, has 
evolved in the framework of the European negotiation and will be what it must be, 
that is simply a guardrail to prevent people who are not very serious letting 
themselves go in the management of their currency in this or that country.‖  
When the journalist noted that the negotiations were not finished yet, he replied:  
―On the Stability Pact, I would simply like to say a word. I approved the Maastricht 
Treaty, as you know, without enthusiasm. Not because of the convergence criteria, 
that is to say the obligation not to exceed a certain level of debt, because I was very 
much in favour of that and they are simply rules of good conduct. The convergence 
criteria in the Maastricht Treaty are simply crash barriers which one puts on a road 
to prevent an imprudent car falling in the ravine.  Those are the convergence 
criteria, and when we say: we will make a Stability Pact to prevent certain countries, 
which will be in the currency zone, giving themselves too many facilities, we are 
right. A rule of the game is necessary, otherwise we have certain disadvantages.‖303  
He went on to state that the EU needed a political institution which is parallel to the 
European Central Bank. This institution would have to be the European Council. Those 
member states in the Eurozone would have to form a political power which could indicate 
clearly to the monetary power what its limits for action were, to which it would be 
accountable, just like in the US or in Germany. The assembly of Heads of State and 
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Government should be able to give directions to the monetary institution. He clearly did not 
want the ECOFIN to arrive at an agreement before or during that interview, without his 
involvement. These statements indicate that he did not envisage automatic sanctions and 
still questioned the independence of the European Central Bank. When he arrived at the 
meeting in Dublin, negotiations could finally progress.  
The next morning, the European Council met without having a preliminary agreement of 
the Finance Ministers. Kohl had the idea of charging Juncker with mediating an agreement, 
but Chirac wanted to discuss it in the large circle of the Council. Wim Kok, the Dutch 
Prime Minister, supported fully Kohl‘s idea, and so an ad hoc group was created.304 Jacques 
Chirac, President of France, Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and John Bruton, Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, charged Jean-Claude Juncker 
to mediate between Theo Waigel and Jean Arthuis, Finance Ministers of Germany and 
France respectively. An informal working group was set up; composed of a French, a 
German and a Luxembourg delegation (their deputies were included).  
 Juncker realised that an agreement was possible and suggested that the exact figures be 
omitted and should be mentioned in a Council Resolution, not in one of the two 
Regulations.
305
  This legal distinction weakens the importance of these figures and 
increases the discretionary powers of the Council. He proposed furthermore that, 
concerning the grey areas between the agreed figures of a decline of GDP, the Council 
should hear the defence of the member state concerned and that the decision on a resolution 
against a member state should be taken by qualified majority vote. The result was a 
compromise which stipulated that a recession of less than 0.75% ―as a rule‖ does not 
qualify as exceptional whereas a recession of over 2% automatically does. If the recession 
lies between those two figures, the Ecofin Council decides whether or not it is deemed 
exceptional. If the EDP is started, only EMU member states have a vote. Heipertz and 
Verdun have described the pact as the ―institutionalization of a political pledge to aim for 
low deficits.‖306 
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5. What is the Stability and Growth Pact? 
 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which emerged as a consequence  
―represents a new historical development. For the first time a number of sovereign 
countries adopt a set of common fiscal rules and an elaborated multilateral 
surveillance mechanism.‖307  
It was laid down in two Council Regulations and a Resolution of the European Council. 
The first Regulation 1455/97 ‗on the strengthening of surveillance of budgetary positions 
and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies‘ was based on Article 99 and 
addressed the preventive side of the Pact. The second Regulation 1456/07 ‗on speeding up 
and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure‘ was based on Article 
104 and addressed the dissuasive side.  The Resolution of the European Council provided 
political guidance to the parties who implement the Pact. The SGP was based on two 
pillars: on the one hand, a multilateral surveillance of the budgetary situations through 
stability programmes which were presented annually to the Commission and the other 
member states, and on the other through the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP).  
 
5.1. The preventive side of the SGP  
 
The first Regulation established an early-warning system in order to prevent a government 
deficit exceeding the 3 percent public deficit/ GDP reference value. Even though the Treaty 
of Maastricht set out the criteria of 3 per cent deficit and 60 per cent debt, the debt criterion 
was absent from the EDP. The procedure was as follows:
308
 Eurozone Member states had to 
submit Stability programmes focused on the public finances and included ‗a medium-term 
objective of a budgetary position close to balance or in surplus and the adjustment path 
towards this objective‘. These programmes would be examined by the Eurogroup within at 
most two months of the submission of the programme. The Council assessed ‗whether the 
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medium budget objective in the stability/convergence programme provides for a safety 
margin to ensure the avoidance of an excessive deficit‘. The Council then issued an opinion 
on the programme and could suggest modifications to adhere to this goal. The opinion and 
possible recommendation of the Council had to be based on a recommendation of the 
European Commission. The implementation of the programmes was monitored by the 
Council. If it identified a significant divergence of the budgetary position, then a 
recommendation could be made to the member state concerned to take the necessary 
adjustment measures. What was noticeable was that neither the Commission nor the 
Council were obliged to submit either an assessment or a recommendation. If this 
divergence persisted or worsened, the Council issued another recommendation to the 
member state to take prompt corrective measures, but this time the recommendation would 
be made public. The early warning system was applied individually to each member state, 
but the Council also issued an overall assessment as to whether the content of the Stability 
programmes facilitated the coordination of policies and whether the economic policies of 
the member state concerned were consistent with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
(BEPG).  
 
5.2. The dissuasive side of the SGP 
 
The goal of this early warning system was to prevent a member state from finding itself in 
an excessive deficit situation. However, this situation might occur if an unexpected 
situation raised the deficit or the Council recommendations were not observed. Therefore 
Article 104 of the Treaty laid out the Excessive Deficit Procedure from its identification to 
its correction. Several opportunities to correct the excessive deficit were given to the 
member state concerned. If it did not take corrective action, the pressure by the Council 
increased, eventually leading to pecuniary sanctions.  The Regulation clarified and set 
precise deadlines to the steps of this procedure. As Stark explained, ―Article 104 punishes 
not the sin but the failure to repent.‖309 The main aspects of the EDP were the definition of 
‗excessive deficit‘, the time span up to the application of sanctions, the deadline for the 
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correction of the excessive deficit, the assessment of the results of the corrective action 
taken, and finally, the application of sanctions and the amounts and mechanisms of the 
sanctions.  
 
A government deficit was not considered excessive if ‗the excess over 3 per cent of GDP is 
only exceptional and temporary and the government deficit ratio remains close to the 
reference value‘.310 The SGP foresaw that a deficit over 3 per cent could be considered 
exceptional if 1) it resulted from an unusual event outside the control of the member state 
(for example, a natural disaster) or 2) it resulted from a severe economic downturn. A 
severe economic downturn was defined as an annual fall of real GDP of at least 2 per cent. 
If the Council decided that the circumstances were exceptional or temporary, then no 
excessive deficit existed and no EDP was launched against that member state.  
On the other hand, if the Council decided that an excessive deficit existed, the procedure 
continued and ‗exceptional or temporary conditions‘ could not be invoked anymore at any 
later stage of the procedure. This left considerable room for political discretion for the 
Eurogroup. The Commission always prepared a report when there was (or it looked likely 
to be) a deficit over 3 per cent, even if there were exceptional and temporary circumstances 
under Article 104 (3). This report initialised the EDP and was then sent to the Economic 
and Financial Committee (EFC) for its opinion. Taking this opinion into account, the 
Commission had to decide whether the deficit was excessive or not. If it did decide so, it 
sent a recommendation for a Council decision. If the economic downturn was over 2 
percent of real GDP, the Commission would note this in its report and the EFC would 
consider that the excessive deficit was not excessive and the EDP would stop here. If the 
economic downturn was less than 2 percent of real GDP, the member state concerned could 
present arguments justifying the excessive deficit, if the annual fall in real GDP was at least 
0.75 percent. If this fall in real GDP was less than 0.75 percent, exceptional circumstances 
could not be invoked.  
 
Only between 0.75 and 2 percent could a member state try to convince the others that no 
EDP should be launched. Again, there was considerable room for political discretion for the 
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Eurogroup. The time span up to the application of sanctions was ten months. The data had 
to be sent by 1 March or 1 September. The Council had to decide at the latest on whether an 
excessive deficit exists three months after. If the Council made a recommendation to the 
member state concerned, the latter had four months to redeem the situation. If the Council 
esteemed that no effective measures had been taken, within a month it would give a notice 
to the member state. If that member state failed to comply with that notice, sanctions would 
be imposed within two months.  
 
The issue of the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit was addressed in the 
Regulation and in the European Council Resolution. As Cabral noted however,  
―there is the possibility of allowing a longer period for the correction of the 
excessive deficit, because the Pact states that the above mentioned rules holds 
unless there are special circumstances. This suggests that the Council did not want 
to be very rigid in this area, recognising that there might be cases in which the 
correction of a deficit might require more time: the specific situation of each 
excessive deficit and the causes behind it should be examined by the Council. The 
second comment is on the ambiguity of the term ‗identification‘; it is difficult to 
accept any way of identifying an excessive deficit other than a Council decision for 
that purpose. Identification may not be the same as occurrence.‖311  
The Council had to assess the results that the corrective action by the member state have 
produced on the basis of actual data of the budgetary outcome of a year already elapsed. 
The Council also had discretion on the time limit to give to the member state concerned. If 
the excessive deficit was not corrected within that time limit, then the Council 
automatically moved into the domain of the sanctions. The application of the sanctions was 
not automatic but was based on a decision of the Council. The sanction was a non-interest 
bearing deposit, which was kept until either it was turned into a fine after two years if the 
excessive deficit was not corrected or it was returned to the member state before the two 
years if the Council considered that the excessive deficit had been corrected. Once a year, 
the Council assessed whether the excessive deficit had been corrected. If this was not the 
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case then the sanctions would be intensified through imposing a new non-interest bearing 
deposit. No single deposit could exceed 0.5 percent of GDP. The sanctions were distributed 
to those member states which have adopted the single currency and did not have an 
excessive deficit. Their share was proportional to their share in total GDP.  
 
 
6. Luxembourg’s policy effectiveness 
 
Having presented the build-up to the creation of the SGP, the Commission proposal and the 
timeline of the negotiations, we can now turn to the discussion of the results. What did 
Luxembourg seek in this agreement? Was it policy effective? If so, which factors 
influenced this policy effectiveness?  
 
6.1. Luxembourg‟s preferences and strategy 
 
Luxembourg‘s national interests, as a small state, were naturally biased towards the 
enforcement of rules and norms rather than voluntary agreements in international relations. 
Thus on that point Luxembourg‘s preference was naturally closer to that of Germany‘s and 
the Netherlands‘, in the sense of having secondary legislation on the budgetary surveillance 
and the EDP. On the other hand, Luxembourg usually preferred communautarian 
agreements to intergovernmental agreements like Schengen- it wanted to see the 
Commission involved in the process of assessing budgetary positions and medium-term 
objectives. Waigel‘s proposal of an intergovernmental agreement was thus received with 
mixed feelings by Luxembourg.
312
 The government wanted to have a stable framework of 
budgetary surveillance and relatively clear definitions of an excessive deficit, with the 
Commission involved in most stages of the whole procedure. Furthermore, as a small state, 
even a wealthy one, Luxembourg was interested in accommodating cyclical developments 
in a flexible way- thus it was against an automatic imposition of sanctions in the case of an 
excessive deficit. Verdun and Heipertz state that, in general, Luxembourg was closer to 
France for reasons of balancing German predominance, but unfortunately they do not 
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elaborate on which points or on how they arrive at such a conclusion.
313
 Nevertheless, I 
would argue that the government was in favour of budgetary rigour and that it should be 
enforced on a European level: ―Luxembourg was supportive of the Germans- without 
doubt- from the start.‖314 
 
6.2. Was Luxembourg policy effective in the creation of the SGP? 
 
Luxembourg managed to achieve most of the objectives it had set for the creation of the 
SGP in 1996, although not necessarily in those two days in Dublin. In fact it was achieved 
earlier. It could be argued indeed that Luxembourg was ―band-waggoning‖ a lot in this 
case. Luxembourg has always had a tradition of trying to have a balanced budget, and was 
the only member state, along with Belgium, who had any experience of belonging to a 
monetary union. It could be argued that this new EU monetary union was a step for both 
further independence and interdependence for the small country within a bigger framework. 
Indeed, Luxembourg‘s position changed from one having no control of its monetary policy 
to a position of having one Member of the Governing Board of the System of European 
Central Banks, with the same voting rights on monetary policy as any other member of that 
currency union. Luxembourg did have an interest in having a rules-based SGP, as its 
experiences in the currency association with Belgium and in the ERM demonstrated the 
potential pitfalls of the new currency union and its possible consequences for the 
Luxembourg economy.  
 
Of the issues that were not very controversial in Dublin anymore, the involvement of the 
Commission was something that Luxembourg had wanted. The process of the EDP was 
stretched over a period of roughly a year, on the basis of a Commission recommendation 
and a decision by QMV by the Council. The medium term objectives were also included in 
the annual stability programmes- an aspect of the preventive side of the SGP which was of 
importance to Luxembourg. There was a real need for agreement for the Luxembourg 
government, and Prime Minister Juncker actively worked towards that goal as mediator 
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between the two main actors. It was clear that these tensions had to be resolved sooner 
rather than later, and these few controversial issues could not be allowed to jeopardise the 
introduction of the Euro. The government realised that the discussions had been going on 
for over a year and only a few, delicate issues had to be resolved. These were not 
insurmountable, as the government discovered, and devised compromise solutions 
accordingly. 
 
Furthermore, the legal basis and therefore strength of the criteria for claiming a deficit was 
not excessive were watered down- on a proposal by PM Juncker to put them in a 
Resolution instead of a Regulation. More specifically, member states undertook not to 
 ―invoke the exceptional nature of a deficit linked to an annual fall in GDP of less 
than 2% unless they are in severe recession (annual fall in real GDP of at least 
0.75%).‖315   
Having presented the issues and the context of these negotiations and looked at what 
Luxembourg wanted and what it eventually got, the following sections present the analysis 
and discussion on which factors influence a member state‘s policy effectiveness.  
 
 
7. Discussion 
 
7.1. Domestic Politics 
 
7.1.1. Luxembourg: From one currency union to another  
 
One of Luxembourg‘s biggest national interests in European integration was access to the 
markets of France, Germany and other European countries.  A common currency was 
therefore a significant improvement for economic relations. Luxembourg was already in an 
economic union and monetary association with Belgium. The Belgo-Luxembourg 
Economic Union (UEBL) was created in 1922. Belgium and Luxembourg had separate 
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currencies (the Belgian Franc BEF and the Luxembourgish Franc LUF) but had parity 
exchanges and could be used in both countries. The monetary policy was effectively under 
the control of the Belgian monetary authorities, even though a common institution 
regulated the exchanges. These are two important differences with the current European 
monetary union: firstly, there was no single currency used by several member states, but 
parity between two currencies; secondly, there were no common decision-making 
institutions in the Belgo-Luxembourg currency association.  
 
Luxembourg has a long tradition mostly of cooperation, but also of conflict with Belgium 
on their currency association. In 1982, the decision of the Belgian government to 
unilaterally devalue the Belgian Franc by 8.5 percent to cut their debt strongly upset the 
Luxembourg government. For Luxembourg‘s Prime Minister Pierre Werner, this decision 
constituted a violation of the principle of co-decision of the Belgo-Luxembourg monetary 
protocols. On June 1
st
 1983 the ‗Institut Monétaire Luxembourgeois‘ (IML) was created, 
allowing the Grand Duchy to affirm its monetary identity and to be an equal partner with 
the other member states in the European Monetary System (EMS). The IML was not yet a 
central bank in the strict definition of the term- but there was an intention to give the IML 
all the necessary competencies to fulfill the role of a central bank in case the Luxembourg 
government decided to end the monetary association with Belgium.  
 
In 1993, a meeting of European Finance Ministers had to decide on the appreciations and 
depreciations of the EMS currencies and on the fluctuation margins. Germany threatened to 
walk out of the currency union project, and the Netherland threatened to do the same. 
France was asking for an appreciation of the DeutschMark, and because Belgium had such 
high debts and deficits, they would certainly have sided with France. If Belgium stayed in 
the monetary association and tied its destiny with France,   Luxembourg would have to 
leave the EMS with Belgium. But the Finance Minister stated that he would join Germany 
and the Netherlands. The Luxembourg government took the secret decision to print bank 
notes and coins. Billions of new Luxembourgish Francs were stored in a secret location.
316
 
The Luxembourg government felt sidelined and ignored by the Belgians and needed an 
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element of pressure to bring the Belgians round. Therefore, Luxembourg‘s position was 
historically closer to the Dutch and the Germans, but a certain feeling of solidarity and the 
many connections between the two countries‘ monetary institutions impeded them from 
voicing their concerns in public. Indeed, this dramatic action was only made public in 2001.  
 
Luxembourg‘s institutions were thus ill-prepared for being an equal partner in a true 
monetary union. Institutions had to be created and laws passed to establish a fully 
independent central bank with the necessary competencies.
317
 The currency association 
with Belgium was, on the whole, satisfactory and a success. Indeed, the currency 
association lasted over 70 years.  But in times of crisis, the Belgian authorities did not 
always take into account the economic situation in Luxembourg, but were rather more 
concerned with their own interests. This section also demonstrates that Luxembourg and 
Belgium had some sort of experience of currency associations before the ERM was 
instituted. This new EU monetary union was a step for both further independence and 
interdependence for the small country within a bigger framework. It could also go some 
way explaining why Luxembourg did have an interest in having a rules-based SGP, as its 
experiences in the currency association with Belgium and in the ERM demonstrated the 
potential pitfalls of the new currency union and its possible consequences for the 
Luxembourg economy.  
 
 
Luxembourg‘s government did not encounter domestic much pressure on the issue of the 
SGP. As regards the finer details of budgetary rigour and surveillance and coordination of 
economic policies, the philosophy had always been to have a balanced budget or in surplus. 
Luxembourg‘s economy is characterised by stability, low inflation and unemployment, 
moderate growth and high-income. The government has managed to keep the budget in 
balance or in surplus over the last decades. It was exempt from certain European trends and 
constraints on holding a pro-European stance, and from many of the constraints faced by 
the main players in the project of economic and monetary union. The domestic political 
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context was much more favourable to an unequivocal commitment for the project. The 
stability of the successive governments and the favourable public opinion and economic 
context all contributed to this.  Therefore the government always leaned more towards a 
strict interpretation of the Pact.  
 
Coordination between and within ministries was not a significant factor, as the final 
negotiations were held in a small ad hoc group at the ministerial and Heads of State level. 
Nevertheless, one factor which played a very important role was the fact that Prime 
Minister Juncker was simultaneously the Finance Minister, thereby being able to attend and 
negotiate both in the Ecofin and in the European Council. At the ECOFIN Council, two 
advisors could aid their Minister, while at the European Council no advisors were allowed 
to be present in the negotiations. The Finance Ministers had to inform their Heads of State 
or Prime Ministers on the progress of the negotiations and the changing positions of the 
other member states. Misunderstandings were likely to happen in these situations when 
negotiations moved rapidly.
318
  
 
Expertise and knowledge were unevenly dispersed in the Council of Ministers and in the 
European Council. Only someone who could negotiate between the Ministers of Finance 
and the Heads of State and government and who had the expertise would make it possible 
to get out of the impasse. As no agreement could be found at the lower levels, i.e. at the 
Monetary Committee, and only partial agreement at the ECOFIN Council, the issue had to 
be referred to the level of heads of state and government, some of whom had only limited 
expertise in monetary issues of this kind. Kohl had asked Juncker to mediate between his 
government and the French government in an ad hoc group comprising a Luxembourgish, a 
French, a German and an Irish delegation, later to be followed in the European Council 
meeting by an ad hoc group between Kohl and Chirac and Juncker. An informal working 
group was set up, composed of a French, a German and a Luxembourg delegation (their 
deputies were included). Luxembourg participants in the working group were Juncker, 
Robert Goebbels (Minister of the Economy), and Yves Mersch. Luxembourg‘s former PM 
Jacques Santer was also present as he was the Commission President. As Juncker was 
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chosen to hammer out a compromise, he had the opportunity to shape the possible solutions 
presented to the other players according to his own ideas.  
 
 
7.2. The negotiation context 
 
Whether the decision-making procedure mattered in Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness is a 
matter of discussion; after all the decision was supposedly taken consensually. In the case 
of the creation of the SGP in 1996/1997, the decision-making procedure was QMV in the 
Council for both Regulations. Qualified Majority (QMV) had as its basis of Article 205 of 
the EC Treaty in 1996. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the voting weights were distributed as 
follows in the Council:  
 
Table 5.1 : Voting weights in the Council in 1996:  
 
Country  Votes 
France, Italy, Germany, UK 10 
Spain 9 
Belgium, Greece, Portugal, The 
Netherlands 
5 
Austria, Sweden 4 
Denmark, Ireland, Finland 3 
Luxembourg 2 
QMV 62 
Total 132 
Source: European Commission.
319
 
 
There were two broad camps within the Council: on the French side, there was Italy, 
Portugal Belgium and Greece. Germany could count on the support from the Netherlands, 
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Finland, Sweden and Austria. As argued above, Luxembourg was probably between the 
two camps, while there is no clear cut information on Ireland and Spain. Therefore, the 
votes were distributed more or less equally in this case; moreover it was clear that only a 
consensus between these camps would ensure that the political agreement would be 
honoured afterwards. Most importantly, it was necessary to get France and Germany to 
agree on it. While Germany could still issue the credible threat of leaving the monetary 
union, it was also clear that a monetary union without France would not make much sense 
either. Therefore voting weights mattered in a secondary way. 
 
The involvement of the European Parliament varied. While the EP was ‗cooperating‘ with 
the Council on the drafting of the Regulation 1466/97 on the surveillance of budgetary 
positions, it was only consulted on the drafting of  Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. There 
were two divisions within the EP during their debates on these Regulations: the first and 
dominant division ran along party lines (left-right cleavages) and the second ran along 
national lines. However, the EP cooperated and consulted well with the Council. 
 
No agreement would have delayed the timely introduction of ERM II and of the Euro as a 
currency. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the budgetary issue in any domestic politics and 
the implications for the sovereignty of setting up the budget could not be underestimated. 
After all, it was and is a domain of national sovereignty to set up the national budget. Yet 
there was a consensus for the creation of improved budgetary coordination among 
Eurozone members and a strong political will for agreement. Considering that the final 
regulations had to be drafted either with the consent or cooperation of the European 
Parliament, the heads of state knew it would take some months before the Regulation 
would be drafted, approved and enter into force. Hence time pressure nudged both camps to 
come to an agreement. 
 
In conclusion it can be argued that the negotiation context mattered only to a low extent in 
this case. Because the decision was taken consensually and the two alliances had roughly 
the same voting weight, it was clear that the outcome would be found in the middle- where 
147 
Luxembourg was positioned. The decision-making procedure in the Council and in the EP 
mattered only indirectly. The most significant element was the time pressure- this has been 
repeatedly stressed by the interviewees.
320
 We shall now look deeper into these two camps, 
focusing on Germany and France.  
 
 
7.3. The preferences of the member states 
 
The positions and strategies of the most important players in these negotiations - naturally 
Germany and France - were instrumental in realising the grand project of economic and 
monetary union.  The empirical evidence gathered indicates that the national debates in 
these countries, the ideologies and internal domestic institutional struggles for determining 
the strategy of both countries are firstly, not as straightforward as commonly assumed and, 
secondly influence significantly the outcome of the eventual negotiations. The first section 
analyses therefore the German domestic struggles for a common position on EMU and 
presents their allies, while the second section looks at the French domestic struggles and 
presents their respective allies.  
 
7.3.1. Germany 
 
Initially, the Germans showed little enthusiasm for the project, and in purely economic 
terms, ―there was precious little advantage for the Germans in a monetary union.‖321 
Tsoukalis affirmed that ―what finally tipped the balance was the perceived need to reaffirm 
the country‘s commitment to European integration in the wake of German unification.‖322 
Economically, export-oriented West Germany had profited from a free trade zone while 
politically, its binding into an EEC helped to alleviate any fears of German dominance. 
When the Wall came down, the regeneration of East Germany was a political and social 
priority, and this resulted in huge costs for West Germany. The transfer payments to East 
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Germany totaled approximately 600 billion Euro by 2000, and high expenditure and low 
growth increased public debt from around 42 per cent to over 60 per cent in 1997.
323
 From 
the 1990s onwards, the cross-party consensus, the public opinion on the ‗Westbindung‘, 
market pressures and the economic benefits of the larger EEC market slowly changed due 
to the consequences of reunification and European integration.  
 
We have a very clear indication of Germany‘s preferences through the proposal for a 
‗Stability Pact for Europe‘ by Theo Waigel, its Finance Minister.324 It recommended that 
government deficits should not exceed 1 % of GDP (as opposed to 3 % for accession) and 
that, should a Member State exceed this threshold, the sanctions laid down in the Treaty 
would be applied automatically. Furthermore, a ―European Stability Council‖ would review 
the main features and goals of the Stability Pact, report on the implementation of the 
commitments and decide on exemptions from the observance of the upper deficit limit in 
the case of extreme exceptional circumstances. Reasons would be given for such 
divergence and a special convergence plan would have to be presented for its correction. 
The Commission‘s role would be restricted to presenting the deficit data. One interviewee 
summarised it as follows:  
―We wanted as little room for manoeuvre as possible for member states and for the 
Commission. For the ECOFIN Council we wanted as least discretionary room as 
possible. This certainly was a maximal position which was very difficult to push 
through. But we argued that these sanctions are not an invention of this new SGP, 
but they are explicitly foreseen in the Treaty of Maastricht.‖325 
 
Turning towards the domestic actors, several observations can be made. The Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU-CSU) were in a coalition government with the Liberal Party 
(FDP) from 1980 to 1997, during which time the CDU/CSU held the Chancellorship 
(Helmut Kohl) and the CSU the post of Finance Minister (Theo Waigel), while the FDP 
held the Foreign Office (with Hans- Dietrich Genscher and from 1992 Klaus Kinkel). The 
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European agenda of Kohl and Genscher had a federalist flavour, in line with the tradition of 
Christian Democrats, with ideational concepts such as subsidiarity, personalism and the 
social market.  
 
There are several actors in the German political system which influenced its position on 
EMU from 1989 to 1997: on the one hand the Federal Finance Ministry, the Federal 
Ministry for Economics and the Bundesbank who could be classified as the financial élite. 
On the other hand there was the Chancellor and his office and the Foreign Office who could 
be considered the foreign policy élite.  The other actors would be the German public, the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Bundestag. The financial élite‘s guiding principle 
was ―sound money‖. The belief in this primacy of economics and price stability led it to 
demand strict budgetary and fiscal policies in EMU, otherwise high interest rates and 
inflation would be the consequence. For the Bundesbank, automatic sanctions were of an 
absolute necessity. The Finance Ministry promised the Bundesbank to do what was 
possible.
326
 The foreign policy élite  
―did not have any principled objections to the quest for a purely stability-minded 
EMU as promoted by the financial élite. However, most Chancellors and Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs did object to the primacy of economics that the German financial 
élite advocated.‖327   
 
The opposition SPD‘s European policy has been shaped by several circumstances during 
the 1990s: it was in opposition from the start of the EMU project in the 1980s until 1997, 
after the creation of the SGP. Reunification radically changed the environment for EU 
policy-making in the SPD which encouraged a more short term and materialistic approach 
to international relations and also had a psychological effect in terms of the increased self-
confidence in international affairs. Oskar Lafontaine, Rudolf Scharping and Gerhard 
Schröder were the high profile leaders who tried to gain votes by being against the EMU 
project. A new approach to EU policy after the elections in 1994 was characterised by 
pragmatism and ideological flexibility. It was also more closely linked to Germany‘s 
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national interests, which could capture the party and the electorate.
328
  In this sense, the 
SPD set as a pre-condition for accepting EMU an EU Social and Employment Policy, or 
wanted to change  EU member states‘ budgetary contribution rules which would  alleviate 
the national budget. Hence, the political pressure from the opposition was quite intense in 
Germany.  
 
The issue of EMU was highly politicised and reflected the fears of a weak currency. The 
German public regarded the D-Mark as a symbol of economic recovery after the Second 
World War and of newly restored international esteem.
329
 It was apprehensive of a 
monetary union on a European level whose success chances were unpredictable and in 
some which members had notorious budgetary deficits and a different monetary culture to 
the stability-oriented policies of the Bundesbank. The public opinion at that time can be 
split in two camps: those in favour of monetary stability and modest government spending 
cut back to pre-unification levels- and the increasing group of those who, after 
reunification, saw the spectacular rise in unemployment and expected the government to 
stimulate growth and economic welfare.330  
 
This national context until the actual negotiations in 1996 on the SGP is thus heavily 
shaped by German reunification and its political, economic and social consequences, which 
could be summarized as follows: low economic growth, rising budget deficits and debt, 
rising structural unemployment both in the East and West, a decline in support for further 
EU integration, a decline in cross-party consensus on the necessity of a federal vision of 
Europe,  and the uncertainty of monetary stability in times of crisis if EMU would move 
forwards. All very good reasons indeed to push for hard and stringent quantified rules for a 
European-wide coordination of national budgetary and fiscal policies!  
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7.3.2. France 
 
The French government, on the other hand, opposed many of the ideas of the German 
government. The fact that there was ―not a unique French vision of European integration 
but rather a spectrum between two poles: wanting integration and wanting to preserve 
national sovereignty‖ was evident in French support for EMU. French policy-makers have 
been caught in a dilemma with regard to the construction of the economic dimension of 
EMU: on the one hand the supranational consequences of a dirigiste approach to macro-
economic policy and, on the other hand, a Gaullist reflex to retain sovereignty as much as 
possible and to insist upon intergovernmentalism in EU-level macroeconomic policy-
making.
331
  
 
The French thus paradoxically wanted a European economic government, yet also maintain 
intergovernmental policy-making and considerable margins for manoeuvre. The dirigiste 
approach is characterised by state intervention in the economy, by the belief that control 
over economic and monetary policy should not be separated, by the perception that low 
inflationary economic policies can be maintained by democratically elected officials, 
guided by enlightened bureaucrats and advisers (notably those from the French Treasury 
and, in particular, the elite corps of Financial Inspectors); and power considerations within 
the French administration. One interviewee assessed the French position as follows:  
―The rationale behind the SGP proposal was accepted by France, but as the 
negotiations went on, the discussion focused on one point- not on the preventive 
side, but on the execution in the case of deciding on the existence of an excessive 
deficit. Here the sovereignty question played a role: a European institution decides 
in the area of national budgetary policy which they saw as untouchable, a sovereign 
area, and they would not take this.‖332 
 
Nationally, several events stood out: the referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht, the 
economic turmoil and the replacement of François Mitterrand by Jacques Chirac as 
                                                          
331Howarth D. J., (2005) ‗Making and Breaking the Rules: French Policy on EU ‗gouvernement économique‘ 
and the Stability and Growth Pact.‘  EIoP, Vol.9, No 15, p.1 
332
 Interview A 
152 
President of the Republic. François Mitterrand from the Socialist Party (PS) was the 
President of the Republic from 1981 to 1995. Together with Helmut Kohl, he is seen as one 
of the main architects of EMU. The ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht through a 
referendum in 1992 was a risky decision by Mitterrand. 48.95 per cent voted against, while 
only 51.05 per cent voted for the Treaty; over 30 per cent of the electorate abstained.
333
 The 
opponents were mainly the Front National, the far left and some people from the RPR, like 
Charles Pasqua. The RPR endorsed the Treaty, as did the socialists. This showed the limits 
of French public approval towards integration.  
 
In 1995, the Gaullist Jacques Chirac (RPR) became the President with a majority in the 
Assembly. Chirac was resolutely against any formal restrictions to the national budgetary 
policies by the EU, on the grounds of sovereignty when he entered the negotiations on the 
SGP.  
―The interest of the French government was to hold on to power while achieving 
EMU as a way to rein in the monetary rule of the Bundesbank and at the same time 
acquire a global reserve currency. The interest of the French opposition parties was 
to undermine the government through suggesting to the public that EMU amounted 
to a ‗German dictate‘ on fiscal rigour that would worsen the unemployment 
situation.‖334   
The Socialist Party, led by Lionel Jospin, the candidate for the Gauche Plurielle and future 
Prime Minister in 1997, and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, future Finance Minister, ran their 
national campaign on EU economic governance in June 1997. They were campaigning to 
boost employment and revive growth at the expense of fiscal austerity. Jospin also insisted 
on a review of the SGP, even though it had not even been formally adopted by the Council 
and the EP when he came into power. 
 
France always advocated horizontal coordination, but was much more skeptical towards 
vertical coordination between the national and EU level. It also advocated a stronger 
‗gouvernement économique‘ which should at least complement what it considered the 
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excessive competencies of the ECB. Behind all this lay the issue of sovereignty and the 
French concern for a loss of influence. Another sensitive point for France was public 
opinion as evidenced during the referendum of the Maastricht Treaty and the economy. 
Thus the domestic political context and the political culture were important factors when 
considering the successive French governments‘ approach to the SGP. More specifically, 
they wanted more political discretion in the Council concerning the detailed steps of the 
EDP, a limited role for the Commission, and as little interference from the EU institutions 
in national budgetary matters as possible. The inclusion of the debt criterion in the SGP and 
the EDP in particular was not welcome, as France was struggling with its high public debt 
ratio.   
 
Did the preferences of these two member states impact on Luxembourg‘s policy 
effectiveness? It is clear that the distribution and intensity of the preferences by these two 
main actors is crucial in understanding the outcome, but also it determined the degree of 
Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness. France and Germany were crucial in getting an 
agreement, and the other member states had implicitly delegated their votes to one of the 
two. Because their preferences were so divergent, and Luxembourg‘s preferences were to 
be found in the middle, it actually got quite a lot of what it wanted. These two states had to 
move towards a compromise and towards the middle ground, which is where 
Luxembourg‘s preferences just happened to lie. But was that all there was to this case 
study? After all, the Irish government chaired the Council formations- could it have had an 
impact we have so far ignored? 
 
 
7.4. The presidency 
 
The Irish presidency of the European Council could have played the role of mediator and 
leader in Dublin. We shall see however that the resources conferred to the office of the 
presidency were not sufficient to guarantee a country the automatic leadership of sensitive 
negotiations. The Irish presidency did not possess any of the other resources necessary to 
take advantage of the opportunities the Chair presented to them. The presidency was not 
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trusted by the main actors to be able to conclude an agreement, as none of the Irish 
negotiators had much experience of Council negotiations.
335
 In the ad hoc group that was 
created on the insistence of German Chancellor Kohl, the Irish played only a marginal role 
and were only included on protocol. None of the interviewees could even remember what 
the Irish position was on the issue. Ireland had a relatively young Rainbow coalition 
government which took office in December 1994. Furthermore this government had not 
been elected but came into office after a coalition breakdown.  The Labour party had no 
government or EU experience at all, and Ruari Quinn, the Finance Minister, had only been 
in office since May 1995. It has also been suggested that the Irish government did not 
realise the potential political difficulties that lay in the creation of a Stability and Growth 
Pact and thus had not examined the dossier in detail.
336
 The domestic standing in politics, 
the level of expertise and the personal authority were thus insufficient to Ireland‘s 
designation as leader of the negotiations. Therefore, this case study is a clear example 
where a presidency is effectively excluded from exercising any influence on the 
negotiations and the final outcome. 
 
7.5. Individual level factors 
 
In 1996, the quality of past relations between the key negotiators played an important role 
in the agreed outcome on the SGP. Kohl‘s appreciation for Juncker was, and is obvious:  
―The fact that Juncker exists is lucky for Europe. He is in the way he thinks and acts 
and with his friendly manner a strong positive point in European politics. And he is 
a wonderful example of the fact that it does not matter how big the country one 
comes from is. A big influence can also come from a small country like 
Luxembourg. It depends on stature, on personality and on competence.‖337 
 
Whether a government belongs to the same political family as most other governments, 
should also be considered when assessing policy effectiveness. In 1996, France was 
governed by the right wing Jacques Chirac. Germany was governed by the Christian 
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Democrat Helmut Kohl, and Luxembourg was also governed by the Christian Socialists 
(CSV) in coalition with the Socialists (LSAP).  Belonging, like Kohl, to the family of 
European Christian Democrats, Juncker had been very close to the German Chancellor. The 
European Christian Democrats ―shared a strong European commitment and a discourse on 
European unity.‖338 Kohl had famously stated that economic and monetary integration was 
an issue of ―war and peace in the 21st century.‖339 This was and still is a rhetoric employed 
by Juncker as well. They endorsed not only EMU, but advocated for a Political Union. 
Furthermore, as Johansson argued, the Maastricht Treaty negotiations were led by a 
coalition of Christian Democrats (Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Greece).
340
 They also dominated the three presidencies charged with the two IGCs on 
the Treaty (Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). They held various meetings and 
organized conferences between the members of the EPP ahead of the IGCs.   
 
The political longevity of Christian Socialist (CSV) Jean-Claude Juncker is the stuff of 
legends. Jean-Claude Juncker became Minister of Labour and Minister Delegate for the 
Budget in 1985 and presided over the Social Affairs and Budget Councils during the 
Luxembourg European Council presidency. In June 1989, he became Finance Minister and 
has occupied this function for 20 years. This means that he was present at every negotiation 
on economic and monetary union.  In 1989, he also became Minister for Employment. 
After being re-elected again in 1994 and the resignation of Prime Minister Jacques Santer, 
he kept both his posts as Finance Minister and Minister for Employment, but he also 
became Prime Minister.
341
   
 
Communication problems between the French and the German delegations led to the 
translation service generously offered by Jean-Claude Juncker during the Council 
negotiations. Neither Waigel nor Arthuis could speak the other‘s language. Nor did Kohl 
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speak French or English or Chirac, who did, German.
342
 French and German are official 
languages of the Grand Duchy. It has always been part of the job description of a Minister 
in Luxembourg to know what was happening in its neighbouring countries. Therefore, the 
negotiators were well aware of the public and political debates in France and Germany. An 
excellent understanding of both neighbours‘ concerns and languages enhanced their 
negotiating capacities with the two countries. Hence past relations, belonging to the same 
political family and having experience and expertise in this matter gave Juncker a natural 
advantage to be designated to broker the compromise. Individual-level factors certainly 
played a big role in Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness in this case study.  
 
  
8. Conclusion 
 
Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness in the creation of the SGP was high because most of its 
preferences were to be found in the final agreement: the involvement of the Commission in 
budgetary surveillance and in the initialisation and process of the EDP was guaranteed; 
there were clear definitions of when a deficit was considered excessive and when not; and 
these were really quite strict, even if their legal basis was not as strong as hoped. Finally, 
and importantly, the project of monetary union was on track and could go into the final 
phase prepared. This outcome came about through several factors: the governing Christian 
Social People‘s Party (CSV), the exceptionally long career of the current Prime Minister 
Jean- Claude Juncker, the economic union with Belgium and their monetary association.  
 
Several interesting points on how to be policy effective result from this analysis. It may 
have been unusual that a member state different from the presidency office holder is 
officially charged with conducting the negotiations and playing the role of broker. It cannot 
be disputed that the fact that Juncker was both PM and Finance Minister did contribute to 
his designation as broker. But the negotiating skills, personal relations and hands-on 
experience of Juncker were the main reasons why he was trusted with resolving this 
sensitive issue. Secondly, Juncker was an intimate friend of Kohl. Thirdly, the personal 
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mediating skills and experience in EU affairs of Luxembourg‘s Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister greatly contributed to the French acceptance of the modalities of the SGP.
343
 
Juncker had acquired the technical skills during the negotiations of the Treaty of Maastricht 
and was familiar with its clauses. It is widely acknowledged in political science literature 
that monetary union was a French project with German principles, i.e. that the content of 
EMU reflects the strict and prudent preferences of the West German financial élite, which 
went far beyond mere coordination.
344
  
 
However, with changing heads of state and different economic climates, would Juncker still 
be called upon to mediate between the big member states on this issue at a later date? In 
other terms, do personal relations between the negotiators play an overriding factor in the 
choice of broker or can this variable be ruled out with certainty? On another issue, we can 
see that certain issues can be taken away from the finance minister and be appropriated by 
the head of state for political reasons. Finally, a safe conclusion can be drawn from this 
analysis: the decision-making procedure did not play a role in these negotiations. Indeed, it 
was the consensus-seeking culture, which came to the fore in the process of these 
negotiations. The fact that the delicate part of the negotiations was not held among all the 
15 member states, but among a small circle of actors, implies that a delegation of the actual 
negotiations took place. This may be due to the time pressure for an agreement or the 
political nature of the issue, and suggests an implicit trust and confidence in this circle of 
actors which would defend broadly the positions each member state considered its own. 
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Chapter 6: Luxembourg’s role in the Reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Having presented and analysed Luxembourg‘s role and policy effectiveness in the creation 
of the Stability and Growth Pact, this chapter will address the question if Luxembourg was 
equally policy effective in the Pact‘s reform. The agreement on said reform was concluded 
under the Luxembourg presidency in the first half of 2005 and was welcomed by most 
member states but it was much criticised in the media. As Luxembourg had the presidency, 
it wanted to conclude the negotiations on the new SGP under its watch and to get a result 
which would stay as close as possible to the old SGP.
345
 However, while it achieved an 
agreement, Luxembourg's policy effectiveness was low in this case, because the rules were 
made more flexible. Considering the constraints of extreme preferences of the major 
players, Luxembourg managed to get an agreement in the first place, increase the 
preventive side of the Pact, and prevent the creation of a list of factors that could be 
invoked at any stage of the EDP to escape sanctions. A comparison between Luxembourg‘s 
preferences and the outcome will however reveal that Luxembourg was not really able to be 
policy effective on several issues, such as the extension of the deadline to correct excessive 
deficits, the ―chapter headings‖ or relevant factors for not starting an EDP and the general 
weakening of the Pact. The reasons for this low policy effectiveness can be traced back to 
France and Germany‘s intransigence. Some factors, which had played a role in 1996, did 
not come into play in 2005- such as institutional coordination, individual-level factors; even 
holding the presidency did not improve Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness.  
 
This case was selected because many factors stayed constant under the creation and the 
reform of the SGP (such as the reputation of the Prime Minister and Finance Minister Jean-
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Claude Juncker, domestic politics, the decision-making procedure; Luxembourg even had 
the added advantage of holding the presidency) yet the outcome in terms of policy 
effectiveness was different. Several elements had changed: the reform of the SGP was one 
of the first major changes in legislation in matters of economic and monetary governance 
where the new members of Central and Eastern Europe were allowed to participate in the 
voting in the Council. Whether they made a difference will be shown in this chapter. 
Furthermore, the Eurogroup (the group of the Finance Ministers of the Eurozone) had just 
been set up and was the main forum for the negotiations, sidelining to a certain extent the 
non-Eurozone members. Therefore, this case study could bring new insights into which 
combined factors are necessary for policy effectiveness and functions as something of a 
control study for the first case study.  
 
The following section presents the drive towards reform and the crisis of 2003, with the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure held in abeyance for France and Germany, and the origins of 
the changed preferences of the main players. The next section presents the European 
Commission‘s proposal, gives a brief timeline of the negotiations and the outcome. A 
discussion on the factors will reveal why Luxembourg was policy effective.  
 
 
1.1. The build-up to the reform from 2002-2005: The SGP is dead”  
 
Even before the decision to hold the EDP in abeyance for France and Germany in 2003, the 
issue started to unravel when Chirac started the debate on the future of the SGP after the 
Barcelona Council on May 14, 2002. Greece was exposed by Eurostat for falsifying its 
statistics at the time of entry into EMU III and for several years subsequently. The German 
SPD- led government barely escaped sanctions on its excessive budget deficit in 2001. It 
was under considerable pressure from the EU institutions and internally from the 
Bundesbank to correct the deficit. Yet it was trying to escape sanctions and put forward 
measures to correct the deficit. By September 2002, it was clear that Italy, Portugal, France 
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and Germany all ran the risk of breaching the SGP rules. Even the President of the 
Commission infamously called the Pact ―stupid.‖346  
 
In November 2003, after the SGP had been in force for only four years, the Conclusions of 
the Ecofin put into question some fundamental rules, namely the importance of the 
Commission‘s recommendation and the rule that all member states are equal in EMU.347 
The Council had decided to suspend the EDP against France, Germany and Portugal.
348
 
How could it come to this? In August 2002 the public deficit for Portugal for 2001 was 4.1 
per cent. The European Commission issued a report and the Ecofin Council deemed the 
deficit excessive, and thus started the first EDP in the history of the Economic and 
Monetary Union. However, this EDP was soon to be overshadowed and swallowed up in 
the debates over France‘s and Germany‘s deficits.  
 
The Council had asked Germany and France to take effective action for deficit reduction. 
However, the Commission found that France had not taken effective action and Germany 
had adopted inadequate measures to implement the Council‘s recommendations. The 
Commission therefore issued recommendations to the Council to advance with the 
proceedings.
349
 During the negotiations on whether an EDP should be set in motion, the 
reasons behind the German government‘s decision to fight against an EDP were twofold: 
firstly considerations of domestic politics in the form of elections, and secondly the cost of 
reunification made it necessary and inevitable that a higher deficit of 3 per cent be incurred. 
It argued that these were exceptional circumstances and as such should be taken into 
account. Furthermore, it also argued that pro-cyclical policies were necessary.
350
 One 
participant analysed the German change of heart as follows:  
―I think that the German government waited to be reelected before changing its 
position. It was largely a circumstantial decision, not an ideological one. The Pact 
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was mostly a German creation which turned against its initiators. It took them a 
while to realise, and when they realised, they changed indeed their position by 360 
degrees.‖351  
Indeed, only in July 2003, Eichel had  
―stopped short of echoing President Chirac's call for a relaxation of the rules, saying 
the finance ministers knew how to apply the rules in a "reasonable and coordinated 
way.‖352  
Yet only two days later, Chancellor Schröder called Chirac's comments ―great and really 
very important.‖353 The impression of the other negotiators was that the German 
government had lost its spirit of fiscal stability, and sight of the consequences of its stance 
for monetary union. Instead it was only concerned with domestic politics. 
 
The French government argued in its defence that in the face of an economic downturn, 
pro-cyclical policies were necessary to stimulate the economy.  It seems that the French 
wanted to lay the blame partly with the Commission and the Council:  
―France and Germany were paying for an implementation of the Pact which was not 
well executed beforehand. In 2000, France and Germany were allowed to 
implement economic policies like tax reductions and redistributions of what was 
called ‗the fruits of growth‘ in France. These policies were to some extent the 
mistake of the Council and of the Commission who let them follow these policies. 
We had not quite yet understood that all these additional resources that the states 
had were linked to the economic growth of the time and that it was not a durable 
situation. In this sense, France and Germany paid for a collective past mistake, and, 
the economic situation worsening, did not manage to keep the deficit below 3 per 
cent.‖354 
 
Clearly, Germany and France did not want an EDP and so, rather than trying to adhere to 
the rules of the game, provoked a crisis which was intended to change those rules. With 
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Germany being one of the pivotal players and now in the same camp as France, the path 
towards reform was laid. Thus on 25 November 2003, the Finance Ministers voted to 
suspend the sanctions mechanism of the excessive deficit procedure against France and 
Germany.
355
 The Council Conclusions of 25 November 2003 did not follow the advice of 
the Commission to take the excessive deficit procedure against France and Germany a step 
further, but instead adopted a series of concerned requests.  
 
What could have been the Council‘s motives for voting to hold the procedure in abeyance? 
An important aspect of the voting procedure is that other ―fiscal sinners‖, i.e. member states 
that also run danger of encountering the launch of an excessive deficit procedure are not 
excluded from voting. In this case, France could vote against or for Germany, and vice 
versa. France and Germany had clearly decided to provoke a crisis and force a debate on 
reform. Another factor is that only countries that have adopted the Euro are allowed to vote 
on decisions on the Article 104(9) of the Treaty. Therefore, countries like Denmark, 
Sweden and the UK were excluded from the vote. For Luxembourg, the motives for 
suspending the sanctions mechanism were twofold and purely strategic: firstly, due to the 
general economic slowdown, Luxembourg found itself in the position of a general budget 
surplus of only 0.8 percent, and a deficit of -1.2 percent in 2003, down from 2.4 percent. 
Budget forecasts were gloomy and predicted a higher deficit for 2004. Secondly, with 
Germany and France being the biggest investors in Luxembourg‘s financial sector, 
imposing fines on both could have a potential backlash on the Luxembourg economy in the 
form of a loss of investment. Luxembourg‘s economy in the years of 2002 to 2004 was 
equally affected by the economic downturn. For the first time in years, the government 
faced a sharp decline in its budgetary balance and even a deficit instead of the usual balance 
or surplus.
356
  Given the economy‘s high degree of openness, it has always depended 
heavily on foreign investments, especially from the neighbouring countries France and 
Germany. Ireland voted against sanctions, as it had received a recommendation in 2001 
reprimanding it for its pro-cyclical fiscal policies when the guidelines called for a tight 
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fiscal policy to quell an overheating economy.
357
 Portugal and Italy voted against for 
obvious reasons: they too had problems with adhering to the budgetary discipline imposed 
by the SGP.  
 
Some observers were of the opinion that the rules were in practice different when addressed 
to bigger member states (France, Germany) than to smaller ones (Ireland, Portugal). 
Already a year earlier in 2002, Hans Gert Pöttering was warning Commission President 
Prodi of this danger:  
―We think that it is unacceptable for small countries like Portugal to get a letter 
from the Commission, while the large countries get off the hook. You keep the 
small fish and let the big ones go. If that is the policy in Europe, then Europe is on 
the wrong course. I would call upon the Commission to act to ensure that we can 
give them once again our full support. But I think that confidence has been severely 
damaged, and I hope that you will be able to restore confidence.‖358  
However, one participant identified additional reasons, beyond strategic arguments, for this 
behaviour of small countries:  
―I didn‘t expect us to have a qualified majority in favour of the Commission 
Recommendation but I certainly didn‘t expect a qualified majority against the 
Commission, because I thought the Irish and the Luxembourgers…but they were 
impressed by the big two. There were probably contacts behind the scenes asking 
them to be cooperative. It was one of the worst nights in my career in Brussels.‖359  
It would appear indeed then, that in practice no decision can be made against a coalition of 
France and Germany. Furthermore, it shows that the small countries were outvoted.  
 
The Commission subsequently filed a claim with the European Court of Justice against the 
Council on the enforceability of the Pact in the context of the required cooperation between 
the two institutions. On 13 July 2004 the ECJ rendered its judgment.360 The ruling 
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underlined the fact that the Council could not suspend a procedure when the conditions 
provided by the SGP were not met. It encouraged those who argued for a change in the 
legal text. The Council preferred to deal with issues of a political sensitivity on its own and 
was not very happy with the interference of the ECJ. Therefore, it decided to reform the 
Pact. The French and German governments had reached their goal by using their sheer size 
and weight in the Council of Ministers in combination with other big and notorious fiscal 
sinners.  
 
1.2. “A political gesture that we overcame 2003” 
 
These events undermined the credibility of the SGP. It had been breached several times by 
the major (and other) EU states and it seemed quite iniquitous to preserve strict rules when 
the biggest economies could not adhere to them. Furthermore the economic climate was 
improving in the Eurozone from 2004 onwards. The political heat was off the topic so it 
could be discussed in a calm manner. The financial markets had not reacted negatively to 
the suspension of the EDP against these two major EU states, yet negative comments in the 
media and from the Commission and the ECB abounded and gave the Council a bad image, 
with it accused of not being credible.
361
 
 
The biggest member states, the German and French governments, were showing no 
intention of taking radical measures to conform to the modalities of the SGP. The political 
will to reform was therefore clearly present for several reasons. France and Germany 
especially advocated more flexibility of the rules, while the ECB and the smaller member 
states, especially the Netherlands, Austria and Finland were afraid that lax budgetary 
policies of the big member states would destabilize the Euro.  The Dutch had been against a 
change for a long time, but had realised that when big member states flout the rules and 
always vote against an EDP for another member state, then the Pact does not function at 
all.
362
 So they agreed to a reform for practical reasons:  
                                                          
361
 Leblond P., (2006) ‗The Political Stability and Growth Pact is Dead: Long Live the Economic Stability 
and Growth Pact.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.44, No. 5, pp. 969-990, The Independent, (2004) 
‗Euro Stability Pact Rulebook in Chaos after Court Ruling.‘ Stephen Castle, 14 July. 
362
 Interview D 
165 
―I think that everyone wanted an agreement. The situation was appeased in relation 
to the 2003 crisis and simultaneously having a new Pact was a way of coming out of 
the story head high: there were indeed problems, we took them into account and we 
changed things. Yes, we wanted a new agreement, but it was in fine in the interests 
of everybody, as a political gesture that we overcame 2003.‖363  
The opponents of a reform were in a minority, as already shown during the Eurogroup vote 
on the EDP against France and Germany. First, the Communication of the European 
Commission will be presented, continuing with a description of the final legislative 
outcome, while the final section presents a discussion of Luxembourg‘s policy 
effectiveness and what influenced it.  
 
2. The Communication of the Commission: the carrot and the stick 
 
The revised Communication of the Commission of September 2004 entailed a refocusing of 
the SGP, for which there were three elements: clarifying and rendering operational the debt 
criterion, identifying country-specific medium-term budgetary objectives and defining the 
adjustment path in the excessive deficit procedure, taking into account issues relating to the 
sustainability of public finances.
 364
 
 
The Commission argued that the new Stability and Growth Pact should clarify the basis for 
assessing the "satisfactory pace" of debt reduction provided for in Article 104(2)(b) of the 
Treaty. In defining this "satisfactory pace", account should be taken of the need to bring 
debt levels back down to prudent levels before demographic ageing had an impact on 
economic and social developments in member states. Member states‘ initial debt levels and 
their potential growth levels should also be considered. Annual assessments could be made 
relative to this reference pace of reduction, taking into account country-specific growth 
conditions. 
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The Commission wanted to allow for more country-specific circumstances in defining the 
medium-term deficit objective of ‗close to balance or in surplus‘. The operational 
specification of the medium-term budgetary objective of ‗close to balance or in surplus‘ 
had been left open by the SGP and, in practice, a balanced budget position in cyclically-
adjusted terms every year throughout the cycle was required for most member states. 
Uniform objectives for all countries did not appear appropriate and lacked an economic 
rationale. The Commission stated that a medium-term objective could be based on current 
debt levels, taking into account their development over time. Furthermore, factors such as 
potential economic growth, inflation, the existing implicit liabilities related to ageing 
populations, the impact of structural reforms or the need for additional net investment 
should also be considered. 
 
Concerning the EDP, the Commission recognised that the scenario of slow but positive 
economic growth is not considered in the existing regulatory framework. It envisaged a 
rethinking of the adjustment path once a country breaches the 3 per cent deficit threshold 
and/or a redefinition of the exceptional circumstances clause. It also wanted to simplify the 
concepts of ‗abruptness of the downturn‘ and ‗loss of output relative to past trends‘, while 
any change to the definition of this clause should be examined in combination with changes 
to the deficit adjustment path. It suggested that the pace of adjustment could differ between 
countries, with the appropriate adjustment path being defined on the basis of the economic 
conditions and debt levels of the member state in question. The Commission also 
considered taking into account the reasons behind the excessive deficits and the policies 
implemented, but gave no precise indications of how this would happen.
365
 
 
On the preventive side of the SGP, it demanded a reinforcement of the commitment of the 
member states to pursue sound and sustainable fiscal policies through peer pressure. The 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would also bring in new provisions, such as 
the Commission's direct ‗early warnings‘ and the Council's decisions launching the 
excessive deficit procedure in the light of the Commission's proposals (rather than 
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recommendations). This, it argued, would clarify the complementary roles of the Council 
and the Commission. The broad economic policy guidelines (BEPGs) could be more 
effectively used to address the issue of good policy in good times. The proposal also 
suggested that the coordination of budgetary policies be enhanced, through giving a greater 
role for stability and convergence programmes in defining a medium-term strategy at the 
start of a new government's term of office.
366
 
 
Finally, the Commission wanted to establish minimum European standards for the 
institutional set-up of statistical authorities. The Commission would have liked to see other 
member states putting pressure on countries that do not respect their legal obligations 
deriving from the Treaty and public opinion being made aware of the situation. It 
highlighted national institutions‘ role in the budgetary process and envisaged measures to 
improve transparency and to make member states even more accountable as regards their 
budgetary policy.
367
 
 
In summary, the Commission (re-)introduced the debt criterion, which was in Article 104 
of the Maastricht Treaty, but absent from the SGP, and it wanted clarification on hitherto 
discretionary aspects of the EDP. It also demanded a reduction of the Council‘s 
involvement in the early warning system. Meanwhile it allowed for more time in the 
adjustment path, and it considered additional factors to be taken into account when 
assessing the budget deficit.  
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3. Timeline of the negotiations  
 
The official review process started with a Communication from the Commission in 
September 2004 upon request of the European Council on 18 June 2004 and the final 
legislative act was approved on 27 June 2005. Under the Dutch presidency, a preliminary 
informal meeting of the ECOFIN in Scheveningen was on the issues of improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Eurogroup and on the strengthening of policy 
coordination.
368
 Luxembourg‘s Prime Minister Juncker was elected as President of the 
Eurogroup at this meeting and would start in this function in January 2005.
369
 It was soon 
clear that that the preferences were too widely dispersed and that, because Finance Minister 
Zalm was most vocal in airing his ideas on the topic, the Dutch could not be effective 
mediators. 
 
The SGP reform was debated at four ministerial meetings in Luxembourg. The first 
meeting was on 18 January 2005. The Luxembourg presidency expected that a political 
agreement on new implementation rules for the Pact would be realised before the European 
Council on 22 and 23 of March 2005. After this initial meeting, Juncker declared himself 
particularly satisfied that a preliminary agreement around the three essential ideas was 
reached. These were:  
―the interpretation of the treaty is not put into question, not even a comma; the 
implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure is not put into question, and 
following from this, the Commission‘s right of initiative stays intact, and there is no 
discussion anymore on taking entire blocks of expenditure out of the 
implementation of the Pact.‖370  
After this meeting, Juncker visited Schröder in Berlin to sound out the positions more 
clearly. They agreed not to take out entire blocks of expenditure from budgetary 
calculations, but to create a concise and precise catalogue of budgetary expenditure which 
could lead to a more differentiated appreciation of a member state‘s deficit by the 
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Commission and the Council. Juncker, then, initially gave in to German demands on the 
creation of a list.
371
 Schröder said at one point during the negotiations that he ―trusted the 
Prime Minister‘s exceptional political dexterity.‖372 
 
On February 16 the Eurogroup met again, with some progress.
373
 The Eurogroup President 
said he was optimistic about the possibility of reaching an agreement in March, and 
especially about the fact that ―the points of view have narrowed considerably‖ and should 
allow the presidency to present a compromise at the next Eurogroup and Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council meetings of 7 and 8 March 2005. Juncker also stated that 
questioning the right of initiative of the European Commission in the application of the 
SGP would not be an issue.  
―It should be clear that it will not be left to the discretion of a Member State as to 
whether the excessive deficit procedure will be implemented. This is reserved to the 
Commission, which will report to the Council and which will draw appropriate 
conclusions.‖374  
Juncker also reported that the Eurogroup and the Council agreed to strengthen the 
preventive framework of the pact, which obliges member states to allocate possible budget 
surpluses to the reduction of the deficit and of public debt so that there would be more 
latitude during periods of low economic growth.  
 
On 7 and 8 March the Eurogroup, after meeting for 9 and a half hours, had to note that no 
agreement was in reach.
375
 The Ecofin also came to the same conclusion, considering the 
reservations of some non-Euro members towards the utility of a reform of the Pact. The 
compromise proposal of the presidency found agreement on a certain number of issues, 
most notably the necessity of member states making more efforts (in budgetary 
consolidation) during good economic periods in order to have more flexibility in periods of 
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economic slowdown. However, the issue of a list of factors, to be taken into account during 
the qualitative appreciation of a slight excessive deficit over the 3 per cent, was still on the 
table; and if such a list was deemed appropriate, there was as yet no consensus on which 
factors should be included. Juncker was also not afraid to threaten to walk away from the 
negotiations himself if no agreement could be found on whether to include a list of factors 
to judge the existence of an excessive deficit.
376
 He argued that he would not conclude any 
reform just for the sake of it. Most participants saw this as a mere threat, but his public 
warning just got them back to the negotiating table with new ideas.
377
  
 
The meeting on 22 and 23 March 2005, the Eurogroup came to an agreement after lengthy 
discussions. The Eurogroup and the Council of Finance Ministers agreed to reinforce the 
preventive side of the Pact forcing the member states to allocate possible budgetary 
excesses towards reducing the deficit and the public debt, in order to be able to have more 
latitude during low economic growth periods.  
 
 
4. The revised Pact: what does it mean? 
 
The SGP was based on two Regulations and a European Council Resolution. A positive 
aspect was that both the Maastricht fiscal policy criteria – 3 per cent of GDP for the budget 
deficit and 60 per cent of GDP for the debt level – remained unchanged. The new Council 
Regulation 1055/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies set out that   
―in light of the economic and budgetary heterogeneity in the Union,  the medium-
term budgetary objective should be differentiated for individual Member States, to 
take into account the diversity of economic and budgetary positions and 
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developments as well as of fiscal risk to the sustainability of public finances, also in 
the face of prospective demographic changes.‖378  
Furthermore, accent was put on saving and debt reduction in good economic times; 
unexpected additional revenues should be used for debt and deficit reduction. The Council, 
when assessing the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective, should 
also take into account whether a higher adjustment effort was made in economic good 
times, whereas the effort may be more limited in economic bad times.  
―For ERM2 Member States, the Council shall examine if the Member State 
concerned pursues the annual improvement of its cyclically adjusted balance, net of 
one-off and other temporary measures, required to meet its medium-term budgetary 
objective, with 0,5 per cent of GDP as a benchmark.‖379 
 
The new Council Regulation 1056/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure stipulated 
that member states avoid an EDP if they experienced any negative growth at all (previously 
the criteria was 2 percent). No EDP would be launched against a member state 
experiencing a protracted period of stagnation or of a very low annual GDP volume growth 
relative to its potential. Instead, if it was a ‗temporary deficit‘ they could draw on more 
‗relevant factors‘ to avoid an EDP. Rather than prescribing a list of factors, the reform 
foresaw chapter headings, like potential growth, the economic cycle, structural reforms 
(pensions, social security), policies supporting Research and Development, and medium-
term budgetary efforts ( consolidating during good economic times, debt levels, public 
investment).
380
 Equally, member states which spent on efforts to  
―foster international solidarity and to achieving European policy goals, notably the 
reunification of Europe if it had a detrimental effect on the growth and fiscal burden 
of a member state
381‖  
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could evoke these too. Furthermore, if an EDP was launched against a member state, the 
deadlines for the implementation of the proposed corrections were extended from 4 to 6 
months. Finally, due consideration was to be given to the implementation of pension 
reforms in their budgetary assessments relating to the excessive deficit procedure. Carrying 
out such reforms may lead to a short-term worsening of public deficits, but a long-term 
improvement in the sustainability of public finances.
382
 
 
5. Luxembourg’s policy effectiveness 
 
5.1. Luxembourg‟s preferences of the Stability and Growth Pact and the strategy 
 
Luxembourg had no major difficulties in adhering to the criteria of the original SGP. 
However, it did not follow from this that Luxembourg‘s position was purely neutral and 
that it assumed simply the role of broker.  Indeed, Luxembourg was very interested in the 
eventual outcome and wanted to keep the SGP as strict as possible. The reason is simple: a 
soft SGP and noncompliance by one or more member states would have an impact on the 
whole Eurozone and thus Luxembourg‘s economy as well- as can be evidenced by the 
Greek bailout. It can be safely argued that Luxembourg found itself in the small group of 
orthodox defenders of a strict SGP, along with the Dutch, the Finns, the Austrians, and the 
Spanish. One participant offered the following analysis:  
―The ‗hero of Dublin‘ invented the SGP. He was convinced of the idea. 
Luxembourg is also a country that traditionally understood the philosophy of 
budgetary rigour and could not understand that those parameters would suddenly be 
useless. It was politically quite easy because we did not care whether the excessive 
deficit was set at -3 or -5 or -2 per cent. Luxembourg was therefore seen by the 
others as neutral but the PM‘s personal involvement was a guarantee for those 
hardliners that he would not want to abolish the SGP as he had participated in the 
creation of the SGP. If he would have wanted to abolish the SGP, he would have 
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implied that what they had done 9 years ago was stupid. He had participated in the 
genesis of the Pact and did not want to abolish it or completely reinvent it.‖383  
 
The Luxembourg government made it a priority to conclude these negotiations under its 
presidency, as this gave it more influence over agenda-setting, the drafting of the proposals 
and it had asymmetrical information on the other member states‘ positions.  The most 
important mission of the Luxembourg presidency was to avoid a fundamental political 
crisis and the explosion of the SGP. Considering the polarised positions within the Council, 
it in fact had little political leverage.
384
 It had to move towards the positions of France and 
Germany; it was evident that it had to make political concessions. But the basic strategy 
was to give in as little as possible to them and to keep the SGP as strict as it could. Treaty 
modifications were out of the question for them, such as modifications of the 3 per cent and 
60 per cent.
385
   
 
Luxembourg had an inclination towards the Dutch position. It has been indeed suggested 
that the Netherlands had been allowed by Luxembourg to play a far bigger role than they 
should have by their natural importance in the negotiations, and that the Netherlands were 
the troublemakers, not France and Germany.
386
  
Hirsch described Juncker‘s preferences on a reform as follows: 
―- taking into account economic cycles (reducing debt during a period of good 
economic conditions, allowing the automatic stabilisers to operate if the market 
slows down); 
- taking into account the criterion of the sum of the debt and its development; 
- intelligent accounting of surpluses: it is not a case of counting the surpluses put 
aside in prosperous times as a deficit when a government uses them when the 
economy slows down; 
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- neither is he an advocate of excluding spending on such areas as research and 
military investments from the deficit calculation because this, in his opinion, would 
be tantamount to opening Pandora‘s box.‖387  
 
Concretely, Luxembourg would have liked to include the debt criterion in the calculation of 
the deficit. It wanted to avoid the creation of a list of factors which allowed a member state 
to escape an EDP at all costs, and it wanted to avoid the possibility that this list could be 
invoked at any stage during the EDP.  
 
 
5.2. Was Luxembourg policy effective in the reform of the SGP? 
 
Luxembourg managed to achieve a few of the objectives it had set for the reform of the 
SGP in 2005, but by no means most or all of them. It can therefore be argued that 
Luxembourg was ―low in policy effectiveness‖ in these negotiations. One of the objectives 
was to get an agreement as close as possible to the old SGP. That was only partially 
achieved. The Commission still has the right to issue recommendations and early warnings, 
there were no Treaty modifications, no list of pertinent factors, economic good times had 
been emphasised, structural reforms in the calculation of the deficit were included, and the 
situation of a slight and temporary excessive deficit was clarified. On the other hand, the 
debt criterion had been abandoned, ―chapter headings‖ and a list of relevant factors had 
been created, and timeframes to correct the excessive deficits had been enlarged. The role 
of the Commission was weakened, and the role of the Council strengthened. 
 
If we look back at the mission statement of the government, the first objective was to avoid 
a fundamental political crisis in the EU. That was achieved. In 2005, the priority for the 
presidency was to get an agreement that would work and would not leave the Eurozone 
without any rules on budgetary discipline. Considering that Germany had threatened to 
walk away from the negotiation table and ‗destroy‘ the Pact, it was absolutely necessary to 
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find a solution which Germany, the biggest economy of the Eurozone, would accept, even 
if that meant softening the Pact.  
 
 
6. Discussion: which factors mattered? 
 
6.1. Domestic politics 
 
As Heipertz and Verdun note,  
―the SGP dossier was and is by its nature the subject of international negotiation 
and interaction, hence an arena where only a very narrow set of domestic actors can 
wield strong influence on governments, and where exclusively governmental actors 
are involved in the actual deliberations at the European level. Therefore, in the SGP 
case, the only potentially strong domestic actors are central banks and political 
parties. To a lesser extent, an important role is also played by specific lobby groups 
(such as trade unions or banking associations), mainly via their influence on public 
opinion that in turn bears on the behaviour of parties.‖ 388  
 
However, other factors should be taken into account when one is defining domestic politics: 
the approval procedure and the quality of institutional coordination. In the years before the 
reform, public finances had not been in surplus as the public was used to. Luxembourg had 
not voted for the continuation of the EDP against France and Germany. Approval in 
Luxembourg was relatively easy to achieve in the reform of the SGP, as the two regulations 
did not have to pass Parliament and even though the Central Bank of Luxembourg‘s 
director criticised the agreed outcome.  
 
Institutional coordination was very important during the presidency as information had to 
be gathered and processed on many different levels. The Luxembourg presidency invested 
considerable human resources in the running of the presidency. Within the Finance 
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Ministry, a new advisor to the Finance Minister was employed who was, together with the 
other main advisor, the main coordinator for the sharing of information, the drafting and the 
negotiations. They had the process and the technical knowledge to steer negotiations.  
 
However, Luxembourg‘s government had another advantage that applies to very few states, 
namely the fact that the Prime Minister was also Finance Minister, and incidentally also 
had been elected President of the Eurogroup. Juncker had taken on his function as President 
of the Eurogroup on 1 January 2005, and became simultaneously acting President of the 
Council of the European Union, while being Prime Minister and Financer Minister. One 
negotiator argued that  
―it helped that he was president of the Eurogroup. I didn‘t doubt that we wouldn‘t 
finish it. It was not clear that it would happen under Luxembourgish presidency, but 
certainly Juncker was the best player in the field. He is a Christian Democrat which 
makes him a compromise man and he is Luxembourgish which also makes him a 
compromise man- and he was the longest sitting Minister of Finance….He cheated 
of course by being PM at the same time. So he had a link with the European 
Council, he knew everybody and he could do a bit of arm-twisting.‖389 
In some countries, the Finance Minister and the Head of State or Government were often 
not on the same wavelength, and had different priorities and visions of what would be an 
appropriate reform. This often led to power struggles between the Finance Ministries and 
the offices of the Head of State or Government. These dual visions within individual 
governments created either a situation where Finance Ministers would agree on something, 
but this agreement would not be approved by the Heads of State, and Finance Ministers 
would have to go back to the negotiation table, which was embarrassing and time-
consuming. The other possibility was that Finance Ministers would have to interrupt 
negotiations to check with the Head of State whether the proposal was acceptable to the 
Head of State, making other Finance Ministers question the credibility of the Finance 
Minister in question. These were problems of institutional coordination which Luxembourg 
did not have; instead it was able to negotiate on both levels, and could shape the 
agreements. As Juncker himself stated in the European Voice: ―I often observe the 
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following when I sit around the European Council table: I see that heads of state and 
government say the opposite of what their finance ministers have said a few days or weeks 
before,‖ Juncker said. ―I regret the lack of co-ordination.‖390 This is a problem that he 
rarely encountered with himself, as he admitted in another interview.  
Information on France‘s and Germany‘s positions was vital, and both the Finance 
Ministries and the office of the President or of the Chancellor had to be consulted.  
―We already tried in the EFC to narrow the options as far as possible and to define 
them as much as possible to try and solve several things. But in many cases that was 
not possible and many capitals argued they were political questions. Not only in 
Paris and Berlin were the negotiations a matter for the head of state or government. 
Therefore it was difficult for the EFC members to pronounce themselves on an 
option, because they had to go back home and hold internal consultations to see 
what was acceptable for the heads of state and governments as they often saw the 
issue differently to the finance ministers in many countries. Consequently our work 
in the EFC was focused on getting a clear picture of the battlefield. The political 
questions became fewer and fewer or became more detailed. In the discussion one 
member would agree to give in on one issue and when one made concessions then 
we could maybe change one or two options or merge them into one by consensus, 
but then we had to ask the ministers what they wanted.
391‖  
Experience had shown Luxembourg‘s negotiators that there was a rift between the Finance 
Ministries and the offices of the Heads of State in both Paris and Berlin. The problem of 
having two different visions within one government complicated the negotiations to a 
significant degree, as the credibility of the negotiators suffered. Their strategy was to know 
all the sensitive issues for each member state, so as to be able to propose compromises. In 
Germany the Chancellor‘s line was to soften the Pact or else destroy it for electoral reasons, 
while the Finance Minister adhered to the basic lines of the existing Pact. In France, the 
Elysée also understood the issues differently to Bercy. Therefore, the danger was always 
that no agreement would be found at the level of the Finance Ministers, and the issue would 
be tabled at the European Council. It was implied that, if this happened, any progress in the 
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negotiations would come to naught, as Heads of State or Government simply were not 
familiar enough with the SGP and the wildest ideas would have suddenly appeared.  
 
It was vital that agreement was found among Finance Ministers, but it was also vital that 
Luxembourg knew what Heads of State were expecting in general terms of the reform. 
Access to these people was essential, and only someone who played in both the arena of the 
Finance Ministers and the arena of the Heads of State and Government, could combine and 
frame these expectations in a coherent package. Juncker had this privileged access and 
could therefore anticipate the reactions of the Heads of State and Government. As a small 
country, the circuits of the communication flow were very tight and only a selected few 
were directly involved in the preparations of the working documents. The communication 
network was also kept small and the presidency managed through this method to include all 
the main actors in a ‗circle of trust‘ and so knew what their bottom lines were. This is an 
example of the specifity of Luxembourg‘s political system at the time, just as in the 
creation of the SGP in 1997. Furthermore, it is a specifity of Luxembourg which is partly 
due to its smallness. This institutional coordination worked well on the lower levels as well, 
as we will see in the dealings with the major players within the capitals during the 
presidency.  
 
 
6.2. The decision-making procedure 
 
In matters concerning economic governance, the Eurogroup and the Economic and 
Financial Committee (EFC) play a central role alongside the Council of Finance Ministers 
(ECOFIN). Even though the Eurogroup is only an informal forum for discussions among 
the finance ministers of the Eurozone, it  
―pre-agrees all critical Council decisions with relevance for the euro area member 
states, it also functions as a forum where ministers decide on the overall orientation 
of economic governance in the euro area and establish common interpretations of 
EMU‘s core policy instruments. This might seem surprising given that the group is 
179 
not mentioned by the Treaty (...) and lacks any formal decision-making 
competences.‖392               
Puetter describes the EFC as the senior expert committee in charge of EMU affairs: Its task 
is to review the economic and financial situation in the EU and to act as an advisory body 
to the Commission and the Council. All substantial issues for discussion within the 
Eurogroup are prepared within this committee. The role of the EFC as a de facto 
preparatory body for the Eurogroup is based on an agreement with the non-euro countries. 
Through the involvement of the non-Euro EFC members in the preparations, the out-group 
is kept informed on the Eurogroup‘s agenda. Furthermore, the EFC secretariat, the 
committee‘s so-called Eurogroup working party and the respective Eurogroup presidency 
share the work of the more detailed preparations. COREPER is not involved in the 
preparatory process.
393
  
 
The decision was taken under Qualified Majority Voting in the ECOFIN Council and in a 
cooperation procedure with the European Parliament on the issue of surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies, while the EP was only consulted for the changes of the 
EDP.
394
 QMV has as its basis of Article 205(2) of the EC Treaty. Following the 2000 
intergovernmental conference and the Nice Treaty, the number of votes allocated to each 
Member State has been re-weighted, in particular for those States with larger 
populations.
395
 This came into force on 1 November 2004 and necessitated a QMV of 231 
votes of 321, while the blocking minority was 67 votes. Under the Nice Treaty the votes 
were distributed as follows among the members: Germany, France, the UK and Italy 
received 29 votes, Spain and Poland 27, the Netherlands 13, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Greece and Portugal 12, Austria and Sweden 10, Finland, Denmark, Lithuania, 
Slovakia and Ireland 7 votes. Luxembourg, Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Estonia received 4 
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votes, while Malta had 3 votes.
396
 The member states of the Eurozone commanded the vast 
majority of the votes (191 votes in total) in the Ecofin in 2005. Consequently, agreement 
there is often only a formality whenever Eurozone ministers reach a consensus among 
themselves prior to a Council meeting. Comparing the voting weight of the Eurozone 
member states with the voting weight of the non-Eurozone member states in 2005, the 
Eurozone‘s weight was 191 votes against the 130 votes of the outsiders. This still left the 
non-Eurozone members the theoretical possibility of constructing a comfortable blocking 
minority if they wanted to go against a pre-agreement of the Eurogroup- a far flung 
possibility though. Verdun and Schure argued that there was a clear division between large 
and small states in the negotiations.
397
 If we count the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Spain, 
Luxembourg in the camp of the hardliners, they were short of a blocking minority (61 votes 
instead of 67). Hence, it was clear from the start that France, Germany and Italy could get 
their way. 
 
Under the consultation procedure, the European Parliament is asked for its opinion on 
proposed legislation before the Council adopts it. The Council consults the EP before 
taking a decision on the Commission‘s proposal and makes sure that its opinion is taken 
into account. The Council is not legally obliged to take account of its opinion but cannot 
take a decision without having seen it.
398
 This applied to EC Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 
on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. The 
cooperation procedure applied to the amendment of EC Regulation 1466/97 on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies, just like in 1997.
399
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Under the cooperation procedure, the EP gave the proposed Common Position of the 
Council a scathing report. The tone of the second reading‘s explanatory statement could not 
have been more condemnatory:  
―the fact that the Council did not, in its Common Position, accept any of the 
amendments submitted by the European Parliament mirrors once more the obvious 
democratic deficit in the architecture of economic governance in place. While the 
European Parliament made the utmost effort to complete the two readings within the 
shortest possible time frame, the Council totally ignores the position of the 
European Parliament and even goes so far as to name the European Parliament the 
scapegoat for the failure or delay of the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact 
should the Common Position not be speedily adopted. The Rapporteur wants to 
express his strong disapproval of this obvious lack of respect for the Parliament and 
lack of political will to truly cooperate with the Parliament in the process of 
reforming the Stability and Growth Pact.‖400  
 
Yet, due to the pressure from the Council, and more specifically from the Luxembourg 
presidency, the EP adopted a resolution approving the Council‘s common position. The EP 
approved the common position even though this did not respect its position from the first 
reading. MEPs rejected the amendments of the Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee, voting by 257 votes in favour to 309 against 1 abstention, not to reinstate 
amendments which had aimed at ensuring a stricter application of the preventive arm of the 
pact. Time pressure certainly played a role in getting the Council to adopt a common 
position and the EP‘s approval. Due to the tabling of at least 4 Eurogroup and Ecofin 
meetings in such a short space of time (January, February and March), the presidency 
created a sense of urgency within the Council. However this sense of urgency was real. The 
reason for exercising pressure was simple, yet very effective: the next presidency was to be 
held by the British, who could have either delayed further negotiations for another 6 
months, as it is not a member of the Eurozone and as they would have control over the 
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agenda. Considering that the British Finance Minister is not a member of the Eurogroup, it 
was hardly a priority of the British to pass this. As mentioned above, the Luxembourg 
presidency exercised a lot of pressure on the EP to approve the Common Position, even 
though it did not take any of the EP‘s amendments on board. The EP wanted to pass a 
reform, but realised that passing it under a British presidency was highly unlikely, and so 
was forced by the Council to accept the agreement as it stood. In the end, the final 
legislative act was approved on 27 June 2005, three days before the British presidency took 
over the helm of the Council. A close call indeed! 
 
In conclusion, we can clearly see that the negotiation context mattered to a great extent in 
these negotiations and had a considerable negative effect on Luxembourg‘s policy 
effectiveness. The European Parliament did not have sufficient powers to influence the 
outcome enough because of the cooperation and assent procedures, and was at the mercy of 
the Council. Time pressure probably helped to force the small member states into agreeing 
what was, in their view, a weaker pact.  
 
 
6.3. Member states‟ preferences:  
“the good, the bad and the ugly” or how large states dominate small states 
 
Several proposals were floated in the run-up and during the negotiations which lasted from 
September 2004 to March 2005. The issues which were rarely mentioned as contentious in 
the interviews were: the promise to keep budget deficits low in ‗good economic times‘ and 
to increase the peer pressure. The contentious issues were the inclusion of the debt criterion 
next to the budget deficit criterion; the timeframe before sanctions would be increased after 
an EDP was launched; a potential list of factors to be invoked to escape an EDP, and at 
what stage of the procedure these could be invoked. The most contentious issue in the 
reform negotiations was a possible list of relevant factors to allow a member state to escape 
an EDP when the economic decline of real GDP is in the grey area of 0.75 per cent and 2 
per cent. These factors could then be calculated out of the budget deficit.  
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6.3.1. Germany 
 
The German government was prepared to start a major political crisis in the EU and wanted 
to destroy the SGP if its demands for more flexibility were not met.
401
 It was using to a full 
extent its biggest member state status in these negotiations and threw all its political weight 
behind it. Schröder abandoned the prudent political stance that former German 
governments had adopted in EU negotiations and dismissed the long-standing political 
dogma in German politics of a prudent fiscal policy and monetary stability. It is possible he 
did not want excessive budget deficits and economic mismanagement to become an 
election theme in 2006. He threatened to walk away from the negotiation table.
402
 But the 
government also had previously faced severe criticisms from within his country, namely 
from the CDU and the Bundesbank, who accused it of jeopardising monetary stability and 
managing the federal budget in an irresponsible manner.
403
 Werner Becker from the 
Deutsche Bank presented the following German demands:  
―1. Excessive deficit proceedings are to be initiated against a country with a budget 
deficit exceeding 3% of GDP ‗only if a member state has made serious errors‘. 
2. The Commission and the Council should take ‗qualitative‘ factors into account in 
addition to the quantitative 3 per cent rule, both when deciding whether a deficit is 
excessive and – should deficit proceedings be deemed necessary – when structuring 
the consolidation timetable. The federal government seeks to draw up a list of 
qualitative factors that is as comprehensive as possible, paying special attention to:  
Structural reforms like Agenda 2010: 
- Quality of government expenditure: e.g. proportion allocated to education, 
research & development and capital expenditure 
- Low inflation is to be regarded as positive 
-Special burdens like German reunification (net transfers of around EUR 80 billion 
p. a.) 
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-Net contribution to EU budget / solidarity payment (2003: about EUR 6.9 
billion)‖404 
The German government favoured a list of relevant factors which could be invoked at any 
stage in an EDP, even when it was already in motion and just before sanctions would be 
decided.
405
 Among the factors, it wanted the burden of reunification included. The initial 
SGP foresaw on the contrary that exceptional circumstances can only be invoked at the 
beginning of the procedure when the Commission has issued a Recommendation and this is 
up for a decision at the Eurogroup. It also wanted a detailed list instead of a vague list, and 
wanted it written in a Regulation to make it binding and legal. Several factors were 
mentioned: burden of reunification, contributions to the EU budget. It has been suggested 
that the German government wanted to reform the Pact in such a way which would create a 
situation in which Germany would not have an excessive budget deficit anymore.  
 
 
6.3.2. France  
 
The French government had always been slightly reluctant to accept the SGP rules. The 
culture of the 5
th
 Republic always saw monetary policy as a political and economic 
instrument, and did not see monetary stability as a valuable goal in itself like the Germans 
had done. It wanted more flexibility in the corrective arm of the SGP, i.e. in the excessive 
deficit procedure. Furthermore, it had been pressing for reform since 2002, so it was willing 
to compromise a lot because the cost of no agreement would have been very high for the 
French. Chirac‘s popular support in France was very low and his credentials for reforming 
the French economy had been waning for some time. The French government wanted an 
agreement and was broadly in favour of the idea of a list of factors, but did not want to 
accept the explicit ―burden of reunification‖ advocated by the Germans. It also advocated a 
list of factors to be taken into account before the initiation of an EDP, such as ―military 
expenses, development aid, administration costs and pensions‖ listed as relevant factors. 
This list amounted to almost 30% of the budget that could be calculated out of the EDP and 
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consequently its position was slightly discredited. The French government also wanted to 
change the grey area of discretion for the Eurogroup if a decline in real GDP was noted 
between 0.75 per cent and 2 per cent.
406
 
One participant analysed the positions of France and Germany as follows: 
―The position of France had the same interests as the Germans in the short term, but 
not in the long term. They were allies up to a point. The Germans had absolutely no 
intention to consolidate. They expected that they would be in a situation of 
excessive deficit for 3 or 4 years and wanted to be left alone in the medium term. 
They wanted to give themselves margins and wanted to be allowed by the reform of 
the SGP to perform big tax reductions, along the lines of reduce to re-bounce. They 
wanted to do big structural reforms, and therefore their deficit would rise because 
they needed these reforms to be re-elected. Because they thought the reforms were 
appropriate, the money would flow in and then they would be able to repay the 
deficit.‖407 
The French faced a great challenge with their public debt and the civil servants realised that 
they need to reduce both the deficit and the debt but also that it was politically impossible 
to get quickly out of the situation. The Pébereau Report, an independent report, had 
illustrated the problems. One participant said:  
―They wanted to be left alone in the short term but they did not play as much on 
gaining time as the Germans. The French and the Germans had converging interests 
up to a point- but then they diverged as one looked closer. The French also agreed 
on the relevant factors etc. But they were more serious in their way- in the economic 
rationale and in terms of what they wanted- than the Germans. On the whole the 
idea of the Germans was to create an instrument which would not bother them 
because otherwise they would not hesitate to destroy it. The French on the other 
hand wanted to keep the instrument, were convinced that it would help them in the 
medium term to solve their structural budgetary problems but they also did not want 
to be bothered in the short term.‖408 
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The Italian government wanted infrastructure and investment in the Mezzogiorno to be 
included in the relevant list of factors.
409
 Greece stated that it, Belgium and Italy (the 
countries having the highest public debts) would not agree to the Commission's proposal on 
upgrading the special weight the issue of a member-state's public debt has on the Pact. As 
regards time limits which must be provided for member-states with excessive deficits to 
return to the path of fiscal stabilization, the member states ‗governments did not appear 
ready to agree on the Commission's proposals.
410
 
 
 
 6.3.3. David versus Goliath? The Netherlands and other hardliners… 
 
Schure and Verdun explain in their article on legislative bargaining in the EU that there 
were three different preferences by the three groups of member states: the small states 
preferred ‗Commission discretion‘, medium sized states preferred ‗no Council discretion‘, 
and big member states preferred ‗Council discretion‘.411 They tested this assumption 
positively on the preferences of the member states in the reform of the SGP.  
 
The Dutch government wanted to keep as close as possible to the old SGP, calling for 
stricter enforcement on the preventive side of the Pact, especially on the sustainability of 
public finances (with regards to old age pensions). Its position was very much in line with 
the ECB. It wanted to avoid countries running excessive deficits and endangering monetary 
stability. The Dutch Finance Minister wanted to prevent a list of factors and the exclusion 
of expenditure from the budget calculations. The Austrians also wanted a strengthening of 
the rules, as it is in their fiscal tradition to have healthy budgets.
412
 
One member of this hardliner group pointed out that they had two possibilities:  
―we could either stick to the old pact, which would mean that nothing happened, 
that it was effectively dead; or we could try to reach a compromise which would be 
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balanced. This would mean that we would be more restrictive elements for the good 
times and also more opportunities for the Commission to intervene. Then we could 
have some flexibility during the bad times. That would be an acceptable 
compromise. It was unacceptable to exclude certain kinds of expenditures. I was 
willing to accept an extra year, or if it‘s a very small excessive deficit over 3 per 
cent, that we would be flexible under certain circumstances.‖413   
Their aim was to get a framework around these exceptions favoured by the Germans and 
the French. So the Dutch tried to include terms like ‗benchmarks‘, ‗medium-term 
objectives‘, or ‗temporary‘.414  
 
Emotions were running high when asked about the economic rationale for a flexibilisation 
of the rules. As one participant put it: 
―These are more political interests. Many countries, especially the smaller countries, 
said that they cannot accept the request of the big countries- those big countries who 
defined what EMU should look like, those big countries who defined what the 
criteria should be and those big countries for which the criteria were designed. That 
those big countries should dictate to them, after they had redirected all their policies 
towards adhering to the SGP, what the new SGP should look like- just because it 
doesn‘t suit them any longer.‖415 
 
There was the concern that prospective Eurozone members of East and Central Europe 
would find it politically difficult to sell budgetary consolidation to domestic opinion if the 
current Eurozone members relaxed the rules. Some of the non Euro members equally had 
an interest in these negotiations, but experienced the disadvantage of being excluded from 
the negotiations in the Eurogroup, which weakened their position considerably. One 
participant explained this argument very forcefully: 
―If the small countries support this, then no one can ever again ask them to 
consolidate because the SGP says so. If the SGP is watered down now, then the 
small countries cannot guarantee that they can bring up the political force to 
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implement a budgetary policy which is conform to the SGP. This was argued 
especially by the small countries, also those from Central and Eastern Europe, who 
were not yet in the Euro area, and more specifically the Baltic States, who were at 
the time very much influenced by the Swedish and Finnish budgetary policies. They 
argued very forcefully that the parameters should not be allowed to be watered 
down because, for them, they were the only arguments in order to reduce their high 
deficits, with all the big social costs involved. They had to say: those are the 
parameters, we have to do this to join the Euro, to respect the SGP, in order to avoid 
sanctions. If you take this anchor away from us, then we are politically not credible 
anymore, then we cannot implement those policies anymore. Those were more 
political and emotional argumentations. But indirectly they are economic interests: 
the non Euro members wanted to keep the parameters because they needed them to 
implement those policies which would allow them to join the Euro. On the other 
hand the watering down of the criteria would have allowed them to join the euro 
quicker. There was certain ambivalence and it depended on how serious they 
were.‖416 
The costs of a breakdown of negotiations would have been disastrous: budgetary 
coordination within the EU would not make sense without Germany as the biggest 
economy, inviting other member states to flaunt the Maastricht criteria. The consequence of 
this would be that the ECB would find it very difficult to make confident forecasts on 
monetary inflation and on setting interest rates. Furthermore, it would have undermined 
confidence in the EU's fiscal framework and the sustainability of public finances in 
Eurozone countries. As Verdun and Schure argue,  
―it became clear that the coalition of small and medium-sized member states was 
unable to persuade France and Germany to consider a Pact with less discretion.‖417  
 
The policy preferences were very polarised on this issue; two camps can be clearly 
identified. In one corner, we have France, Germany, Italy and other ‗fiscal sinners‘ fighting 
against the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and other small countries such as Luxembourg. 
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Hence, there was less leeway in these negotiations for Luxembourg, as on this occasion it 
found itself in the wrong corner against the might of France and Germany.  
 
 
6.4. The Luxembourg presidency 
 
The presidency of the European Council in the second semester of 2004 was held by the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands did not have time to spend on negotiations on the SGP 
reform other than to hold two meetings in the Ecofin which started the negotiations. 
However, these Ecofin Council meetings had other Excessive Deficit Procedures running 
against several Member States. The first meeting, which was informal, was held on 
September 10
th
 2004 in Scheveningen and had several items on the agenda, namely the 
Greek deficit and the discussion of the Commission Communication. It was the desire of 
many countries not to start under the Dutch presidency because nobody could imagine that 
Dutch Finance Minister Zalm would preside over the discussion in a manner that would 
induce consensus. As one participant put it: 
―It was the sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit desire of many countries that it 
should run under Luxembourgish presidency, even though they were put more in 
the hardliner camp, but as people to whom one can talk. At that moment, many 
heads of state and government had pronounced themselves on the issue and so it 
was thought a good idea that one who plays in both clubs would lead the 
negotiations. This was not the case for Zalm, who could not do the communication 
with the heads of state as easily because, as finance minister, he would never have 
had the access to Chirac or Schröder.‖418 
 
But Luxembourg had intensive contacts with the previous Dutch presidency. At the end of 
the Dutch presidency, Gerrit Zalm and his team came to Luxembourg and they explained 
their strategy. They were in favour of more restrictive elements during the good times and 
for the possibility of the Commission to intervene in good times, and then more flexibility 
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when bad times came.
419
 Since December they had been working continuously on the 
updates of this working document. This was necessary to establish a guide to the reform.  
 
The procedures of drafting and negotiating were as follows: the Eurogroup came together, 
then around 5 people drafted a proposal. At the time the secretariat of the EFC had no 
secretary, because its former secretary, Günter Grosche, retired in December 2004. As the 
Eurogroup was a new institution and the presidency had not had that much experience in 
administrative matters, they hired Günter Grosche as advisor to Juncker as president of the 
Eurogroup. He was personal representative of the President of the Eurogroup and 
participated as such in the meetings of the Eurogroup. Because he was a known figure in 
the Ecofin to the ministers and had occupied a neutral position, he read out the summary in 
the mornings of the meetings because we wanted to avoid the Prime Minister being directly 
attacked as president of the Eurogroup. He was the link between the Eurogroup and the 
Ecofin. However, the German government did not appreciate Mr Grosche‘s presence and 
consequently he had to stop this activity, but continued as Juncker‘s advisor. The 
Luxembourg Finance Ministry staff wrote the conclusions, and sometimes they included 
some political interpretations. The meetings would start with a summary of the preceding 
meeting, then the negotiations would continue.  
 
The Luxembourg presidency received some criticisms from the start, notably from the 
Germans. The chairman of the EFC, Caio Koch-Weser, who was also State Secretary in the 
German Federal Ministry of Finance, prepared the first couple of meetings, trying to 
influence the agenda and direction of the negotiations. The chairman of the EFC should 
have taken the position of a consensus builder. However, this was very difficult for him, as 
he also had to push a specific national agenda while at the same time being the referee. The 
Luxembourg presidency wanted to avoid an excessive German influence, and others were 
not prepared to accept Koch-Weser‘s leadership in the negotiations. So the Luxembourg 
Finance Ministry took advantage of its prerogative to set the agenda and draft the 
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preliminary proposals, thereby taking charge of the negotiations and sidelining Koch-
Weser.
420
 
 
The presidency worked with both secretariats, the secretariat of the Committee on 
Economic and Financial Affairs and the Council Secretariat. In the case of the Council 
Secretariat, they worked with them on procedural and legal matters, even though they also 
discussed economic matters with them. With the DG ECFIN secretariat, they discussed 
mostly the economic aspects, and they drafted documents together. On a personal level the 
working relations were very good. They also had good working relationships with 
Commissioner Almunia.
421
 The presidency wrote the draft proposals with the people from 
the Secretariat, who were delegated there by the Commission.. The presidency always sent 
them their work, so that they could check how it fits in the discussions, and who was likely 
to oppose the proposals. The distribution network consisted of Paris, Berlin, The Hague, 
Brussels (because their member of the ECFIN was in charge of the issue), Cabinet 
Almunia, of the secretariat of the DG ECFIN and of the Council. They always sent them a 
preview before they sent the proposals to everyone. This allowed them to collect opinions 
from the Commission, who are the guardians of the treaty, then the ‗demandeurs‘, and then 
some neutral people. The key ‗demandeurs‘ were always consulted before the document 
was released to the others. 
 
One member of Luxembourg‘s negotiations team provided the following analysis:  
―I think that the presidency exercised a strong power. It depends on the 
determination of the presidency. But it was exactly because of Koch-Weser‘s bias 
that a neutral deal-broker was not possible. Koch-Weser was especially angry, as it 
was an institutional coup d‘état against him, taking his powers away. All these 
dossiers came under the presidency, even the drafting. It was not possible otherwise. 
No discussions on this subject were held in the EFC on our document- we gave it 
directly to the ministers. A presidency‘s power is what one makes of it; it can go far 
beyond agenda-setting. It depends on how one wants to do it.‖422 
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Thus the Luxembourg presidency was in permanent contact with all the negotiating parties, 
and Juncker visited and received some Heads of State and Finance Ministers over the 
course of the three months. The Dutch were briefed on the discussions with the others.
423
 
The Dutch and Austrians did not coordinate their positions, but it has been suggested that 
this happened more or less spontaneously.
424
 While the Dutch Finance Minister was a 
known and vocal hardliner for a strengthening of the Pact, the Austrian Finance Minister 
was more subtle in his declarations. The presidency motivated them to oppose France and 
Germany because many other member states were silent on the issue. The presidency urged 
them that they should be very hard in the negotiations and give up very little because, as a 
presidency, Luxembourg needed this pressure to balance that coming from the other side.
425
 
Furthermore, we have seen already that the Luxembourg government was leaning towards 
their position and consequently needed someone who would voice its views.  
 
We can see that both holding the presidency and coordinating effectively between the 
different institutions had an impact on Luxembourg‘s partially successful strategy. It fully 
exploited the access to information on the other member states‘ preferences and its control 
over the negotiation procedure, but as argued before, it had very little leeway against the 
demands of France and Germany.  
 
 
6.5. Individual-level factors 
 
Individual-level factors are based on past relations, political longevity and experience and 
belonging to the same political family. Past relations between Luxembourg‘s negotiators 
and the other main actors had changed since 1997. While Luxembourg still presented the 
same Prime Minister, France the same President, Chirac, and The Netherlands the same 
finance minister, Zalm, in Germany the SPD ruled. While there has been some evidence 
that Juncker and Schröder got on well in general, on this issue they were clearly divided.  
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Nevertheless, praise for Luxembourg‘s presidency on forging an agreement, and more 
specifically Juncker, abounded. The new French Finance Minister Thierry Breton 
congratulated Juncker for the ―masterful direction‖ of these negotiations of this historical 
debate.
426
 One participant praised him:  
―He did a good job with respect to the Germans. He convinced them about certain 
things. Because Zalm was too direct for Mr Eichel, the Dutch were no longer 
effective in negotiations. I think we got much more than we expected from the start. 
We were not completely sure about Juncker‘s position, because he is on very good 
terms with the large countries, so we were not always sure if he would be an honest 
broker. But he was.‖427  
 
On a less serious note, Zalm said after the success of finding agreement on the SGP that  
―he [was] prepared to contact the Pope if Juncker can now get a deal on the EU's 
next sticky problem, the financial perspectives for 2007-13.‖428  
Unfortunately, the agreement on the financial perspectives only came about under the 
British presidency, so Zalm could not be called upon to fulfil his promise. Another 
participant in these negotiations said: ―Jean-Claude Juncker has a lot of experience, and he 
is a smooth operator.‖429 The personal expertise, seniority and reputation of Juncker had a 
major impact on the participants‘ willingness to cooperate and come to an agreement. 
Again, the unique double advantage of having access to both the Heads of State and to the 
Finance Ministers gave Juncker an extraordinary access to information about the 
preferences of these negotiators, and gave ample opportunities to play with several levels 
within a member state. ―Contrary to many discussions that came after, a lot of the details 
were discussed at length and there were very detailed talks on the more technical issues at 
the ministerial level.‖430 This is an indication of the fact that ministers had to be well 
prepared because the discussions, and here Juncker‘s experience of being finance minister 
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for over 13 years came into play. Furthermore, it seems that ambiguity was the negotiation 
strategy of Juncker:  
―I think that Juncker was very effective in the idea that on the one hand I keep the 
Netherlands in and on the other I keep France and Germany. I imagine that was the 
strategy, then the rest would follow. Juncker was smart. He did an extremely good 
job, also taking positions when necessary.‖431  
 
While in Dublin in 1996, Christian Democrat Prime Minister Juncker had a powerful ally in 
Germany‘s Christian Democratic Chancellor Kohl and his CSU counterpart Finance 
Minister Waigel, the situation had changed in 2005. Germany was governed by a SPD- 
Green coalition who did not share the same values as Luxembourg‘s CSV. France was 
governed by Chirac‘s centre-right RPR, then UMP, which was following a more dirigiste 
approach in budgetary and monetary affairs. The Netherlands were governed on the other 
hand by the Christian Democrats CDA (Prime Minister Balkenende‘s party) in coalition 
with the liberal Party for Democracy and Freedom (VVD) which is more economically 
liberal and held the Finance Ministry under Zalm. As argued elsewhere, Luxembourg‘s 
government was closer to the Dutch, belonging as they did to the same political family. 
 
The small circle delegated to find a solution included the Netherlands, France, Germany 
and Luxembourg. All but one of the interviewees hailed Juncker‘s and the staff‘s 
competence as a major factor. Acquiring the trust of all the major players, having personal 
qualities such as appearing as honest broker and being a ―compromise man‖ while also 
taking a stand, seem to have been crucial in getting an agreement. The Luxembourg 
presidency focused on two axes of communication: one with France and Germany, and the 
other with Austria and the Netherlands. These two also embodied two opposing visions of 
the reform, and represented the main actors of each camp. In the Dutch camp, we can 
include Austria, Spain, Finland, and Commissioner Solbes. The French and German camp 
incorporated Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Belgium. Their strategy was to know all the 
sensitive issues for each member state, so as to be able to propose compromises. Referring 
to the relations with the Luxembourg presidency, one participant said:  
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―They were very good. We talked a lot to them, and they knew exactly what we 
wanted. They also knew exactly what the other big member states wanted. They did 
the go-between between France and certain member states and the Dutch and 
certain others on the other hand.‖432  
 
We can see from this analysis that past relations, belonging to the same political family and 
expertise could have had a significant impact in Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness in this 
case. Indeed, all but one of the interviewees (who was not included in the ‗circle of trust‘) 
have hailed Juncker‘s and the staff‘s competence as a major factor in getting an agreement. 
However, even though present, this factor did not increase Luxembourg‘s policy 
effectiveness in this particular case. These individual-level factors did not seem to shift 
other negotiators‘ preferences. It was clear that reputation and individual-level factors could 
not make up for the polarised preferences. 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
The previous sections have shown that Luxembourg managed to achieve some of the 
objectives it had set for the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, but by no means most 
or all of them. Therefore, it could be argued that Luxembourg was low in terms of policy 
effectiveness. If we look back at their mission statement, the first objective was to avoid a 
fundamental political crisis in the EU. That was achieved. The second objective was to get 
an agreement as close as possible to the old SGP. That was only partially achieved. The 
Commission still has the right to issue recommendations and early warnings, there were no 
Treaty modifications, no list of pertinent factors, economic good times had been 
emphasised, structural reforms in the calculation of the deficit were included and the 
situation of a slight and temporary excessive deficit was clarified.  
 
On the other hand, the debt criterion had been abandoned, ―chapter headings‖ had been 
created, and time frames to correct the excessive deficits had been enlarged. The reasons 
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for this ―low policy effectiveness have also been identified in this analysis: The major 
factor impeding or favouring a member state‘s policy effectiveness is the position of other 
member states in relation to the preferences of the member state in question. The 
constraints on these particular negotiations have been identified and discussed at length 
above. There was a general consensus in the Eurozone member states‘ governments on 
loosening the Pact‘s provisions for strengthening the preventive side and weakening the 
dissuasive side of the EDP. It has been shown that the political will to reform was clearly 
present, except in Germany, whose government was prepared to let the negotiations fail if 
its excessive deficit situation was not resolved by the new SGP.  
 
Luxembourg clearly favoured the Dutch version of a new pact, and gave it more 
importance in the negotiations than it would have had otherwise, thereby serving its own 
interests. However, as Germany had moved closer to France‘s vision of a Pact, the 
Netherlands could not do much to prevent a flexibilisation of the rules. If Germany and 
France have roughly the same visions then the small countries have little chance of being 
policy effective. This finding confirms previous statements that no decision would be taken 
against an alliance of both countries.
433
  It also confirms that under QMV, it is much more 
difficult to be highly policy effective. Finally, it has been shown that the European 
Parliament, although it has been granted some powers in monetary matters, could not use 
them and was not only overruled by the Council, but was also effectively neutralised by 
time pressure and by considerations of monetary stability. 
 
The following factors did not have a positive impact on policy effectiveness: holding the 
presidency of the Council of the European Union, reputation and domestic politics. 
Luxembourg‘s presidency achieved to get an agreement, but not necessarily one which it 
had in mind. While the personal expertise, seniority and reputation of Juncker had a major 
impact on the participants‘ willingness to cooperate and come to an agreement, it did not 
shift the preferences of Germany and France towards its own preferred outcome. The 
decision-making procedure of QMV was clearly not in Luxembourg‘s favour as it found 
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itself in a minority position. The process and content knowledge, stemming partially but not 
only from holding the presidency, and the coordination of the staff at the Finance Ministry 
with all the critical players, did not bear fruit. Time pressure had a negative impact in the 
sense that the hardliners had to give in to French and German demands. Similarly, while the 
approval procedure had been easy and institutional coordination was extraordinarily high 
and used to a maximum extent, it did not bring the intended results.  
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Chapter 7: Luxembourg’s role in the negotiations of the 
EU Council Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems, subsection Unemployment 
benefits 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Moving on from monetary union into the area of social security, this case offers a different 
insight into how a member state can be policy effective in EU negotiations. While the first 
two cases were moving in the lofty dimensions of high politics, this case goes down to the 
nitty-gritty details of everyday decision-making which nevertheless has a deep impact on 
people‘s everyday lives. In the context of the overarching principle of free movement of 
people in the European Union, an effective and fair coordination of social security systems 
is essential to make this principle a working reality. In December 1998 reform was initiated 
by the Commission who wanted to remove the obstacles to the free movement of persons 
created by the coexistence of different national social security systems within the internal 
market. More specifically it planned to establish the principle of the State of last 
employment to be competent in all areas of social security, notably in the area of 
unemployment benefits for frontier workers.
434
 
 
Luxembourg had a considerable interest in this specific point, as 38 percent of total 
employment is occupied by non-residents in Luxembourg and these represent 20 percent of 
all non-resident workers in the EU. The Commission proposal entailed that unemployment 
benefits should be paid by the member state where the former employee was working, not 
where he was residing, for a maximum period of six months. Luxembourg could not accept 
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this for several reasons: firstly because the financial burden on its system of benefit 
payments would be considerable; secondly for domestic political reasons and finally 
secondly because of the absence of harmonisation of social security payments in the 
European Union.
435
  
 
On December 1, 2003 the Council of Ministers decided that the country of employment 
pays three months of benefits to the country of residence, or 5 months for people who 
worked there for at least 12 of the last 24 months, to the rates applicable in the country of 
residence. In effect the competency stayed with the country of residence but the country of 
employment participates in the payment of benefits. The principle that was retained in the 
regulation is that Luxembourg pays only three months benefits to the country of residence 
for those persons who lost their job. However this disposition did not apply to 
Luxembourg. EC Regulation N° 883/2004 stipulated that although the country of 
employment would contribute for at least three months, the country of residence would still 
be the one paying the unemployment benefits. Luxembourg would only be liable to pay 5 
months of unemployment benefits if it chose to start and conclude bilateral agreements with 
its neighbours. So Luxembourg got an exception for the 5 months financing and a delay of 
application for registering frontier workers at the job-seeking agency.
436
 The regulation was 
initially going to enter into force in 2007. But the implementing Regulations 988/2009 and 
987/2009 were only approved in September 2009, so finally it entered into force in 2010. 
Therefore Luxembourg could be said to have been medium policy effective in these 
negotiations.  
 
This case was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, it was hailed as a success by the 
government in Luxembourg to defend its particular labour market and social security 
system. Secondly, and as opposed to the other two case studies, the decision-making 
procedure did not only involve unanimity in the Council, but also co-decision with the 
European Parliament- one of the most difficult procedures within the EU system. This case 
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study also differs in one important aspect to the other two: it was a very low profile and 
technical issue, even though it impacts on peoples‘ rights and lives in a significant way. 
Finally it was a very interesting case because agreement was happening in the shadow of 
enlargement and because Luxembourg‘s position was opposing European integration and 
harmonisation- something of a rarity! 
 
This chapter argues that Luxembourg‘s strategy of giving in as little as possible and as late 
as possible in an environment of unanimity worked. A strategy of distributive bargaining in 
an environment of low salience proved to be fruitful. If an issue is of little interest to the big 
member states, the Commission proposal is abandoned in favour of a sub-optimal 
agreement, and secondly that the EP can exert significant pressure on member states, and 
finally that European governance is sometimes based on the delegation of negotiations to a 
small circle of actors.   
 
The following section presents firstly, the European Commission‘s proposal, then continues 
with a timeline on the negotiations and presents the agreed outcome. The next section 
presents the main features of Luxembourg‘s welfare system and the importance of frontier 
workers for the labour market. Luxembourg‘s aims, strategy and policy effectiveness will 
also be presented. Finally, the factors which played a role in Luxembourg‘s medium policy 
effectiveness are analysed. Was unanimity the main reason for Luxembourg‘s policy 
effectiveness? Did the European Parliament play a role in these negotiations? Which other 
member states had a stake in these negotiations? Did domestic politics influence the 
position of the government? 
 
 
1.1. The build-up to the modernization from 1993-1998: in the name of transparency and 
simplification.  
 
The coordination of social security systems was developed and had expanded over 30 years 
into a wide array of regulations, directives, special clauses, exemptions and case law. The 
member states' very different social security schemes offered a wide variety of rights to 
201 
workers and the self-employed, including levels of benefit. The coordination of social 
security was considered as an important step towards fulfilling the objective of free 
movement of persons. Even before the decision to reform the whole Regulation 1408/71 
was taken in 1998, a previous Commission proposal which dealt specifically with the 
situation of frontier workers was published in 1992. This proposal already entailed that the 
country of last employment, not of residence would be responsible for unemployment 
benefits. It also already recognised that Luxembourg has a specific situation and the 
Commission wanted to change the rules but give Luxembourg a transition period of 10 
years. The EP then issued an opinion in which it suggested the transition period for 
Luxembourg be reduced to 5 years. The proposal was shot down by 6 or 7 member states, 
so that the Commission abandoned the issue without ever formally withdrawing it. 
 
In line with the call for simplification made at the Edinburgh European Council of 
December 1992 and in the interests of transparency and readability, the Commission 
considered it appropriate to simplify the coordination rules. Indeed this was one of the 
arguments, along with making bridges between national legislations and, more importantly, 
introducing some innovations towards harmonizing legislation, which were put forward to 
justify a reform of this immensely complicated and politically sensitive dossier. 
Furthermore data-processing and exchange had changed considerably over the last 30 
years, and new rules had to be introduced to take those into account. The proposal was 
created within the framework of second phase of the SLIM-programme (Simpler 
Legislation for the Single Market). Finally, the changes in national legislation and the 
interpretations and case law of the European Court of Justice since the 1970s had to be 
taken into account appropriately and included in the new proposal.
437
 Since the coming into 
force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the proposal has as its legal base Articles 18, 42 and 308 
TEC. 
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2. Meanwhile, in Luxembourg… 
 
2.1. Frontier workers and their unique contribution to the economy  
 
The problem the Luxembourg government foresaw with the Commission proposal was that 
it would put a huge financial burden on Luxembourg‘s national budget because of the sheer 
number of frontier workers in the country. When the welfare state was created, the capital 
as well as the workforce in the steel industry came from abroad.
438
 Today the situation has 
not changed significantly: multinational companies and migrants and frontier workers play 
a crucial role in Luxembourg‘s economy.  
 
The number of both foreign residents and frontier workers from the neighbouring regions 
of Saarland and Rhineland- Palatinate in Germany, Wallonia in Belgium, and Lorraine in 
France has steadily increased since 1983. While in 1984, around 10 percent of the total 
workforce were frontier workers in Luxembourg, the latest statistics show that they count 
now for over 40 percent of the workforce.
439
 The percentage of nationals working in 
Luxembourg has been declining over the years, with a steady progression both of foreign 
residents and frontier workers. While in 1970, Luxembourg nationals made up over 70 
percent of the salaried work force, this was reduced to 35.5 percent in 2001. In comparison, 
frontier workers made up less than 10 percent in 1970, but this number increased to around 
37.5 percent of the workforce employed in Luxembourg in 2001. The obvious explanations 
for this increase are the comparatively high unemployment rates in the neighbouring 
regions, the higher salaries in Luxembourg, and the lower taxation rates.
440
  
 
The flux of frontier workers between Saar-Lorraine-Luxembourg-Rhineland-Palatinate-
Wallonia shows the attractiveness of Luxembourg in 2001. The region attracting the most 
frontier workers was Luxembourg: the total number of workers crossing the border from 
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Belgium, France, or Germany totalled 96 100. In comparison, Rhineland-Palatinate 
attracted 2470 frontier workers from the other countries (except the Saarland), while 
Wallonia saw 3300 workers crossing the border and the Saarland 26 100 (except the 
workers from Rhineland-Palatinate).
441
 In the regions around Luxembourg, Saarland, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Lorraine and Wallonia, the unemployment rates of June 2008 varied 
from 5.4 percent in Rhineland-Palatinate to 13.4 percent in Wallonia (national figures). The 
number of unemployed people was estimated around 500 000 persons and the total 
population was 11 million.  It was estimated that the number of frontier workers in 
Luxembourg exceeded 150 000 in 2008. Of these, around 50 percent came from France, 26 
percent from Belgium and 24 percent from Germany.
442
 The percentages of Luxembourg 
nationals, foreigners living in Luxembourg, and frontier workers working in the different 
sectors of the economy are illustrative of the dependencies of the labour market on foreign 
and frontier workers. 40 percent or more of the construction, real estate and service to 
companies, financial services, trade and transport and communication sectors were 
dependent on frontier workers in March 2002.
443
 The importance of the frontier workers 
has increased both in numbers and consequently in the domestic political debate in 
Luxembourg. 
 
Many of the frontier workers are employed in Luxembourg on the basis of either short term 
contracts or fixed term contracts. In most other countries, unemployment benefits are 
considered an insurance, similar to a medical insurance. In Luxembourg it is not an 
insurance, but it is a right to a replacement salary which is guaranteed by the state. Benefit 
is paid for twelve months on a sliding scale: 
- first six months – 80 percent of basic salary (85 percent if applicant has a dependent 
child), up to 2.5 times the social minimum wage; 
- last six months - the same percentage of basic salary, up to 2 times the social 
minimum wage. 
The amount was reduced if the unemployed person lived with someone who earned more 
than twice the social minimum wage. Benefits were automatically indexed to changes in the 
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cost of living. To qualify for unemployment a person needed to have worked in 
Luxembourg for at least 26 weeks in the last twelve months and to have left the job for 
reasons not of his or her own free will.  
 
It has been almost impossible to calculate or project the estimated number of frontier 
workers that would benefit from receiving unemployment benefits in Luxembourg. There 
was almost no reliable statistics available on the number of unemployed frontier workers 
because they have to register with the job-seeking institution of their country of residence, 
not with Luxembourg‘s ADEM. The only way to find out how many people who used to 
work in Luxembourg and have lost their job is by looking at the claims form E301 which is 
issued when a frontier worker loses his job and has to apply for unemployment benefits in 
his home country. 
 
Table 7.1: The number of claims forms E301 delivered to frontier workers: 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Germany 992 1.595 1.497 1.972 1.859 1.898 2.610 2.092 2.315 
Belgium 581 885 774 898 730 683 905 662 601 
 
France 5,024 7,504 7,631 8,988 8,029 7,541 10,506 8,942 10,407 
Total  6,597 9, 984 9,902 11,858 10,618 10,213 14,021 11,696 13,323 
Source : Ministère du Travail
 444
 
 
The claims form E301 proves the period of employment of the frontier worker in 
Luxembourg so that he can claim unemployment benefits in his country of residence. While 
frontier workers benefited relatively more from the periods of high growth and high 
employment in Luxembourg than resident workers, it is not altogether surprising that they 
are relatively more affected in this period of low, or even negative growth.
445
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At first sight it may seem that these statistics are a good indicator of unemployment among 
frontier workers. However, there are several problems with it: firstly, in Belgium, frontier 
workers are not required to present this particular claims form to claim unemployment 
benefits. This means that the number presented in the table above may well not represent 
the true extent of Belgian frontier workers who had lost their job. Secondly, most of the 
French frontier workers are working in the interim sector, meaning that they have usually 
short periods of unemployment in which they have to claim the E301 form. This may then 
lead to one frontier worker claiming 10 E301 forms a year, which may inflate and distort 
the numbers of unemployed frontier workers.
446
 As frontier workers rarely register with the 
ADEM, this may be one indicator, albeit a distorted one, for finding out the extent of 
unemployment among frontier workers. If we look at the evolution of unemployment in 
Luxembourg since 2001, we can see that the total amount has almost doubled. 
 
Table 7.2. Evolution of the number of claims for unemployment benefits in Luxembourg 
since 2001:  
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of 
claims 
5.522 6.692 8.103 8.710 8.983 9.266 9.029 10.016 
Source: Ministère du Travail
 447
 
 
If we look at the evolution of unemployment benefits paid out, we can see that there has 
been a tripling of the total amount since 2001.
448
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Table 7.3. Evolution of unemployment benefits paid out (in millions Euro): 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Millions 
Euro 
42 60 90 109 121 121 123 130 
 
 
While the number of claims has doubled in the years 2001 to 2008, the actual total sum 
paid out for unemployment benefits has more than tripled. This suggests that not only 
unemployment levels have risen, but also that cash benefits have risen enormously. This 
shows clearly the potential financial impact if frontier workers were to get their 
unemployment benefits from their state of last employment, Luxembourg. All this shows 
the important consequences an unemployment benefit law based on the State of last 
employment could potentially have on Luxembourg in the face of an economic downturn. 
In the face of massive redundancies, the financial costs for paying these unemployment 
benefits would be enormous for the Luxembourg social security systems.  
 
 
3. The Commission proposal: a slap in the face for Luxembourg? 
 
On December 12 1998 the Commission issued a new proposal which would apply the same 
rules to all areas of social security: the competent state would be the state of last 
employment, including unemployment benefits and without a transition period for 
Luxembourg. The then Commissioner said that the current Regulation 1408/71 was totally 
unintelligible, that it was evidently not working well.
449
 The stated purpose of this 
Regulation was to coordinate the Member States' social security legislation. However, as 
the Economic and Social Committee points out, its scope was in fact greater, since it 
introduced important amendments to the way certain matters are regulated compared to the 
current rules.
450
 The Commission wanted to establish a direct link between country of 
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employment and social security systems. The whole proposal covered such a wide range of 
important issues such as pensions, invalidity benefits, or sickness benefits, but for the 
purpose of this analysis, only the question of the financing of unemployment benefits for 
frontier workers will be considered.  
 
As for the definition of the "competent" State, the old Regulation 1408/71 laid down rules 
(Title II of the Regulation) which determined which country's legislation applied in the 
event of a conflict between the laws of two or more Member States. The principle was that 
a person is subject to only one country's legislation which, as a rule, is that of the Member 
State in which he or she is employed or self-employed. The State of employment was as a 
rule thus the 'competent State' and the rights of the worker/self-employed person to social 
security benefits are decided by that State. However, the exception was unemployment 
benefits for frontier workers, where the competent State was the State of residence, and this 
was one of the exceptions the Commission wanted to get rid of. 
 
Article 5 of the Commission proposal entitled ―Waiving of the residence rules‖ stipulated 
that ―a benefit due under the legislation of one or more Member States may not be refused 
or subjected to any reduction, amendment, suspension, withdrawal or confiscation on 
account of the fact that the beneficiary resides in the territory of a Member State other than 
that in which the institution responsible for providing benefits is located. This would apply 
to unemployment benefits. Article 51 set out the unemployment benefit conditions for 
unemployed persons who, during their last employment, resided in a Member State other 
than the competent State, which in this proposal would be the country of last employment.   
―A person insured against unemployment who, during his last activity as an 
employed or self-employed person, resided in the territory of a Member State other 
than the competent State and who makes himself available to the employment 
services in the territory of the State in which he resides, shall receive the benefits 
provided by the competent institution in accordance with the provisions of the 
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legislation of the competent State as though he were available to the employment 
services of the said State.‖451  
Furthermore, the frontier worker has the right to choose between making himself available 
to the employment services of the State of last employment or the State of residence. These 
two articles constitute the crux of this chapter. The Commission wanted to establish the rule 
that  
―firstly, persons are subject to the legislation of one Member State only, and 
secondly that a person pursuing a professional activity in a Member State is subject 
to the legislation of that State (lex loci laboris); and lastly that persons not pursuing 
a professional activity are subject to the legislation of the Member State where they 
reside. It is to be noted that persons who have the right to a social security benefit 
by virtue of pursuit of a professional activity (sickness/unemployment benefits) and 
who no longer pursue such activity, are nevertheless considered to be continuing to 
pursue it‖.452   
The waiving of the residence rule, which would apply to unemployment benefits as well, 
and the proposal that the State of last employment would pay for the unemployment 
benefits of frontier workers, were the main issues which were worrying the Luxembourg 
government. An account of this reform proposal‘s long path towards agreement will be 
presented to facilitate an understanding of the complexity of the negotiations.  
 
 
4. The Council and European Parliament negotiations: a long and winding road  
 
 
On the 12 December 1998, the Commission submitted to the EP the proposal for a 
European Parliament and Council regulation on the coordination of social security 
systems.
453
 In the EP Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, Jean Lambert was 
appointed Rapporteur in July 1999. The EP was very interested in the situation of frontier 
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workers and played an active role in the negotiations of the issue analysed in this case 
study. On 27 January 2000 the Economic and Social Committee gave its opinion by 79 
votes to 5 with 20 abstentions.
454
 The ESC welcomed the waiving of residence rules 
without comments and broadly agreed with the proposal of the Commission. It made no 
comment either on the unemployment for frontier workers, indicating a clear acceptance of 
the Commission‘s proposal on this matter. As Rob Cornelissen, Head of the Unit ‗Free 
Movement of Workers and Coordination of Social Security Schemes‘ in DG Employment 
and Social Affairs pointed out, no significant progress was made in the institutions of the 
Council from 1998 until 2001.
455
 This lack of progress allegedly stemmed from the fact that 
there was no real order in which issues were negotiated, nor was there general agreement 
on principles or parameters around which discussions could centre and progress.  
 
The European Council, gathered in Stockholm on 23 and 24 March 2001, mandated the 
Council to start working on certain parameters for the modernisation of the Regulation 
1408/71 by the end of 2001. On 8 October 2001 the President of the Council concluded that 
there was room for further discussion, since there were still differences of opinion on 
making the State of last employment responsible for such provision. Some fears were 
expressed that, if this was the case, the authorities responsible for helping to find new jobs 
would not be the same as those responsible for paying unemployment benefits and would 
not be located in the same State. In addition, the financial burden would be unfairly 
distributed.  
 
Three months later however, the Council of Employment and Social Policy managed to 
adopt some parameters for the modernisation of Regulation 1408/71 on 3 December 
2001.
456
 It distinguished between general parameters, which would help for changing very 
technical provisions, and specific parameters. Among the general parameters, parameter 4 
concerned the waiving of the residence rule, which the Council recognised as essential to 
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compliance with the basic principles of Community law. Continued work was made 
provisional on the situation of frontier workers with regard to unemployment benefits 
(parameter 10). This indicated that no consensus was found on this chapter. Nevertheless, 
the Council noted that certain benefits should not be exportable, particularly when they 
were closely linked to the social context of a specific Member State (mixed-type non 
contributory benefits) or should be exportable only within certain limits or certain situations 
(unemployment).  
―The specific parameter 10 on the unemployment chapter must be simplified while 
respecting the current coordination rules. In the case of an unemployed person who, 
when last in employment, was resident within the territory of a Member State other 
than the competent State, the main aim is for that person to be integrated as well as 
possible into the labour markets. It will also be necessary to ensure adequate social 
protection for the unemployed person, to take account of the financial aspects of the 
question and to guarantee effective control.‖457  
 
These general and specific parameters were critical for Luxembourg. While the general 
parameter 4 already mentioned that unemployment may not be included in the waiving of 
the residence rule, the specific parameter 10 remained very vague and did not give any 
indication on who would eventually pay for unemployment benefits for frontier workers. 
Luxembourg had been able to ward off the possibility that the State of last employment 
would be paying the unemployment benefits for frontier workers. While it was set in the 
general parameter that the waiving of the residence may not apply to unemployment, it was 
unclear whether it would also not apply to unemployment for frontier workers.  
 
Pressure was starting to be felt by the Council as the EP elections loomed only 2 years 
ahead and enlargement was equally just around the corner. The Barcelona European 
Summit of March 2002 asked the Council to conclude its work so that the Regulation could 
be adopted before the end of 2003. Between June 2002 and June 2003 work was continued; 
however, it is not clear if the Danish presidency of the second half of 2002 put much 
emphasis on this issue.  
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At the last meeting of the EP Committee on Employment and Social Affairs on 11 June 
2003, it adopted the draft legislative resolution by 19 votes to 15, with no abstentions. The 
only committee which delivered an opinion was the Committee on Legal Affairs and the 
Internal Market.  Two Luxembourg MEPs were present at the vote: Robert Goebbels 
(LSAP- replacing Anne E.M. Van Lancker) and Claude Turmes (Déi Gréng- replacing 
Hélène Fautre). On 3 September 2003, the EP ended its first reading by proposing 47 
amendments. On 10 October, the Commission approved the amended proposal and 
published its amended proposal on 14 October 2003.  
 
On 20 October 2003 Minister Biltgen suggested that the country of residence stayed 
competent for the payment of unemployment benefits, but that the country in which the 
person was last employed pays three months of unemployment benefits, at the same rates 
applied in the resident country, to the relevant institutions of that country. Furthermore he 
made clear that Luxembourg would not pay 5 months of unemployment benefits. A certain 
number of member states asked to raise the length of the payment to six months. This 
would apply to those employees who had worked at least 12 months during the last 24 
months in the country of last employment.  
 
On December 1, 2003 the Employment and Social Policy Council came to an agreement. It 
was decided that the country of last employment would pay three months of benefits to the 
country of residence, or 5 months for people who worked there for at least 12 of the last 24 
months, to the rates applicable in the country of residence. The Italian presidency noted that 
―only two outstanding issues connected with this problematic dossier, which has 
been on the table of the Council since 1999, concerned the issues of the provisions 
regarding the unemployment chapter.‖458  
 
The agreement came about over the weekend before between the Ministers of Luxembourg, 
France, Belgium and Germany- indeed Luxembourg‘s Minister had called them over the 
phone to hammer out a compromise. On 26 January 2004, the Council approved the 
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common position, and work started on transforming it into a legal text. On 20 April 2004, 
the EP adopted two amendments to the common position, which were also approved by the 
Council. On 29 April 2004, the Regulation 883/2004 was adopted by the Council and the 
EP. On the 1 May, the EU was enlarged to 27 Member States, and in June the elections 
were held. A close call indeed! 
 
5. The final outcome: Regulation 883/2004 
 
 The Regulation 883/2004 ensued, after approval by both the EP after the second reading 
and the Council in an Agriculture and Fisheries Council without debate in April 2004.
459
 
Article 7 concerned the waiving of residence rules. This article applies to Articles 64 and 
65, but only within the limits inscribed therein. Article 65 of the final Regulation stipulates 
that  
―the State of last activity would reimburse unemployment benefits for a minimum 
of three months; and that the period of reimbursement would be extended to five 
months where the person concerned has, during the preceding 24 months, 
completed periods of employment or self-employment of at least 12 months in the 
Member State to whose legislation he was last subject, where such periods would 
qualify for the purpose of establishing entitlement to employment benefits‖.  
―The second issue concerned Luxembourg's request for a specific transitional period 
in view of the need to reinforce its employment services that would result from 
frontier workers being able to register additionally with the employment service of 
their State of last activity. The Council agreed that a two-year transitional period 
should be granted to Luxembourg‖. 460   
 
In Article 86 on bilateral agreements, it is stated that as far as relations between, on the one 
hand, Luxembourg and, on the other hand, France, Germany and Belgium are concerned, 
the application and the duration of the period referred to in Article 65(7) shall be subject to 
the conclusion of bilateral agreements. In the section on transitional and final provisions, 
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the Regulation states in Article 87 that the provisions of the second sentences of Article 
65(2) and (3) shall be applicable to Luxembourg at the latest two years after the date of 
application of this Regulation. 
 
 
6. Luxembourg’s policy effectiveness 
 
6.1. Luxembourg‟s preferences and strategy 
 
The most important issue was the waiving of the residence rule in Article 5 of the proposed 
Regulation. If that was achieved, then the work would already be half accomplished, and 
details would only concern the amount of the reimbursement towards the country of 
residence. The State of last employment was supposed to cover all the benefits for the 
person employed, regardless of whether this person lives in the same Member State. This 
change in policy by the Commission was justified on the grounds that it contributed to one 
of the essential aims of the EU, namely it was supposed to improve the free movement of 
people. The waiving of residence rule was based on the principle of equality, and entailed 
that citizens covered by the regulation would enjoy the same rights and would be subject to 
the same obligations as the nationals of the Member State in which they reside and/or work.  
It is based on three basic elements: assimilation of the facts, aggregation of periods, and 
retention of rights, regardless of the citizen‘s place of residence.461  Luxembourg‘s second 
objective was to get a delay of implementation for the registration of frontier workers at the 
ADEM. Luxembourg‘s unemployment agency had been criticised for not being pro-active 
enough and notoriously understaffed. The reform that was underway was contested 
domestically. 
 
The government of Luxembourg wanted to keep the status quo on this issue. It did not 
accept the Commission‘s proposal as it was published. These extreme preferences led the 
government to adopt a distributive bargaining strategy where it tried to gain as much as 
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possible without regard for the benefits that other member states or indeed frontier workers 
would gain. The motto was ―to give as little as possible only if we absolutely have to.‖ The 
Minister had given clear instructions to let agreements fail at lower levels, and ordered it to 
the level of Ministers, thereby creating an atmosphere of tension in this extremely 
complicated and technical dossier. The instructions to the working group and the 
COREPER were to block the proposal until the end. 
462
  
 
The reputation of a team of negotiators depends also on its coherence on the one hand, and 
on the clever use of the different strands of visions on the other hand. Clearly, using a 
discourse of Europeanisation and combining it with a discourse on national interests played 
out well in the end. To be precise, if one argues that one wants to further European 
integration but just cannot accept one particular point of a regulation, one is more likely to 
gain some understanding from the other negotiators, than if one adopts a die-hard approach. 
As the Minister for Employment Biltgen argued,  
―Luxembourg has a tradition of being listened to, because we usually are playing a 
more pro-European role and are seen as brokers, and not defending a national 
position‖.463  
Specific references to Luxembourg‘s special situation were made in official Council 
documents, indicating that Luxembourg was willing to let this regulation drag indefinitely 
until its demands were at least partially satisfied.  
 
The issue was whether the country of last employment is responsible for the payment of 
unemployment benefits to frontier workers. Luxembourg‘s government had realised 
however that the winds had changed since the first Commission proposal in 1993. It also 
realised that it could not block the proposal indefinitely because ―at one point it would have 
been overrun.‖464 Traditionally, Luxembourg always set out its position clearly and 
explained it, and said that it was ready to negotiate, in order to participate in the 
negotiations and to get something afterwards which would be advantageous. While 
Luxembourg had always argued that the frontier workers should be taxed in the state of 
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employment, it realised that its position on the issue of paying unemployment benefits for 
frontier workers was illogical. The strategy was to argue, that due to the wide disparity in 
national legislation, it was simply too difficult to develop a system in which the state of last 
employment was responsible for unemployment benefits. It questioned the practicability of 
tracing the unemployed frontier worker. What if he was working already again in his state 
of residence, but still continued to receive unemployment benefits from Luxembourg? 
Luxembourg also criticised the proposal that an unemployed frontier worker has the choice 
to register at the job seeking agency either in his state of residence or in the state of last 
employment, as in no other area of social security does the person have the choice between 
two different systems.  
 
Once the parameters were in place, and unemployment was not going to be included in the 
waiving of the residence rule, Luxembourg‘s government had to find a solution to the 
demands that the state of last employment would pay back to the country of residence a 
portion of unemployment benefits. Again, this still was related to financial interests: how 
many months would the state of last employment pay back to the country of residence? The 
Commission proposal had meant that a frontier worker who was employed for less than 12 
months would have 3 months of his unemployment benefits reimbursed by Luxembourg to 
the job-seeking agency of the country of residence. If he had worked there for more than 12 
months, this reimbursement would increase to 6 months. Luxembourg argued that it could 
compromise and pay 3 months back, but that 6 months would be excessive. With its 
approximate 140 000 frontier workers, a high proportion of them in temporary positions, 
and the rising costs of unemployment benefits for the state‘s budget, the financial burden 
this proposal imposed on Luxembourg would have been considerable. The government and 
its negotiators therefore had to stress again and again that it was not defensible politically at 
home to agree to the Commission‘s proposal. 
 
The duration of payment only became an issue after it became clear that the residence rule 
would still be applicable to the payment of unemployment benefits. The agreement was 
quickly reached on the amount of 3 months of paying the unemployment benefits back to 
the country of residence. However, the outstanding issue was whether 5 or 6 months would 
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be payable if the unemployed frontier worker had been working there for more than 12 
months. Luxembourg did not accept this last formula and insisted it would become too 
costly for its administration. The other big economic interest for Luxembourg was that the 
unemployed frontier worker would be able to register with the country‘s job-seeking 
unemployment agency. Minister Biltgen argued that the government needed time to 
implement its reforms, and that only then could Luxembourg realistically fulfil its 
obligations towards the frontier workers.
465
  
 
6.2. Was Luxembourg policy effective in these negotiations? 
 
Luxembourg managed to get a transitional period of 2 years for frontier workers to register 
at its employment services, and it got the chance to form bilateral agreements with its 
neighbouring states on paying 5 months of unemployment benefits to the state of residence- 
bilateral agreements which it was never intent on realising. Furthermore, the waiving of the 
residence rule is not applicable to unemployed frontier workers.  
 
Luxembourg managed to achieve some of the objectives it had set for the reform of the 
Regulation 1408/71, but not all of them. Therefore, it could be argued that Luxembourg 
was medium policy effective in this case. If we look back at its mission statement, the first 
objective was to avoid the inclusion of the principle of the country of employment in the 
financing of unemployment benefits. That was achieved but with the caveat of financing 3 
months payable to the country of residence.  
 
The second objective was to get delays of implementation. That was achieved, in 
subsequent negotiations it was established that Luxembourg will only implement these 
measures in 2012, rather than 2007 as originally planned. On the other hand frontier 
workers can register at both the resident and work-related unemployment agency, which 
will include them in the unemployment statistics, which enables the institutions to gather 
more reliable statistics on the available labour market in the Grande Region. 
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Finally, why did Luxembourg come up with the solution of bilateral agreements, which 
would be negotiated on the reimbursement of 5 months of unemployment benefits? The 
Minister explained the ulterior motives behind this:  
―We have an interest of working together with their administrations and finding 
things out. If we want to find out more what happens on our labour market, then we 
need to know more about what happens with those people- do they look for jobs in 
Luxembourg or not? Do they work in their country or not? For example, we pay 
partly invalidity pensions to former frontier workers which raises our 
unemployment statistics and we don‘t even know if those people work in their home 
country or not. (There is the potential problem of fraud.)‖.466  
 
Leaving it up to the member states to conclude bilateral agreements was effectively taking 
the issue out of the hands of the Commission. The fact that Luxembourg got in effect an 
exemption to pay 5 months of unemployment benefits to the country of residence has to be 
counted as a success. Indeed, this disposition would only be implemented if Luxembourg 
and the neighbouring decide to conclude bilateral agreements. So far, no country has shown 
any intention of initiating such negotiations.  
 
 
 
7. Discussion 
 
7.1. Domestic politics 
 
This section will present the institutional factors which played in Luxembourg‘s favour: the 
approval procedure related to the main domestic stakeholders, the absence of domestic 
debate and the subsequent freedom of the government to pursue freely its negotiation 
strategy. Finally, it is important to address the question of the coordination between 
ministries and the different levels of negotiation, and to assess the level of mobilisation of 
MEPs in the process.  
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Firstly, an assessment of the political sensitivity of the large number of frontier workers in 
Luxembourg will shed light on the reasons for the extreme preferences the government was 
holding. It was clear to the Minister of Employment Biltgen and the entire coalition cabinet 
of Christian Socialists (CSV) and the Liberals (DP) that this was a politically charged issue, 
which could potentially bring a lot of negative press and a public opinion backlash of 
nationalistic sentiments. The Minister was under pressure from the cabinet that he should, 
under no circumstances, give up the principle of the state of residence in unemployment 
benefits.
467
 Both Luxembourg‘s massive economic dependency on frontier workers and 
their perceived linguistic influence had influenced the domestic political debate. They were 
and are undoubtedly seen as a valuable asset for business and the economy, contributing a 
high percentage to the growth of national GDP and productivity. Their skills and expertise 
made them sought after in the job market.  
 
However it was also argued that because living costs were much lower in France, Belgium 
and Germany, they were willing to work for a lower salary than the residents, thereby 
taking away jobs from the residents.  
―Levels of poverty and income inequality in Luxembourg are among the lowest in 
the world and that the 'depth' of poverty is comparatively low. When examining the 
Grande Région, Luxembourg stands apart as one of the richest regions in Europe 
and disposable incomes in Luxembourg are some 70% higher than in the 
neighbouring regions.‖468  
These lower living costs have even induced an increasing number of Luxembourg‘s 
residents to become frontier workers themselves.  
 
Therefore, the economic advantages and disadvantages of the presence of frontier workers 
was and is a delicate subject, just by the fact of their sheer numerical importance. This has 
obviously been a favourite issue with the populist right wing ADR, who regularly called for 
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stricter language requirements in employment, and for a reduced dependence on frontier 
workers. It argued that national unemployment would decrease and that there would be 
fewer frontier workers if language requirements were reinforced. On the other hand, it 
seemed that the mainstream parties felt it was too much of a hot potato to discuss the issue 
openly. There were only some anecdotal calls for reducing the economic dependence on 
frontier workers and improving Luxembourg‘s educations system to alleviate 
unemployment, especially with regards to the least qualified people.  
 
The perceptions of the roles which frontier workers played in Luxembourg‘s society meant 
that approval for the Commission proposal would have caused considerable political 
damage to the government in an election year (2004). The findings suggested that the 
debate was low on this issue in the national political parties, trade unions and other fora. 
However, this does not mean that the issue was entirely uncontested. 
 
The CSV (Christian Social People‘s Party) and the liberal DP (Democratic Party) were in 
coalition at the time. The CSV was responsible for Employment and Social Affairs, with 
Minister François Biltgen and Minister of Families, of Social Solidarity and of Youth 
Marie-Josée Jacobs being present at all negotiations. The LSAP (Luxembourg Socialist 
Worker‘s Party) was in opposition, but Robert Goebbels, MEP was member of the EP 
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs. Claude Turmes, MEP for the Greens, was 
also a member of this Committee. It seems that cross-national solidarity with frontier 
workers was low, as interviews suggested that even the LSAP viewed the issue as being of 
vital national interest rather than a European-wide issue to increase the rights of frontier 
workers.
469
 It was argued by the LSAP that considering the lower costs of living in the 
neighbouring countries, it was not really a problem that frontier workers receive their 
unemployment benefits from their state of residence. However, it considered it fair that 
Luxembourg contributes towards their unemployment benefits.
470
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Furthermore, the trade unions were not very vocal either. There are two general trade 
unions in Luxembourg. The Luxembourg Christian Trade Union (LCGB) is associated with 
the Christian Social People‘s Party (CSV), while the (bigger) Independent Trade Union 
Federation of Luxembourg (OGBL) is officially independent, but linked to the LSAP. Both 
the LCGB and OGBL have secretaries for frontier workers for every neighbouring country. 
Curiously the LCGB indicated that they chose not to take a position on the proposed 
reform.
471
 Even though the LCGB has a secretary concerned with the rights of frontier 
workers, no opinion on this matter was publicly issued. As one member put it:  
―In the area of social security- and I include here unemployment- we do less LCGB 
politics but national politics; on the whole in a very discreet manner in Brussels 
because we run really on a nationalist track there. It is clear however for a trade 
unionist that someone who works here and becomes unemployed should have the 
opportunity to register at our unemployment agency and receive his unemployment 
benefits here. This is the general position. But a small country which has so many 
frontier workers, 140 000! It is a financial burden which is enormous. This is why 
this issue was debated very discreetly.‖472 On the one hand, they draw some of their 
membership from frontier workers, but on the other, their main concerns are the 
resident workers.  
 
This evidence indicates that the political elite were showing a united front in paying 
unemployment benefits for frontier workers. This is possibly linked as well to the 
Luxembourg model of the tripartite: it may have been decided in that confidential forum 
that the trade unions would not interfere on the government‘s line. It was easy to get the 
position approved by the major stakeholders involved: business organisations, all the 
political parties and even the trade unions were on the same line as the government. As one 
participant put it:  
―We were informed about the negotiations in Brussels, and the difficulties ensuing. 
Just before the end, we were also informed that this could be a compromise which 
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Luxembourg would bring into the discussions. We gave our agreement to that 
compromise. It was a compromise which was supported by the social partners.‖473 
Public opinion would have probably been against it, had it been aware of the Commission‘s 
proposal. Economic interests are often used as very persuasive arguments in EU 
negotiations and have to be taken seriously. This seemed to be the case here as well, even 
when one of the richest member states argued it could not afford to pay such an admittedly 
small price and in spite of all the revenues it received from frontier workers‘ taxes. As 
shown in the section on Luxembourg and its frontier workers, Luxembourg was the country 
that would be most affected financially by the waiving of the residence rule.  
 
Moving on to the coordination of institutions, several things are to be noted: while 
unemployment benefits are dealt with in most member states under the Ministry of Social 
Affairs or under similar denominations, in Luxembourg both the Ministry of Employment 
and the Ministry of Social Security negotiated this issue. The coordination between the 
Ministry of Social Security, which was responsible for the overall negotiations on this 
Regulation, and the Ministry of Employment, responsible for the particular issue of 
unemployment benefits, was essential to an effective negotiation strategy. While the 
Ministry of Employment was apparently not involved in the first phase of the negotiations, 
it took over the reins in the negotiations when the hot phase started. At the lower level of 
the working group on Social Security, the official representing Luxembourg had a very 
flexible mandate and no specific instructions. This unnerved some officials in the Ministry 
of Employment, who intervened and informed the Minister of this situation. The Minister 
then instructed the officials in the working group and in the COREPER to block the issue 
and let it rise to the level of the Council of Ministers, where he would be able to influence 
more effectively the negotiations. Both ministries agreed that they cooperated well, and that 
information flowed constantly on the status of negotiations from the Ministry of Social 
Security to the Ministry of Employment. Therefore, the fact that two ministries were 
involved did not impede Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness. 
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Furthermore, Luxembourg enjoys continuity in its administrative and diplomatic personnel, 
most of whom are more than familiar with the EU dimension to their work.  One participant 
offers the following self-assessment:  
―Luxembourg does not have a big turnover. We have a certain advantage in having 
a smaller workforce than others because we are a small country. A lot of our 
officials are obliged to know the European dossier. Often we cannot go into so 
much detail as the others because they have more staff resources. But that reflex of 
knowing EU issues is there. That reflex is also 100% present in the political class. 
Every politician, whether in government or not, is aware that part of his work is at 
the European level. In other countries it is different. We have the huge advantage of 
having politicians who are more embedded in the EU than most of the other 
member states‘ politicians as a rule and on a more regular basis‖.474  
This can give it certain advantages, like the historical memory of the staff, who know the 
negotiations process, the legislation and how it came about, what the problems were and 
are.  
―In such a technical issue as social security, what really helps a country to defend a 
position is not the size of the country or its population but the profound technical 
knowledge of the issue and proposal. There are some countries, and Luxembourg is 
one of them, where there is a very good knowledge of both the law and the 
implementation‖.475 
 
What is curious is that during the Belgian presidency in 2001, when the political agreement 
for the parameters for the reform of the Regulation 1408/71 was formed, the Council 
document stated that Luxembourg was represented by the Minister for Social Affairs Marie 
Josée Jacobs and by the Prime Minister Juncker.
476
 Considering that this was a meeting of 
the Employment and Social Affairs Council, why was the Prime Minister present? The only 
other item debated that day that could have fallen under his remit were the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines. There were no other Finance Ministers or Prime Ministers present at this 
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meeting. I could not establish whether the PM had any obvious involvement in those 
negotiations. Nevertheless, it seems that the PM had managed to negotiate the particularly 
fuzzy parameter on the unemployment benefits for frontier workers.
477
 
Finally, the national government mobilised its MEPs effectively to influence the 
Committee on Social Questions.  Robert Goebbels, a Socialist MEP, had repeated contacts 
and used his networks to persuade the Committee Members that special arrangements for 
Luxembourg had to be accepted, considering the exceptional nature of its labour market, 
and of the consequent political sensitivity of the issue. Furthermore, two of Luxembourg‘s 
MEPs were present at the vote in the Committee: Claude Turmes (Greens) and Robert 
Goebbels (LSAP). They were explaining the problems Luxembourg would have to the EP 
Committee and played an active role in getting its agreement on the Council position.
478
 
 
 
7.2. The negotiation context 
 
The most difficult decision-making procedure was applied in the area of social policies, and 
more specifically in the coordination of social security systems: unanimity in the Council of 
Ministers and co-decision with the European Parliament. Considering both this difficult 
procedure and the vast scope of the reform of the Regulation 1408/71, it was little wonder 
then that the discussions lasted almost a whole parliamentary term of 5 years!  
 
This procedure ran as follows: the EP analysed the Commission‘s proposal and the 
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs adopted a legislative draft resolution. The 
Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market also delivered an opinion. The 
Commission produced an amended proposal. During all this time, negotiations ran parallel 
in the various levels of the Council: in the working group, in the COREPER and at the level 
of Ministers. After the Council reached a consensus, the EP proposed and voted 
amendments, on which the Commission gave a commentary, which would be taken into 
account when the Council voted on the amendments of the EP. The amended adopted 
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proposal went back to the EP who gave its second reading. Then the Council published a 
common position, on which the Commission writes a Communication. Finally the 
regulation was drafted and published.  
As one participant put it:  
―Unanimity is a big point. Most of the time, we do try to find a consensus on a text. 
Social security touches an essential element of the public, so each member state‘s 
concern is taken into account. There are no small or big member states in the 
negotiations.‖479  
Clearly, here is an apparent contradiction in the way this is phrased. While unanimity is an 
important factor, there is always a quest for compromise in the Council in social security 
legislation.  
 
Meanwhile, the European Parliament had not been happy at all since 1998: Some MEPs 
were indeed very interested in the coordination of social security system, and mostly in 
frontier workers. One interviewee argued that: 
―there was an evolution in the EP: they were traditionally on the side of the 
Commission, but after a while they realised that they could not win on every point. 
This is normal in every negotiation; in the beginning you expect to win everything 
but then you are willing to give up certain points because you get certain others. The 
initial strong opposition of the EP led to negotiations in a constructive debate with 
Mrs. Lambert who had to convince the other members of the Committee to accept 
the package. One must not forget that it was only one point, one detail in the whole 
reform of the Regulation 1408/71. Mrs. Lambert played a very positive role in 
making the negotiations constructive and produced good results
480.‖  
The EP in its first reading on the proposal on 17 June 2003 provided a definition of frontier 
worker in its Amendment 16 of Article 7 point (c a) (new):  
―Frontier worker means any person pursuing an activity as an employed or self-
employed person in the territory of a Member State and who resides in the territory 
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of another Member State to which he returns as a rule daily or at least once a 
week.‖481  
No mention was made of the waiving of the residence rule.  
 
Members of the European Parliament were conscious that frontier workers were directly in 
their line of responsibility. A frontier worker could not go to an MEP of his region or 
country, but had to seek support from an MEP of their country of employment. The 
situation of frontier workers therefore was at the very least a bilateral, at most even a 
European issue, which they were responsible for. Furthermore, ―it would be a positive point 
which they could stress during elections:  they did something to improve the situation of 
frontier workers.‖482 Some MEPs therefore were wholly in favour of the Commission‘s 
proposal that the country of last employment should be responsible for frontier workers in 
all matters relating to health care and taxation. Dutch MEP Ria Oomen was particularly 
adamant to secure more rights for frontier workers. However, Luxembourg‘s MEPs were 
much more inclined towards the position of their national government, realizing the 
financial burden that the Commission‘s proposal entailed for their constituents.483  
 
Time pressure was an important factor in the negotiations: the elections of the European 
Parliament in June 2004 were approaching and because of co-decision it was clear to the 
Council and the Commission that agreement had to be found and the legislation had to be 
passed by the current legislature. A new Parliament would have delayed legislation 
considerably because a new Committee would have to be appointed and would have had to 
get to know the dossier and the issues from scratch. Enlargement also put pressure on 
finding an agreement, as the ten new member states‘ governments would have joined the 
negotiation table and could potentially have unravelled these numerous carefully agreed 
compromises on the previous chapters of a very sensitive political nature. Luxembourg was 
under pressure to give in from various sources: the Commission, the European Parliament, 
the presidency of the Council and the other member states. As one participant argued,  
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―The pressure was on us because if we blocked one point, we blocked the whole 
package. This is why this point was excluded again and again while we continued 
working on the other points. When everything else was agreed, Luxembourg still 
had a veto on one point. Then they had to pressure Luxembourg so that it would 
give up that veto.‖484 
 
While at the lower level of the Council, no pressure was felt, at the COREPER France, 
Germany and Belgium appeared to be pushing Luxembourg towards accepting the 
Commission proposals. At the level of Ministers, meanwhile, the pressure was coming 
from the European Commission and from certain MEPs. The Minister was told that he was 
blocking reform on a whole package, not just an isolated issue, and that it was 
unacceptable. The difficulty of verifying whether this was a concerted and conscious act by 
the parties involved has been noted above. One could argue that this would be beyond the 
point anyway, as the perception of pressure is probably as significant as the actual pressure. 
What was clear was that the Luxembourg government felt under pressure to solve this 
problem and contribute to an agreement. The personal report of the Belgian representative 
in the COREPER mentioned that before the grand political agreement in December 2003, 
―we had to exercise a lot of pressure on Luxembourg on the unemployment chapter.‖485 
 
At the Employment and Social Policy Council of 20 October 2003 under the Italian 
presidency, the text makes a specific reference to Luxembourg. It states that  
―due to a specific need of Luxembourg to mitigate the consequences of the current 
draft of Chapter 6 (unemployment benefits), agreement on this chapter had to be 
delayed until December. It is recalled that due to the complexity and urgency of this 
file, it was decided to reach agreement in Council on a chapter-by-chapter basis. 
Partial agreements have already been reached under the Spanish, Danish and Greek 
presidencies. Final approval will be subject to agreement on the text as a whole, 
pending which agreements on the different chapters are considered provisional.‖486  
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The Italian presidency of the Council was felt to exercise considerable pressure and to 
jeopardise Luxembourg‘s achievements in order to please the European Parliament.  
 
This, along with the impending EP elections and enlargement to 27 member states, put 
quite intense pressure on Luxembourg, indicating quite clearly that if it failed to find an 
agreement on this issue, then it would endanger all agreements that had been found before. 
Neither the Council nor the Commission considered isolating the issue from the rest of the 
reform just to get a reform. One interviewee explained:  
―There is a point in every delicate negotiation, after a certain amount of time, where 
all the member states are ready or willing to negotiate and accept a text in which 
they did not get everything they had imagined in the beginning, and then it 
works.‖487 
Pochet noted that three factors seemed to have been decisive for the adoption of the reform: 
firstly, the fear that any change would be impossible at 25 member states and therefore 
feeling that a compromise had to be reached rather than risking no change at all over the 
foreseeable future. Secondly, the end of the legislature of the EP would have postponed the 
examination of the changes for a considerable while. This pressure was also felt within the 
EP and helped avoiding institutional blockages. Finally, the revision method of adopting 
chapter by chapter allowed finding compromises to be spread out over time.
488
  
 
What emerges is the realisation that the negotiation context, i.e. the decision-making 
procedure and the time pressure exerted mattered considerably in Luxembourg‘s eventual 
policy effectiveness. Indeed, unanimity was almost a guarantee that its concerns would be 
heard. But what about the other member states? Was the payment of unemployment 
benefits for frontier workers a salient issue in those domestic politics? 
 
 
 
                                                          
487
 Interview A 
488
 Pochet, P., (2007) ‗Social Europe : Still binding regulations?‘ Paper prepared for the EUSA Tenth Biennal 
International Conference, Montréal, Canada, p.  
228 
7.3. Member states‟ preferences  
 
Other member states‘ preferences were very difficult to gauge because most interviewees 
remembered primarily the special situation of Luxembourg and the negotiations conflicts it 
caused. Furthermore, the time lapse and the natural disinclination of national governments 
to make their negotiation positions public did not help. The only clear evidence of a defined 
preference was found in Belgium and Italy, which expressed a clear choice in favour of the 
rule of the state of last employment.  It was certainly in Belgium‘s financial interests, even 
if we only look at the figures for the Walloon province in 2004: there was a total flow of 37 
055 people from Wallonia to the neighbouring countries, while it only received 4 711 
frontier workers.
489
 One participant had recorded in her notes:  
―it was clear that Belgium was very much in favour of the Italian presidency re-
opening the debate on the state of last employment being responsible for the 
payment of unemployment benefits.‖490  
Here is a clear indication that Belgium and Italy had supported the Commission‘s proposal.  
 
By looking at statistics, where available, on the number of frontier workers in other 
member states, it is possible to get an approximate handle on the intensity of interest in this 
particular issue. The last report on frontier workers in the European Union dates from 1997, 
and while these may have been useful at the start of the negotiations on the reform of the 
1408/71, they were already outdated in the hot phase of the negotiations in 2003.
491
 This 
report concluded that the country with the most frontier workers is Switzerland with a total 
of about 150 000, followed by Germany with a total of about 77 000, and Luxembourg with 
about 54 000. The increase of the number of frontier workers is a staggering 300 per cent 
for Luxembourg in 2009.  
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If we compare Luxembourg‘s situation with other member states, the reason why the 
financing of unemployment benefits to frontier workers was not a hot potato becomes 
obvious. In the Bodensee region, which covers Austria, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and 
Germany, the total flow of frontier workers was a total of 32 000 in the summer of 2006.
492
 
Between Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark, over the Oresund Bridge, the total flow 
of frontier workers was 17 100 people in November 2007, which was a new record.
493
 If 
one compares these cross-border flows to the flux of incoming frontier workers of 140 000 
in the direction of Luxembourg, one can see why other member states were not that 
emphatic about the issue.  
 
While fear of the impending enlargement to much poorer Eastern neighbours could have 
been a potential factor for some member states like Germany and Austria to support 
Luxembourg‘s position, this does not transpire from the interviews. While this may be 
puzzling, it has to be remembered that both countries had imposed transitional restrictions 
on the free movement of workers from most of the new member states. For the purposes of 
this analysis, only the situations of countries with a direct border to a new member state are 
portrayed below. The Accession Treaty allowed for the introduction of 'transitional 
measures'. Commonly referred to as the '2+3+2-year arrangement', this scheme obliged the 
member states to declare in May 2006, and again in May 2009, whether they would open 
up their labour markets to workers from the A-8 (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia) or keep restrictions in place. Italy had 
initially restricted access but dropped the restrictions. Greece dropped all restrictions as of 
May 2006 for the 2004 accession member states but introduced some restrictions on 
Bulgaria and Romania, which it lifted in 2009. All restrictions will be lifted in January 
2014. Like Austria, Germany insisted on continuing transitional restrictions on workers 
from the former communist states, beyond its eastern borders. Workers from these 
countries have to apply for work permits before 2011. Austria especially insisted on this 
because of its perceived high unemployment. To illustrate this practice: a bilateral 
Commission, composed of Ministers of Austria and Hungary, regulates the number of 
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Hungarian frontier workers that are allowed to work there. This Commission gave 2 550 
Hungarians a work permit in 2008, and there was a hot debate in Austria whether an 
additional 100 or 200 frontier work permits would be issued.
494
 These are undoubtedly very 
small numbers compared to Luxembourg‘s situation. Therefore, the number of frontier 
workers from the former communist states and paying their unemployment benefits was 
indeed practically irrelevant for them, at least in the near political future.
495
  
 
Germany‘s governmental position, on the other hand, was ambivalent according to the 
sources.
496
 There is a supposedly more or less evenly balanced flow of frontier workers in 
the West and South, so the calculation was that it would not lose from a change of rules 
proposed by the Commission. The transitional measures on free movement of workers from 
the East would mean that it would, at least as long as those measures were in place, not lose 
from the Commission‘s proposal. The reason for calling Germany‘s position ambivalent is 
that there is conflicting evidence on its position. It seems that interviewees at different 
levels of Council negotiations had a different perception of its position. One interviewee 
argued that Germany was on Luxembourg‘s side:  
―The Germans and the Dutch were against it- they were our allies. We were never 
isolated during the negotiations on the parameters. There was a group of member 
states who said that they did not want to change anything in unemployment. Those 
were not hard discussions because the Council and the presidency realised it was 
useless because the proposal would never be unanimously adopted; which is why 
we stayed with the old principle.‖ 497  
Another stated that the Germans were  
―in a process where they drive things forward and the Germans could not say ‗we 
play completely against it just because of that problem‘. The reform of the 1408/71 
was a whole package. The Germans saw that they got what they wanted on other 
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points in the 1408/71, which nuanced their position on frontier workers in the East 
even more.‖498  
Meanwhile, at the level of the Council of Ministers, there was no perceived support for 
Luxembourg‘s position that the country of last employment should be totally excluded 
from any payments towards the unemployment benefits of frontier workers.  
 
This section has clearly illustrated the problems that may arise in analysing Council 
negotiations and member states‘ preferences. There is conflicting evidence, which can be 
explained in several ways: 1) The interviewees had either not remembered what a 
government stood for, or they confused the position of a member state on this particular 
issue with another issue. Sometimes, the issue of an unemployed person being able to move 
to another member state to find work and receive unemployment benefits from that member 
state was raised and discussed at length, before coming back to frontier workers. 2) There 
was a coordinated effort by some national governments to exercise pressure at different 
levels of the Council. 3) There was a certain lack of coordination within a government‘s 
administration on the position, thereby producing different variations of positions. Within 
the Council documents, there is no explicit mention of other member states taking an active 
interest in this issue. However, within the European Parliament, there was clear support for 
the Commission‘s proposal as evidenced by a factsheet and its readings.  
 
It can be concluded that there were no clear cut potential allies for Luxembourg on this 
issue. Luxembourg could not, as it tends to do, hide behind powerful allies and let them do 
the ‗dirty work‘ for it. It had to stand up for itself. It had to argue convincingly that it could 
not afford to pay for the unemployment benefits of frontier workers, even though it is one 
of the richest member states in the EU and collects taxes from frontier workers which go 
towards the Fonds National pour l‟Emploi, i.e. the fund which pays out unemployment 
benefits to resident workers. It therefore needed a lot of understanding from other 
governments. 
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7.4. The different presidencies: did they influence the outcome? 
 
In the case of the payment of unemployment benefits for frontier workers, the major 
presidencies under which first, the parameters and then the final agreement came about, 
were the Belgian and the Italian presidencies of 2001 and 2003. They both had an interest 
in the issue and drove negotiations forwards but did not manage to be policy effective on 
the specific issue in question. The Belgian presidency was an honest broker in these 
negotiations and facilitated the agreement on the parameters. It had wanted the principle of 
country of last employment to be applied to unemployment benefits and those proposals 
failed, while the Italian presidency wanted to have payments over a longer period of time, 
but those did not go through either. Instead, it was even effectively excluded from the final 
negotiations in which the parties concerned reached an agreement. Indeed, the agreement 
was finalised between the Ministers from Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany and France, and 
then presented at the meeting of Ministers. The Council of Ministers agreed that leaving 
these four countries to do bilateral agreements was acceptable as it did not affect them and 
was no major impediment to EU integration of the social security systems.  
 
The Belgian government considered its flows of frontier workers to be roughly equal, that 
is, it sent off about the same amount of frontier workers as it receives.
499
 It is difficult, if 
not impossible to substantiate this statement, as statistics are surprisingly hard to find. 
However, I do suspect that there are more frontier workers in the neighbouring states from 
Belgium than the other way around.
500
 The Italian government played a curious role in the 
negotiations: it seems it wanted to change the agreed parameters during its presidency in 
the second half of 2003. It was under pressure to get an agreement by the Council and the 
EP before the end of its presidency. Some evidence suggests that the Italian presidency 
tabled a proposal which changed the agreed parameters on unemployment. This was done 
because the Italian presidency, according to one source,  
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―felt they had not given enough to the EP beforehand, and the only chapter left was 
unemployment benefits where they could give something. So they decided to 
change this chapter‘s parameter back to the original Commission proposal.‖501  
It may have been that the presidency was under pressure from the EP‘s Group on Social 
Questions- or it may have been that it followed its own agenda and decided to try and 
negotiate a different deal for unemployment benefits. The idea that the Italian presidency 
was under pressure from the EP is therefore not to be dismissed lightly and is evident in the 
following statement:  
―The EP has always shown a great interest in the problems encountered by migrant 
workers and the self-employed working in another Member State and has adopted 
various resolutions in an attempt to improve their conditions.‖502 
 
In conclusion, the Belgian presidency facilitated agreements on the parameters and 
assumed the classic role of mediator and broker in 2001. The negotiations of the parameters 
had been a complicated and lengthy process which had demanded considerable diplomatic 
skills of this presidency. Meanwhile, considering that the Italian presidency had been 
effectively excluded from the final agreement after having tried to unpack some agreed 
principles, it came as no surprise that it was neither considered as mediator nor had an 
influence on the final outcome.  
 
 
7.5. Individual-level factors: under pressure? 
 
Reputation was assessed in three ways: past relations between Ministers and staff and 
belonging to the same political family, the experience and longevity of the Minister and his 
diplomatic staff, and being included in the circle of actors who finalise the agreement.  
As only the neighbouring countries were directly touched by Luxembourg‘s extreme 
preferences, the composition of their governments is only considered here. In France Chirac 
had been president since 1995, and the centre right UMP Jean-Pierre Raffarin was Prime 
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Minister from 2002 until 2004. The Minister for Social Affairs, of Employment and 
Solidarity Francois Fillon had been in this post during this entire time. Meanwhile in 
Germany, the SPD-Green Alliance had won the elections for their second mandate in 2002 
and both the Minister for Health and Social Security Ulla Schmidt and the Minister for the 
Economy and Employment Wolfgang Clement were SPD members. Gert Anders, also 
SPD, was State Secretary at the Ministry for the Economy and Employment and 
responsible for these negotiations. In Belgium, the first Verhofstadt government was in 
power from July 1999 to June 2003. The Minister for Social Affairs and Pensions was 
Frank Vandenbroucke (PS) and the Minister for Employment was Laurette Onkelinx (PS). 
As all of these belonged to a different political family compared to Luxembourg, it 
therefore seems that this factor would have had no (or very little) influence on the similarity 
of their positions or on the quality of their relations. In terms of longevity and experience, 
only the Belgian Vandenbroucke could present the same credentials as Luxembourg‘s 
Minister for Employment. They had both been in government since 1999 and thus were 
involved in these negotiations from the start and knew each other quite well.  
 
In fact it was Luxembourg, not Belgium that took the initiative for finding a compromise 
and contacted the concerned other member states.  In this case, the relations between 
political actors were significant in the negotiations. The Minister used his personal 
networks to hammer out a political agreement with the Ministers of France, Germany and 
Belgium. He called them over the weekend and proposed he would be willing to pay 3 
months if a sentence was included which said that they would conclude bilateral 
agreements, so those additional 5 months‘ payments would not be applicable to them. He 
then argued in the Council of Ministers that Luxembourg had a problem, but that the four 
countries who were affected had found an agreement and that all the others should note this 
and agree.
503
 
 
The reputation that Luxembourg‘s officials and ministers pride themselves on being both 
pro-European and honest broker has been confirmed in this case study. Both an official and 
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the minister, Biltgen, emphasised the importance of compromise and of being pro-
European.  Biltgen offered the following self-assessment:  
―What marked me was that I had to find an agreement which did not leave Europe 
standing out in the rain and one which I could defend at least a bit at home. If we do 
have an interest, then we say ―Hey we also have an interest!‖ but we try not to have 
an excessively national position and other countries do the same. What is our 
advantage is that we engage in negotiations to find compromises.‖504  
 
This section showed that reputation and personal relations were not as crucial as in the 
other case studies, but were a side factor. Furthermore, the pressure that the negotiators felt 
forced them to find and accept a compromise proposal. As in the case of the reform of the 
SGP, reputation and expertise had some impact on getting an agreement, and that the 
negotiations are often better handled in a small circle of actors, whose agreement ensures 
the acquiescence of the other actors. Personal contacts between ministers were necessary to 
get an agreement. However, considering the low level of polarised interests involved in this 
issue, it is probably safe to assume that it was far easier to find a compromise than in the 
case of the SGP.  
 
8. Conclusion  
 
The previous section has shown that Luxembourg managed to achieve some of the 
objectives it had set for the reform of the Regulation 1408/71, but not all of them. 
Therefore, it could be argued that Luxembourg was ―medium policy effective‖ in the 
outcome of these negotiations. If we look back at its mission statement, the first objective 
was to avoid the inclusion of the principle of the country of employment in the financing of 
unemployment benefits. That was achieved but with the caveat of financing 3 months 
payable to the country of residence. The second objective was to get delays of 
implementation. That was achieved, in subsequent negotiations it was established that 
Luxembourg will only implement these measures in 2012, rather than 2007 as originally 
planned. On the other hand frontier workers can register at both the resident and work-
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related unemployment agency, which will include them in the unemployment statistics. The 
constraints and advantages for Luxembourg‘s government on these particular negotiations 
have been identified and discussed at length above. There was a general consensus in the 
member states‘ governments on simplifying the coordination of social security systems by 
applying universally the principle of the country of last employment. Luxembourg was the 
main troublemaker in the Council of Ministers, dragging its feet on agreeing to a reform, 
until the pressure increased so much that it found eventually a way outside the Community 
framework.  
 
The domestic politics factor must always be at the forefront when analysing any 
negotiations on EU regulations or directives. The absences of a national debate and of 
pressure by the public, trade unions or the opposition parties, certainly gave Luxembourg 
more freedom in the negotiations. While the government argued convincingly in the 
Council and the EP that it could not politically afford to agree to the waiving of the 
residence rule, or to pay more than 3 months of unemployment benefits to the state of 
residence, the actual pressure was more latent and anticipated rather than manifest and 
open. Finally, the coordination between Ministries and the low turnover of staff ensured 
that Luxembourg‘s strategy of negotiation was coherent and effective. 
 
The decision-making procedure at least partly determined the outcome of negotiations. 
Unanimity was certainly a factor which played in Luxembourg‘s favour. In this case, the 
power of co-decision of the European Parliament meant that Luxembourg did not only have 
to convince the member states, but also the MEPs who had significant divergent interests to 
Luxembourg‘s interests in the outcome. While other member states were not that concerned 
about this issue, it could be argued that it was almost easier for Luxembourg to persuade 
the Council, than it was to persuade the EP. Finally when the issue is salient, the positions 
taken are more likely to be reflective of real preferences. It has been shown that the 
political will to reform was present both in the Commission, the EP and among a majority 
of member states in the Council. The fact that the Commission decided to squeeze into a 
single regulation such major issues as pensions, cross-border health care, invalidity 
benefits, and unemployment benefits also proved decisive in getting an agreement: by 
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linking all the issues and their agreements, it was less possible to drag the issue indefinitely 
and to block negotiations. Time pressure was an important factor in the negotiations: the 
elections of the EP in June 2004 were approaching and because of co-decision it was clear 
to the Council and the Commission that agreement had to be found and the legislation had 
to be passed by the current Parliament. A new Parliament would have delayed legislation 
considerably because a new Committee would have to be appointed and would have had to 
get to know the dossier and the issues from scratch. Enlargement also put pressure on 
finding an agreement, as the ten new member states‘ governments would have joined the 
negotiation table and could potentially (and probably would have) started to unravel these 
numerous carefully agreed compromises on the previous chapters of a very sensitive 
political nature.  
 
But due to unanimity in the Council, the relative disinterest of many member states in this 
detailed matter, and the extraordinary economic interests of Luxembourg, the government 
managed to persuade the Council into a sub-optimal agreement and maintain its economic 
interests. It managed to get the Council to accept bilateral agreements, which would not be 
in the remit of the Commission, and which were never intended to materialise. Therefore, 
the institutional factors of unanimity and of domestic politics played a crucial part in these 
negotiations, while reputation played a much less important role. In summary, it was 
ultimately a specific problem that only Luxembourg experienced. If a member state argued 
convincingly that it had a significant economic interest in an area, then it would be listened 
to by the other member states. The argument that a regulation has to be defensible 
politically at home is a very strong one. However, whether this argument was the biggest 
factor in Luxembourg‘s success is debatable: would Luxembourg have been able to achieve 
the result under Qualified Majority Voting? Or if France or Germany had had vested 
financial interests? 
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Chapter 8: Findings  
 
 
1. Assessing Luxembourg’s policy effectiveness in the European institutions  
 
This model explains how a member state is able to successfully exercise its ability to 
include its preferences in the final legislative outcome. Measuring policy effectiveness is 
conducted in five stages: 1) establish the policy preferences of the member state 2) present 
the Commission proposal 3) establish the strategy and the goals of the member state in the 
negotiations 4) present the final legislation 5) compare and contrast the final legalisation to 
the policy preferences and to the strategy and goals. There are variations in the degree of 
policy effectiveness- often a member state cannot get everything it wants. For the purpose 
of this study, a three degree classification of outcomes has been devised: high, medium and 
low. The way in which policy effectiveness was measured here allows for it being highly 
variable across particular decisions and occurring through processes both implicit and 
explicit. 
 
The research design of this thesis involved 3 case studies analysing the role and impact of 
Luxembourg‘s government in achieving policy effectiveness in different EU negotiation 
contexts. The creation and subsequent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 and 
2005 constitute the first two case studies, where Luxembourg was said to have played a 
role. The final case study dealt with the rather technical issue of the payment of 
unemployment benefits for frontier workers in the broader reform of EC Regulation 
1408/71, agreed in 2004. A focused inquiry addressed the same question in all the chapters, 
explaining whether, how and to what extent Luxembourg was able to be policy effective. In 
this thesis I have sought to complement existing research on policy effectiveness, 
leadership in EU negotiations and power of member states.
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influence a state‘s ability to be policy effective are put forward. Several questions are 
asked: How do the domestic politics influence the ability of a member state to shape 
regulations and directives? To what extent do the preferences of the other member states 
interfere in policy effectiveness? Does holding the presidency of the Council make a 
member state policy effective? Do intangible resources matter at all? Is the negotiation 
context the major constraint/ aid in policy effectiveness?  
 
In the following sections, the findings are discussed in more detail, and related to existing 
findings and theorising in the literature. The evidence from each case study supports some, 
but not all the propositions. I then discuss which combined factors lead to policy 
effectiveness. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the challenges of this research and 
proposes new avenues for further investigation. We shall now turn first to a systematic 
evaluation of Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness, followed by a discussion on the factors 
that influenced it.  
 
 
Luxembourg managed to achieve most of the objectives it had set for the creation of the 
SGP in 1996. Luxembourg had an interest in having a rules-based SGP, as its experiences 
in the currency association with Belgium and in the ERM demonstrated the potential 
pitfalls of the new currency union and its possible consequences for the Luxembourg 
economy. Because the preferences of France and Germany were so divergent, and 
Luxembourg‘s preferences were to be found in the middle but closer to Germany‘s, it 
actually got quite a lot of what it wanted. This confirms the study by Arregui and Thomson 
who find that if a member state has extreme positions, it is less likely that it is close to the 
decision outcome.
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During these negotiations, Luxembourg was clearly in favour of an agreement of binding 
rules for budgetary discipline and sanctions for the non-respect of those. In its view, these 
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would guarantee the smooth introduction of the Euro as a currency and keep it stable, 
which was a necessary prerequisite for the continued good functioning of its economy. 
Luxembourg was therefore interested in getting an agreement which was not based on the 
smallest common denominator, and actively shaped the outcome of the negotiations. 
Luxembourg was highly policy effective in uploading its economic interests in these 
negotiations. This case study shows that Luxembourg either needs to have Germany or 
France on its side if it wants to be policy effective in QMV or, at the very least they need to 
be indifferent.  
 
 
Luxembourg managed to achieve some of the objectives it had set for the reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in 2005, but by no means most or all of them. If we look back at 
their mission statement, the first objective was to avoid a fundamental political crisis in the 
EU. That was achieved. In 2005, the priority for the Luxembourg presidency was to get an 
agreement that would work and would not leave the Eurozone without any rules on 
budgetary discipline. It was close to the Dutch position on a stricter version of the SGP, but 
they were in a minority. Considering that France and Germany were on the same page and 
Germany had threatened to ‗destroy‘ the Pact, it was absolutely necessary to find a solution 
which Germany, the biggest economy of the Eurozone, would accept, even if that meant 
softening the Pact. The role of the Commission was weakened, and the role of the Council 
strengthened. Another objective was to get an agreement as close as possible to the old 
SGP. That was only partially achieved. The Commission still has the right to issue 
recommendations and early warnings, there were no Treaty modifications, no list of 
pertinent factors, economic good times had been emphasised, structural reforms in the 
calculation of the deficit were included and the situation of a slight and temporary 
excessive deficit was clarified. On the other hand, the debt criterion had been abandoned, 
―chapter headings‖ had been created, and time frames to correct the excessive deficits had 
been enlarged. Hence, Luxembourg was low in terms of policy effectiveness in these 
negotiations. 
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Luxembourg managed to achieve about half of the objectives it had set for the reform of the 
Regulation 1408/71, but not all of them. Therefore Luxembourg was ―medium policy 
effective‖ in the outcome of these negotiations. If we look back at their mission statement, 
the first objective was to avoid the inclusion of the principle of the country of employment 
in the financing of unemployment benefits. That was achieved but with the caveat of 
financing 3 months payable to the country of residence. The second objective was to get 
delays of implementation. That was achieved, in subsequent negotiations it was established 
that Luxembourg will only implement these measures in 2012, rather than 2007 as 
originally planned. On the other hand frontier workers can register at both the resident and 
work-related unemployment agency, which will include them in the unemployment 
statistics, and benefit from training. This has the advantage of giving Luxembourg more 
information on the neighbouring labour markets.  
 
 
2. Discussion 
 
2.1. How did the domestic level influence the ability of a member state to influence the 
three regulations? 
 
As regards the creation of the SGP, domestic approval was quite easy to achieve in 
Luxembourg. At the Dublin Council meeting in December 1996, Luxembourg‘s 
government did not receive much pressure from the domestic side. The government leaned 
more towards a strict interpretation of a Pact. In addition, the population has been 
historically one of the most enthusiastic towards European integration. Therefore, the 
political problems and constraints arising from low public support for an economic and 
monetary union were not acute in Luxembourg. Monetary policy is a very technical subject 
and the costs are widely distributed; therefore it is unlikely that public opinion was very 
informed on the subject.
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Finance Minister was the same person: Juncker. This gave him ample access to both the 
Finance Ministers and the Heads of State or Government. Hence domestic approval had no 
impact whatsoever, but institutional coordination had a positive impact on Luxembourg‘s 
policy effectiveness. 
 
 
As for the reform of the SGP in 2005, approval was easy to achieve. However, in the years 
before the reform, Luxembourg had to incur a slight deficit for the first time. The public 
finances had not been in surplus as the public was used to. The director of the Central Bank 
of Luxembourg criticised the outcome. Luxembourg was holding the presidency; therefore 
the reform was more prominent in the country than it would otherwise have been. However, 
the complexity of the matter and the economic consequences were difficult to grasp for the 
public.  
In 2005, institutional coordination was very important during the presidency as information 
had to be gathered and processed on many different levels. It was vital that agreement was 
found among Finance Ministers, but it was also vital that Luxembourg knew what Heads of 
State were expecting in general terms of the reform. Access to these people was essential, 
and only someone who played in both arenas, the arena of the Finance Ministers and the 
arena of the Heads of State and Government, could combine and frame these expectations 
in a coherent package. This is an example of the specifity of Luxembourg‘s political system 
at the time, just as in the creation of the SGP in 1997. A minister with two posts is quite 
common in Luxembourg; many ministers occupy more than one post. This not only 
improves coordination but also improves the knowledge of the ministers of transversal 
issues. Furthermore, Luxembourg‘s administration had developed excellent working 
relations with the Commission, the Secretariat of the Council and of the ECOFIN. As a 
small country, the circuits of the communication flow were very tight and only a selected 
few were directly involved in the preparations of the working documents. In short, given 
that domestic approval of the deal was easy to achieve and the level of institutional 
coordination was very high and efficient, the conditions for policy effectiveness were laid. 
However, it did not lead to high policy effectiveness.  
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In the case of unemployment benefits to frontier workers, it was easy to get the position 
approved by the major stakeholders involved: business organisations, all the political 
parties and even the trade unions were on the same line as the government. The Minister 
was under pressure from the cabinet that he should, under no circumstances, give up the 
principle of the state of residence in unemployment benefits. As demonstrated in the 
chapter, the financial consequences for the state would, relatively speaking, have been 
enormous. Frontier workers themselves were absent from the debate. Constraints of 
domestic politics mattered in the negotiation strategy of the Luxembourg government. 
National and EP elections were around the corner, and the Minister for Employment could 
argue that if the principle of the country of employment was retained, he would see a 
backlash of nationalist sentiments and a shift of his party‘s support towards the more 
nationalist and Eurosceptic ADR. It is interesting to note that these negotiations were not 
politicised at all until the negotiations were concluded. Clearly, the government had 
decided not to hold press conferences on the issue until an agreement had been reached.  
Institutional coordination was very important as many levels, and two Ministries negotiated 
on the issue from 1999 to 2003. Again, Luxembourg had an institutional specifity in this 
matter which could potentially have a negative impact: while at the EU level and in many 
member states, unemployment falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Social 
Security, it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Employment in Luxembourg. The 
coordination between the Ministry of Social Security, who was responsible for the overall 
negotiations on this Regulation, and the Ministry of Employment, which was responsible 
for the particular issue of unemployment benefits, was essential to an effective negotiation 
strategy. The Ministry of Employment took over the reins in the negotiations when the final 
phase of the negotiations started. The Minister had given clear instructions to let 
agreements fail at lower levels. Both ministries agreed that they cooperated well, and that 
information flowed constantly on the status of negotiations from one Ministry to the other. 
Furthermore, both ministries were held by the CSV party. Finally, the national government 
mobilised its Members of the European Parliament effectively to influence the EP‘s 
Committee on Social Questions. This spontaneous inter-institutional coordination certainly 
helped getting the Council position through Parliament.  
244 
 
2.2. Was the negotiation context a contributing factor in policy effectiveness? 
The first factor we considered was that the number of member states would affect 
Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness. The fewer member states were involved, the more 
policy effective Luxembourg would be. The case studies of this thesis happened in 1996, in 
2003 and in 2005. Two case studies count a total of 15 member states, while there were 25 
member states in the other case study. If the number of member states affects policy 
effectiveness negatively, Luxembourg should have been more effective in two case studies 
(the Stability and Growth Pact in 1996 and the payment of unemployment benefits to 
frontier workers in 2003) than in the case study of the reform of the Stability and Growth 
Pact in 2005. This has been confirmed by the present research.  
 
In the case of the creation of the SGP in 1996/1997, the decision-making procedure was 
QMV in the Council for both Regulations- therefore we expected Luxembourg to not be 
policy effective. There were essentially two opposing preferences on the scope and content 
of a SGP, embodied by France and Germany. The respective alliances of these two camps 
were of roughly equal weight in terms of voting. Furthermore, it was clear that when 
France and Germany had found an agreement, the other member states would support it. 
Luxembourg was positioned in the middle but leaning towards the German side and 
therefore highly policy effective, regardless of QMV.
508
 The involvement of the European 
Parliament varied from cooperation to consultation. The EP did not play a major role in this 
case, as pressure to implement the last stage of EMU did not give it time to influence the 
Council Common Position. 
 
The same voting procedures were applied in the reform of the SGP in 2005.
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 The winds 
had changed by 2005- no longer did the German government embrace the vision of 
‗Stability‘, but had been converted to the French insistence on ‗Growth‘, leaving the Dutch 
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to be the main advocate of low national budget deficits and coordination of economic 
policies. France and Germany wanted more flexible rules. It was clear that the Dutch and 
Luxembourg found themselves in a minority on this issue. The distribution of votes shows 
that France and Germany could count on many partners, and they were not willing to accept 
anything less than a more flexible pact which would shield them from an EDP. While in 
1997, the EP was satisfied with how it was consulted and how it cooperated with the 
Council, in 2005 the second reading‘s explanatory statement was scathing.510 In this case, 
QMV led as expected to low policy effectiveness for Luxembourg. The EP wanted to pass a 
reform, but realised that passing it under a British presidency was unlikely, and so was 
forced by the Council to accept the agreement of the Council as it stood. This case study 
confirms Hosli‘s research that Germany and France together hold an informal veto 
power.
511
 
 
The situation with time pressure was slightly different in 2005: the Euro was introduced 
and was stable; the markets had neither reacted in a negative way to the Excessive Deficit 
Procedures held in abeyance for France and Germany, nor to the ECJ ruling that the 
Council was allowed to hold EDPs in abeyance in the first place. However there was a real 
sense of urgency. The reason was simple: the next presidency was to be held by the British. 
Taking all this into consideration, the negotiation context significantly impacted in a 
negative way on Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness.  
 
 
Moving on to the final case study, the negotiation context mattered greatly. The decision-
making procedure applied here was unanimity in the Council of Ministers and co-decision 
with the EP. In this case we expected high policy effectiveness for Luxembourg because of 
unanimity and under the condition that its preferences were close to that of the EP. 
Luxembourg was the main troublemaker in the Council of Ministers because of its extreme 
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preferences in the Council, and it could not count on the EP‘s support. The fact that the 
Commission decided to squeeze into a single regulation such major issues as pensions, 
cross-border health care, invalidity benefits, and unemployment benefits proved decisive. 
By linking all the issues and their agreements, it was less possible to delay the issue 
indefinitely and to block negotiations- for Luxembourg, but also for the EP. Unanimity 
allowed Luxembourg to drag its feet until the Council eventually found a way outside the 
Community framework. The EP was not happy at all about this deal, but because of time 
pressure and because it was only a small detail in an otherwise huge reform, it approved it. 
A new parliamentary election would have delayed legislation considerably. Enlargement 
also put pressure on finding an agreement, as the ten new member states‘ governments 
would have joined the negotiation table.  
 
If a member state has extreme preferences under unanimity and co-decision, it is likely to 
be medium policy effective- at best. This can be witnessed in this case where 
Luxembourg‘s objective was to keep the status quo while all the other actors, including the 
EP, were willing to lift the exception within the Regulation and establish the principle of 
country of employment. Luxembourg was under pressure to give in from various sources: 
the Commission, the EP, the presidency of the Council and the other member states. 
However, due to unanimity in the Council, the effective inter-institutional coordination 
with the national MEPs to influence the Parliament, and finally and most importantly, the 
relative disinterest  from the other member states, especially France and Germany, an 
agreement was found which saved the face of the government. This is not in line with other 
research on extreme preferences in the Council, which identifies the extremity of the 
position as the ―largest and most debilitating effect on member states‘ bargaining 
success.‖512 Furthermore, this case study also does not support the finding that under co-
decision, a member state is more likely to be policy effective if its position is close to that 
of the Commission.
513
 This certainly calls for more research of extreme preferences under 
these conditions. 
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2.3. How did the distribution and intensity of preferences within the Council affect 
Luxembourg‟s policy effectiveness? 
 
There were two camps within the Council in the first case study, represented by two big 
member states: France and Germany. As argued above, these had roughly equal voting 
weights. As Segers and Van Esch show in their historical analysis of the French and 
German positions on EMU budgetary discipline, ―one may conclude that negotiations 
concerning European monetary integration have always involved simultaneous struggles on 
both the French and the German domestic level. On the European level, debates took place 
between the more ‗monetarist‘ French on the one hand and the more ‗economist‘ Germans 
on the other.‖514 
The German government intended to establish some sort of binding rules after monetary 
union was in place. It was pushing for hard and stringent quantified rules for a European-
wide coordination of national budgetary and fiscal policies. France advocated a stronger 
‗gouvernement économique‘. More specifically, they wanted more political discretion in 
the Council concerning the detailed steps of the EDP, a limited role for the Commission, 
and as little interference from the EU institutions in national budgetary matters as possible. 
The inclusion of the debt criterion in the SGP and the EDP in particular was not welcome, 
as France was struggling with its high public debt ratio.  France and Germany were crucial 
in getting an agreement, and the other member states had implicitly ‗delegated‘ their votes 
to one of the two. Luxembourg was leaning towards the German version of a Pact, but not 
on every issue. Because Germany was the main state who had to be satisfied, it was clear 
that Luxembourg found itself, this time at least, in the right camp.  
 
 
In 2005, there was a clear division between large and small states in the negotiations, as 
Verdun and Schure already suggested.
515
 This analysis confirms their findings. Considering 
the polarised positions within the Council, Luxembourg had, in fact, little political leverage. 
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It was clear that Germany and France had their own agenda and just would not budge on 
their positions. To explain it in Putnam‘s terms of ―win-sets‖, the Germans moved their 
win-set to such an extreme end of the spectrum of possible win-sets that only a small win-
set was possible at all.
516
 Germany found this issue very salient and threw all its political 
weight behind it. The German government favoured a list of relevant factors which could 
be invoked at any stage in an EDP, even when it was already in motion and just before 
sanctions would be decided. The French government had been pressing for reform since 
2002 and did not want to find itself in an excessive deficit situation anymore, but realised 
that its high public debt was unsustainable in the long term.  
 
The Dutch government wanted to keep as close as possible to the old SGP, calling for 
stricter enforcement on the preventive side of the Pact, especially on the sustainability of 
public finances (with regards to old age pensions). The Dutch Finance Minister wanted to 
prevent a list of factors and the exclusion of expenditure from the budget calculations. The 
Austrians also advocated a strengthening of the rules. Luxembourg had an inclination 
towards the Dutch position. In the end, considering the widely distributed and intensely 
held preferences within the Council, the most important mission of the Luxembourg 
presidency was to avoid a fundamental political crisis and the explosion of the SGP. It had 
to move towards the positions of France and Germany, because their preferences were so 
intense (or salient) and therefore this factor had a significant negative impact on 
Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness.517  
 
 
As for the last case study, I have elaborated in the chapter on the difficulties of gauging 
other member states‘ preferences on this detailed issue. While fear of the impending 
enlargement to much poorer Eastern neighbours could have been a potential factor for some 
member states like Germany and Austria to support Luxembourg‘s position, this does not 
transpire from the evidence. There were no clear cut potential allies for Luxembourg on this 
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issue. Hence, it is assumed that the preferences were neither widely distributed nor intense 
in the Council. In this case, the distribution and intensity of preferences impacted positively 
on Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness because they were absent.  
 
 
2.4. Do the presidencies have an impact on a member state‟s policy effectiveness? 
 
 
Luxembourg did not have the presidency in 1996, but Ireland was holding the chair of the 
Council. The Irish presidency did not possess any of the other resources necessary to take 
advantage of the opportunities the Chair presented to them. It was not trusted by the main 
actors to be able to conclude an agreement. None of the participants could even remember 
what the Irish position was on the issue. It has also been suggested that the Irish 
government did not realise the potential political difficulties that lay in the creation of a 
SGP and thus had not examined the dossier in detail. The domestic standing in politics, the 
level of expertise and the personal authority were thus insufficient to Ireland‘s designation 
as leader of the negotiations. Therefore, this case study is a clear example where a 
presidency is effectively excluded from exercising any influence on the negotiations and 
the final outcome. Instead, Luxembourg‘s Prime Minister Juncker led the negotiations and 
proposed alternative solutions to the two main visions of fiscal coordination. The 
compromise solution that Juncker proposed was fully in line with Luxembourg‘s ideas on 
the topic, which coincided with German concerns. Luxembourg was Germany‘s ally in the 
negotiation process, but was not necessarily perceived as such by the French. Steering the 
negotiations in the direction which the government secretly favoured is an ability which is 
not necessarily linked to holding the presidency, but depends on other factors like the 
distribution of preferences, individual-level factors and institutional coordination.  
 
Moving on to the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2005, the opposite outcome to 
the previous case study can be observed. We have an example of a presidency which took 
advantage of all the resources a presidency has to offer, but did not manage to be policy 
effective. The Luxembourgish presidency was indeed able to take full advantage of the 
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asymmetrical information, of agenda setting and of procedural control. The Luxembourg 
government had made it one of its priorities to conclude the negotiations on the reform of 
the SGP under its presidency. During many bilateral meetings with all the major actors, 
Germany, France and the Netherlands, at the levels of Finance Ministers, Prime Ministers 
or Presidents, but also at the levels of civil servants and advisers, the presidency had 
considerable access and asymmetrical information on their respective positions and bottom 
lines. However Luxembourg was low in policy effectiveness despite holding the 
Presidency. This confirms other studies which have produced the same results.
518
  
 
In the case of the payment of unemployment benefits for frontier workers, the major 
presidencies under which first, the parameters and then the final agreement came about, 
were the Belgian and the Italian Presidencies of 2001 and 2003. But the agreement was 
finalised between the Ministers from Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany and France, and 
then presented at the meeting of Ministers. The Council of Ministers agreed that leaving 
these four countries to do bilateral agreements was acceptable and was no major 
impediment to EU coordination of the social security systems. Hence, it did not matter 
whether Luxembourg held the presidency or not; it managed to be medium policy effective 
anyway.  
 
 
2.5. Did individuals matter in terms of policy effectiveness?  
 
In 1996, the quality of past relations between the key negotiators played an important role 
in Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness. Luxembourg is literally wedged between France, 
Belgium and Germany. It is part of the job description of a Minister in Luxembourg to 
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know what is happening in its neighbouring countries. Therefore, the negotiators were well 
aware of the public and political debates in France and Germany. An excellent 
understanding of both neighbours‘ concerns and languages enhance their negotiating 
capacities with the two countries. France was governed by the right wing RPR Jacques 
Chirac and Germany was governed by the Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl. Juncker had 
been very close to Kohl, who apparently used to call him ―Junior‖. He had been present at 
every Council negotiation on monetary and economic union since the 1980s, he had the 
necessary expertise and the diplomatic skills to mediate efficiently between France and 
Germany. This gave him an expertise which many Finance Ministers did not have. Because 
he was Prime Minister simultaneously, he had access to the European Council as well. 
Kohl had asked Juncker to mediate between his government and the French government in 
an ad hoc group comprising a Luxembourgish, a French, a German and an Irish delegation, 
later to be followed in the European Council meeting by an ad hoc group between Kohl and 
Chirac and Juncker. This factor was, indeed, one of the main elements for Luxembourg‘s 
high policy effectiveness in the creation of the SGP.  
 
Many of the above noted phenomena apply to some extent to the 2005 reform of the SGP. 
The personal expertise, seniority and reputation of Juncker had a major impact on the 
participants‘ willingness to cooperate and come to an agreement. The process and content 
knowledge, stemming partially but not only from holding the presidency, and the 
coordination of the staff at the Finance Ministry with all the critical players, also played in 
Luxembourg‘s favour. Again, the unique double advantage of having access to both the 
Heads of State and to the Finance Ministers gave Juncker an extraordinary access to 
preference information. Experience had also shown the Luxembourg negotiators that there 
was a split between the Finance Ministries and the offices of the Heads of State in both 
Paris and Berlin. Contrary to the creation of the SGP, there was no small group as such that 
negotiated the outcome; however it was clear that the main actors in these negotiations 
were the Dutch, the French and the Germans. In this case study, individual-level factors 
were present but did not have an impact on possible policy effectiveness. 
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In the final case study, individual-level factors were rarely mentioned by the interviewees. 
However past relations, experience and longevity must have played a role in these 
outcomes. Luxembourg‘s strategy of negotiation was to give in as little as possible. The 
Minister for Employment had been in government since 1999, and his officials in the 
Permanent Representation and in the Technical Committee had been working in their 
function since the early 1990s, thus acquiring on these crucial levels of the negotiations 
very detailed knowledge of the whole implementation of the Regulation 1408/71. 
Luxembourg‘s Minister for Employment Francois Biltgen and his team in the Permanent 
Representation and the working group initiated a compromise by talking to the respective 
ministers and officials from France, Germany and Belgium. Again, we have evidence of the 
negotiations taking place among a small circle of actors. Hence, this factor impacted in a 
slightly positive way on Luxembourg‘s medium policy effectiveness. 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
3.1. Which factors produce policy effectiveness?  
 
This chapter has presented the findings of the research conducted over the past four years. 
It has dealt with the question of member state policy effectiveness in the EU, and showed in 
three case studies how it was achieved. The outcomes show that Luxembourg was once 
high, once medium and once low in terms of policy effectiveness.  
 
The policy effectiveness model developed here was an attempt to go beyond the 
intergovernmentalism theory, which denies small countries any effectiveness on the basis 
of their own negotiating skills or resources.
519
 It also tested the assumption that 
Luxembourg always ‗gets lucky‘, and that it often gets more than it should deserve.520 
While leadership in constitutional negotiations and in holding the EU presidencies has been 
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analysed and theorised, notably by Beach and Mazzucelli and Tallberg, comparative studies 
on member states‘ individual policy effectiveness have often been only descriptive without 
trying to tease out the more generalisable factors which led to that effectiveness. 
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Table 8.1 : How did these factors influence Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness (PE)? 
 
Factor Lux PE in SGP 
1996 
Lux PE in SGP 
2005 
Lux PE in EC Reg 
883/2004 
Relevance of 
factors: 
Domestic politics    ? 
Domestic approval 0 0 1 No 
Institutional 
coordination 
1 0 1 Yes 
Negotiation context    Yes 
Number of actors 1 0 0 No 
Decision-making 
procedure  
0 -1 1 Yes 
Time pressure 0 -1 -1 Yes 
Preferences in the 
Council 
    Yes 
distribution 1 -1 1 Yes 
intensity  1 -1 1 Yes 
Presidency    No 
Control over 
procedure 
0 0 0 No 
Asymmetrical 
information 
0 0 0 No 
Individual-level 
factors 
   Yes 
Past relations 1 0 0 No 
Same political family 1 -1 0 No 
Expertise and 
experience 
1 0 1 Yes 
Inclusion in the circle 
of actors 
1 0 1 Yes 
Total points 8/11 -5/11 6/11  
Outcome high low medium  
-1=negative impact; 0= no impact; 1= positive impact  
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If there are at least 2 occurrences of -1, then the factor has a negative impact. If there are at least 2 
occurrences of 0, then the factor has no impact. If there are at least 2 occurrences of 1, then the factor has a 
positive impact. 
 
This table summarises neatly the results of this research, and demonstrates which factors 
had a positive and which a negative influence on Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness. 
Qualitative comparative analysis would not have been an appropriate strategy to discuss 
these findings, as  
―contrary to conventional wisdom, a full-blown QCA cannot be meaningfully 
applied to just two, four or eight particular cases [...] Rather its full potential unfolds 
in studies based on mid-size N.‖521 
 
The table shows which factors did not have an impact at all- the most clear-cut result we 
find is that the office of the presidency does not have an impact on a member state‘s policy 
effectiveness, whether it holds the office itself or another member state. From these three 
case studies, we cannot derive conclusive results on the relevance of the impact of domestic 
politics. However, I would suggest this is largely due to the nature of the case studies, and 
therefore it should not be disregarded. The findings are also in line with other research in 
that they corroborate the fact that decision-making procedures and time pressure do 
matter.
522
 These results show also that individual-level factors clearly matter when 
searching for ways to be policy effectiveness, and they call for more research.  
The table gives an account of the outcomes, with the results being quite consistent with the 
factors‘ impacts. Hence, the first case study shows that Luxembourg was highly policy 
effective, due to the positive impact of the factors of the distribution and intensity of 
member state preferences and because individual-level factors gave it powerful allies. The 
second case study shows clearly a result of low policy effectiveness, due to the negative 
impact of the negotiation context and the preferences in the Council. The third case study 
produced medium policy effectiveness, due to the positive impact of domestic constraints 
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and a low distribution of preferences in the Council. We shall now look in more detail at 
the relevance of each of these factors in turn. 
 
Putnam‘s theory of two-level games has also been included in this analysis, with its 
emphasis on the domestic politics side in analysing a member state‘s policy effectiveness in 
the EU. All the case studies were based on Regulations, which are directly applicable in all 
the member states and so did not require to be ratified by national Parliaments. The 
approval procedure only impacted in a positive way in the case of EC Reg. 883/2004, but 
this may be due to the exceptional nature of monetary policies, as suggested both by 
Putnam and by Heipertz and Verdun.
523
 Putnam states in his article on diplomacy and 
domestic politics, 
―When the costs and /or benefits of a proposed agreement are relatively 
concentrated, it is reasonable to expect that those constituents whose interests are 
most affected will exert special influence on the ratification process. One reason 
why Level II games are more important for trade negotiations than in monetary 
matters is that the ―abstention rate‖ is higher on international monetary issues than 
on trade issues. Another factor fostering abstention is the greater complexity and 
opacity of monetary issues‖.524  
This study also confirms that domestic constraints can have a positive impact on policy 
effectiveness.
525
 Institutional coordination was proven to have a positive impact in two 
cases. This confirms research by Bindi, who argued in her study on Italy‘s policy 
ineffectiveness that it was largely due to a lack of coordination of EU policies at the 
national level, paired with a lack of coordination with the Permanent Representation.
526
  
 
In the negotiation context, it was found that the number of actors did not matter in all but 
one case study. The decision-making procedure had less of a negative impact on policy 
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effectiveness that might have been thought initially, as it had a positive impact in the EC 
Reg. 883/2004 under unanimity and co-decision, but had no impact in the creation of the 
SGP and was only negative in its reform. While in the case of EC Reg. 883/2004 under 
unanimity, Luxembourg‘s government had intense and extreme preferences, it managed to 
take full advantage of the threat of veto to force an agreement which suited it. The two SGP 
cases, while both under QMV, produced different levels of policy effectiveness. QMV did 
not impede or favour policy effectiveness for the first case study, but had, as expected a 
negative impact in the 2005 case. So why is there this discrepancy between the two SGP 
cases? Firstly, in the creation of the SGP, Luxembourg found itself leaning towards the 
German side, but was still in the middle of the policy spectrum. Secondly, the vote 
distribution was roughly equal. In the 2005 reform Luxembourg, while still having the 
same preferences, found itself at one extreme of the policy spectrum, with the biggest 
member states at the other end. Finally this research concurs with other studies that the 
European Parliament, even though it has increasing powers, is still far less powerful than 
the Council of Ministers.
527
 It also confirms Widgrén‘s rule of thumb that ―the higher the 
majority threshold in the [Council of Ministers], the less the EP is able to wield influence 
on EU decisions.‖528 Finally time pressure was found to matter in every case study but not 
necessarily in Luxembourg‘s favour; in the SGP 1997 case it had no impact; in the SGP 
2005 it was the upcoming British presidency which had a negative impact, and in the 
unemployment case study it was the upcoming enlargement and EP elections which had a 
negative impact. Therefore, it can be said that time pressure impacted in two of three cases 
in a negative way on policy effectiveness. 
 
The distribution and intensity of the preferences of the other member states is the major 
impediment, but also contributor, to policy effectiveness. If the other member states 
(particularly if they are large) have intense and extreme preferences, then a member state is 
less likely to be policy effective, as any win-set has to move towards that intense preference 
(as in 2005). On the other hand, if the other member states show a relative disinterest, then 
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the member state is more likely to be policy effective (as in 2003). Finally, if the member 
state finds itself in a median position, it is also more likely to be policy effective (as in 
1996). This factor probably needs to be refined and probably redefined in light of these 
findings.  
 
The hypothesis that individual-level factors, i.e. past relations, belonging to the same 
political family, expertise and longevity would benefit policy effectiveness also produced 
mixed results. In the SGP in 1996, it was definitely a positive factor; however while this 
factor was also present in the reform of the SGP it did not bear fruit due to Germany‘s 
intransigence. In the last case study, individual-level factors mattered only to a certain 
extent. These findings give some credence to Tallberg‘s and Bailer‘s propositions that 
individuals matter.
529
 It is surprising that this factor seems to have been the single most 
positive influence on Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness in the three cases.  
 
Tallberg, in his study on EU Presidencies and their influence, has provided a useful 
framework to analyse how a member state can shape outcomes while being the Chair of the 
Council.
530
 My findings support many of his, notably that a presidency can make use of the 
additional information and the control of the agenda to shape the policy process. However, 
it has also confirmed that holding the presidency alone does not an emperor make. Indeed, 
it was found that the Presidency did not impact in a single case the outcome in a positive 
way. The biggest single factor in determining whether a member state can be policy 
effective is, as expected, the distribution and intensity of the preferences of the other 
member states in the Council. This factor recurs in every combination of factors that is 
necessary for policy effectiveness. 
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3.2. How to be policy effective in EU negotiations: a guide  
 
The previous section has demonstrated whether the factors selected for this research had 
any relevance on Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness. We can now tentatively argue which 
factors influence policy effectiveness in a positive way based on our findings. In 
Luxembourg‘s case, the negotiation context did not have a positive impact on policy 
effectiveness. This is hardly surprising, considering its small voting weight in the Council 
and the EP. Time pressure affected policy effectiveness in a negative way. Furthermore, the 
office of the presidency did not have a positive influence either- which is contrary to 
previous findings on when Luxembourg held the presidency.
531
 However it is in line with 
other studies on the impact of Presidencies.
532
 The evidence is inconclusive on the impact 
of the approval procedure but, again, this is related to the nature of the case studies rather 
than a valid indication of its impact. Institutional coordination did seem to have a positive 
impact on the overall policy effectiveness, which previous studies have also confirmed.533  
 
The two factors that show a positive result are the preferences in the Council and the 
individual-level factors. Expertise and experience, and being included in the restricted 
circle of actors who eventually decide on the final agreement are factors which should be 
paid more systematic attention in studies on member state power and EU negotiations. 
Only then is it possible to get a comprehensive picture of why some governments manage 
to get their preferences included in the final legislative agreement. Belonging to the same 
political family did not seem to influence policy effectiveness in a positive way in these 
three case studies. Neither did past relations seem to affect Luxembourg‘s policy 
effectiveness- a somewhat counter-intuitive finding as many of its politicians stress the fact 
that they need to have good personal relations with their counterparts. However, Bazerman 
et al. have found many authors find that ―individual differences offer limited potential for 
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predicting negotiation outcomes.‖534 This is probably related to the prominence of the 
distribution and intensity of preferences factor. This seems to be the overriding factor 
which plays in favour of Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness. Clearly, the lower the distance 
between Luxembourg‘s preferences and the preferences of a significant number of other 
member states, the more likely it is to be policy effective. Furthermore, if a country such as 
Luxembourg has different preferences to a coalition of France and Germany, it is very 
unlikely to be highly policy effective. As Barry has argued, ―it is better to face a divided 
opposition than a united one (divide et impera) and that the most advantageous position in a 
triad arises when the other members quarrel.‖535 At the very least the others must be 
indifferent, and even then the member state has to be actively involved and shaping the 
negotiations if the Commission has planned something that it does not agree with.  
To summarise: 
 
1) a member state is highly policy effective if: a) there is QMV and the member state‘s 
preferences are to be found in the middle of the spectrum, b) it has good individual-level 
factors working in its favour c) time pressure is high, d) institutional coordination works 
well, e) domestic approval is easy (SGP 1996) 
 
2) a member state is medium policy effective if: a) there is unanimity in Council and the 
member state‘s preferences are extreme b) the distribution of preferences is not wide and 
the intensity of preferences is low, c)  approval at home is difficult. (EC Reg. 883/2004) 
 
3) a member state is lowly policy effective if: a) there is QMV and the member state‘s 
preferences are to be found at one end of the spectrum, b) there is a wide distribution and 
high intensity of preferences, c) time pressure is high (SGP 2005) 
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3.3. What is so special about Luxembourg? 
 
The previous section has shown that the findings do not give a clear cut answer on what 
makes a member state policy effective- in fact, the most straightforward answer would be: 
it depends. Luxembourg has been highly policy effective in the creation of the SGP, due to 
Jean- Claude Juncker‘s double hat of Finance Minister and Prime Minister, as well as his 
expertise and his personal relations with other Heads of State. In the reform of the SGP, 
Luxembourg was not policy effective despite holding the presidency. Juncker was President 
of the Eurogroup and still had that same double hat as well. The widely distributed and 
intense preferences of France and Germany combined to produce an agreement which 
Luxembourg did not favour, but had nevertheless helped to produce. Finally, in Regulation 
883/2004 Luxembourg was able to be medium policy effective because of domestic 
constraints, a low distribution and intensity of preferences of the other member states and 
because of unanimity. A variety of a combination of factors can thus lead to policy 
effectiveness, which does not speak in favour of the simplicity of this framework, but does 
reflect reality quite accurately. 
 
Finally, some of the observations that refer above to the uniqueness of Luxembourg‘s role 
and characteristics shed an interesting light on future possibilities of policy effectiveness. In 
reference to its size, several observations can be made. It is a country that is deeply 
dependent on the positions of the other member states in order to be policy effective. 
Luxembourg either needs to have Germany of France on its side if it wants to be policy 
effective in QMV or, at the very least they need to be indifferent. Because it is such a small 
country there are some inherent disadvantages the government faces in EU negotiations, 
such as a small voting weight in the Council and the European Parliament. As shown in the 
introduction, until the first enlargement it was a dummy country whose vote did not matter. 
While still overrepresented compared to its population, it is very rare that it can be a pivotal 
player. The government has to work intensely on the quality of personal relations with 
members of the French and German government in order to be heard by them in the 
Council. The government needs to tread carefully whenever France and Germany unite, as 
their alliance may not always be in its favour. Secondly, Luxembourg cannot impose its 
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vision if the preferences of the others are widely and intensely distributed. Luxembourg 
needs big strong allies or at least their indifference in order to be policy effective.  
 
Another observation is that a stable political system in a small state can produce the 
important factors which enhance its policy effectiveness. In that sense, it is undisputed that 
holding two or more ministerial posts, especially the PM and Finance Minister 
simultaneously, has significantly increased Luxembourg‘s chances of policy effectiveness 
in two cases. Indeed, the fact that a minister occupies two posts is quite common in 
Luxembourg; many ministers occupy more than one post. This not only improves 
coordination but also improves the knowledge of the ministers of transversal issues. It also 
has a direct impact on an increased institutional coordination and increased reputation, 
expertise and improved past relations. It remains to be seen how Luxembourg‘s policy 
effectiveness will fare now that PM Juncker has given up this double post and Luc Frieden 
is now Finance Minister. Another insight that results from this research is that 
Luxembourg's MEPs, even if they do not belong to the coalition government of the time, 
still lobby for the government's position in the EP. This may be both related to the stable 
political system and to the size of the country. As there are only 6 MEPs, they are well 
aware that of their responsibility to make Luxembourg‘s voice heard in the European 
Parliament. Furthermore, most parties send their (former) political heavyweights in the race 
for the elections; most of the current MEPs have held ministerial posts, or some other high 
political offices before. They are therefore often well versed in EU Council negotiations 
before they move on to the European Parliament.  
 
If we want to draw lessons from this research on Luxembourg‘s policy effectiveness in the 
EU, what stands out most is that Luxembourg is deeply dependent upon individual-level, 
almost personalised factors rather than other factors which may be more permanent. We 
can see that historically Luxembourg has instead been able to rely on precisely these 
individual-level factors. Luxembourg is widely regarded as a trusted, competent partner and 
sometimes even leader in EU negotiations and decision-making.
536
 It has also been noted 
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that the credibility, experience and diplomatic skills of Luxembourg‘s Prime Ministers has 
led them to be designated President of one of the most important European institutions: the 
European Commission, thereby reaching international visibility and respect. Indeed, two 
former Prime Ministers have so far been appointed by the European Council to that post: 
Gaston Thorn and Jacques Santer. Pierre Werner was charged to develop the first paper on 
a possible monetary union in the 1970s. Jean-Claude Juncker‘s name, the Prime Minister 
since 1995, has regularly been tipped for subsequent nominations for the posts of 
Commission and European Council President.
537
 Furthermore, Luxembourg, as the smallest 
member state, was sometimes allocated Commission portfolios which are considered as 
some of the more important ones: in the 1970s, its Commissioner was responsible for 
Competition under Jenkins; in the early 1990s, it was allotted the agriculture portfolio, and 
under the Barroso II Commission, Viviane Reding is currently responsible for Justice, 
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship. The country and its politicians have managed to turn 
a weakness into an advantage in terms of its small number of staff and double ministerial 
hats. However politicians, even of exceptional political dexterity and of great technical 
expertise, sometimes lose elections or decide to retire from politics.  
 
These resources are unstable and this presents a danger to Luxembourg‘s policy 
effectiveness in general. As European Voice notes dismissively on Juncker‘s ability to 
become a good and effective President of the European Council:  
―Juncker's popularity in Paris and Berlin owes much to his skills as a fixer, derived 
from his long membership of the most powerful EU institutions, the European 
Council and Ecofin, the finance ministers' Council (...). But what Europe and the 
Eurozone needs in that position is not a fixer who owes his political fortune to 
accommodating the demands of the most powerful member states, but a real 
political heavyweight who commands respect in international financial 
institutions.‖538  
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This statement may be excessively negative but it nevertheless shows the inherent 
vulnerability of any politician from such a small country and, by implication, the 
precariousness of its policy effectiveness. 
 
 
4. Reflections and further research 
 
How member states can successfully defend their national interests or impose their policy 
preferences in EU negotiation processes is the central question of this research. Three broad 
areas are covered in this thesis: European decision making processes, EU policy making, 
and the political system of Luxembourg. Policy effectiveness has been defined as the 
successful exercise of a member state‘s ability to include most of its policy preferences into 
the final legislation. The factors that are considered to influence policy effectiveness 
included domestic politics, such as the approval procedure and institutional coordination. 
The distribution and intensity of other member states were proven to matter greatly. The 
negotiation context, more specifically the decision-making procedure and time pressure 
played a role as well. Furthermore, individual-level factors such as experience, past 
relations or belonging to the same political family are rarely systematically included in 
research, but I have attempted to include these in qualitative terms.
539
  
 
4.1. Looking back 
 
Reflecting on the framework of this thesis, a number of remarks on the research design can 
be made and several questions can be raised. First, the measure of policy effectiveness used 
here is relatively cumbersome: at the beginning it is necessary to establish the policy 
preferences of the member state, then to present the Commission proposal, followed by 
establishing the strategy and the goals of the member state in the negotiations. The final 
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legislation is compared and contrasted to the policy preferences and to the strategy and 
goals. Then an analysis follows on which factors played a role or not in this outcome.  
 
This approach is probably too detailed to be applied to a large number of cases, or to 27 
member states to see which one got most of its policy preferences included in the 
negotiations. However, the goal of this thesis was much more modest. Based on three case 
studies, it was possible to produce an exhaustive and in depth account of policy 
effectiveness of a particular member state. This qualitative and descriptive approach can 
complement the more quantitative studies conducted recently on member states‘ power in 
the European Union, either as a cross-check or in order to give more depth.
540
 The 
framework might be said to have a somewhat mixed intellectual heritage; after all we find 
traces of the intergovernmental approach, the expertocratic approach and the constructivist 
approach; but it is arguably more realistic as a tool to explain policy effectiveness than the 
purer alternatives on offer.
541
 Finally, it is a framework which can be applied to any 
member state, whether they are big or small, new or old, rich or poor member states. It can 
be applied equally to any case study, whether they are high or low politics: treaty 
negotiations, regulations or directives. Furthermore it takes account of the role of the EP, an 
omission in many studies on member state power. This model works equally well under the 
new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, which gives more decision-making power to that 
institution under the extension of co-decision, and has slightly different decision-making 
procedures. 
 
Looking critically at the framework, were the factors well chosen? Several factors were 
considered to have an impact on member state policy effectiveness, and these were then 
subdivided into more specific factors. Some of these could have been grouped in a different 
way- for example, the ‗distribution and intensity of preferences‘ could have been 
incorporated easily into the ‗negotiation context‘ as they are intimately related. I chose not 
to do that in order to disentangle the decision-making procedure per se from the 
                                                          
540
 Bailer S., (2004) ‗Bargaining Success in the European Union.‘ European Union Politics, Vol.5 Issue 1, pp. 
99-123 
541
 Bulmer S., (1983) ‗Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making.‘ Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 21, No 4, pp 349- 364 
266 
‗distribution of preferences‘ analytically. After all, the negotiation context (decision-
making procedure in the Council and EP and time pressure) deals with the relative weight 
of the member states in the Council and the EP. The distribution and intensity of 
preferences deals with what they want and how much they want it. The decision-making 
procedure furthermore was not expected to play a role directly in every case study, as many 
studies have revealed that consensus decision-making is often the norm.
542
 While voting 
weights are always in the back of the negotiators‘ minds, the distribution and intensity of 
policy preferences is expected to always impact on a particular member state‘s policy 
effectiveness. Therefore, bundling the two together would have distorted the findings: if the 
decision-making procedure is unanimity, there is a low distribution and intensity of 
preferences in the Council and the member state in question has extreme preferences, a 
small member state can potentially have more impact on the final decision than under QMV 
where it would have or at least could have been overridden. In such a framework, the 
intensity of preferences would not be accurately reflected; however it has been 
demonstrated here and elsewhere that the intensity of preferences or the salience of the 
issue matter.
543
 The distribution and intensity of the preferences are intimately related to the 
decision-making procedure in terms of potential policy effectiveness, but they need to be 
treated differently in order to produce a precise picture. Some factors were also difficult to 
measure, especially those related to ‗individual-level factors‘. Here we have scope for 
refining and making this measure more precise than just relying on the assessment of a 
person‘s expertise by other negotiators. ‗Past relations‘ are also notoriously difficult to 
quantify and to assess other than by subjective accounts.  
 
Turning to the case studies themselves, we can ask legitimately if they were well selected. I 
would argue that there is a balance which was struck. Two high profile case studies on 
monetary and budgetary policy were complemented with a low profile yet important 
legislation on the coordination of social security systems. The cases on monetary policy can 
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be accused of being too technically complex and presenting diffuse preferences in the case 
of Luxembourg.  
 
But one has to bear in mind that Luxembourg was the focus- three implications follow from 
this statement. Firstly, it is difficult to identify recent case studies where Luxembourg is 
presented as punching above its weight because EU politics is little politicised and 
publicised in Luxembourg. Secondly and perhaps equally importantly, Luxembourg is one 
of the member states which has the lowest frequency of position-taking in the Council.
544
 
Thirdly, the SGP and its reform are cases of high politics- an area where small states are 
less likely to be policy effective and hence these cases are particularly revealing.
545
 The 
challenge of using two case studies on the surveillance of budgetary policies was therefore 
worth it, and gave the additional advantage of being able to draw comparisons between 
them. It could have been more promising to use policies where there were clear-cut 
preferences in order to facilitate the analysis, such as the last case study, where 
Luxembourg had unambiguous preferences, but none of the other member states did.  
 
This shows an inherent problem in EU Council decision-making research: finding out the 
real preferences of the member states‘ governments, and finding out the potential 
coalitions. The decision making process, especially within the Council formations, is still a 
black box to most scholars, a challenge which, in this research, could only be met by elite 
interviews of the negotiators involved, by process tracing and document analysis.
546
 This is 
a cumbersome procedure and one often has to deal with incomplete information.  
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4.2. Options for further research 
 
Having reflected on the research design and on the lessons learned, what can be done 
(differently) in further research on EU and Council decision-making? All of my case 
studies show evidence of two developments in terms of decision-making processes: the 
shift of decision-making from public to informal arenas, and the involvement of the 
European Council in areas which are not of its competence. Indeed, the compromises found 
were always proposed in the Council of Ministers after several key member states had seen 
and agreed to them beforehand. Incidentally, the evidence also indicates that the European 
Parliament did not influence the legislative outcome at all in these cases. Several interesting 
areas of research have recently opened up through the public Council votes since 2006; this 
means more data is available to the Political Scientist and it is theoretically easier to 
determine preferences and policy effectiveness. This means less exclusive reliance on 
interviews than in the present research. This data can be used to produce more accurate 
qualitative and quantitative research on which member state could include most of its 
policy preferences in the final legislation. It also opens up more comprehensive research on 
alliances within the Council, and allows comparisons on member states‘ alliances between 
different Council formations across time.  
 
Since the economic and financial crisis, institutional change and new modes of governance 
in the area of economic governance in general, are emerging not only at the national level, 
but also at the European level. These developments will potentially have a substantial 
impact in the area of budgetary coordination and surveillance. Because the reform of the 
SGP was negotiated under the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, a detailed study of how 
this decision came about fits neatly into existing and future research.
547
 This certainly is 
worth further exploration, as it may skew the results presented here. Again, if small N case 
studies are used, the potential shifts from public to secluded areas can be identified through 
interviews and other qualitative research methods. The details of these reform processes 
(how and by whom these decisions were effectively taken, and which member states have 
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been most successful in including their preferences into the final legislative outcome) are a 
subject worth studying. While the Stability and Growth Pact has been comprehensively 
covered, the angle of further research can be more geared towards drawing further lessons 
on EU Council negotiations in the area of EMU.
548
 
 
On the other hand, detailed investigations into the institutional relations between the 
Eurogroup, the European Council and the ECOFIN Council have to continue. These 
relations are being redefined since Lisbon and the economic crisis and disentangling these 
could be useful research. The relations between the ins and outs of the Eurozone need 
elucidation in terms of taking decisions and responsibility. There is definitely scope for 
elaboration on the interactions between the President of the European Council, the 
President of the Eurogroup, and the President of the ECOFIN and between these 
institutions in these negotiations. It is interesting to note that Von Rompuy, the newly 
elected President of the European Council, was chosen to lead the negotiations on the 
review of the SGP in 2010- not Juncker, President of the Eurogroup of Finance Ministers. 
Here again, there is effectively a shift of responsibility from Finance Ministers to the Heads 
of State and Government. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty have made this possible, but 
they did not prescribe it. Is this an indication that Juncker lost his touch, and that Finance 
Ministers across Europe have lost the trust of their Heads of Governments? Or is this 
increased involvement of the Heads of State and Governments into different ministerial 
responsibilities part of a wider phenomenon in EU politics? In monetary and budgetary 
policy especially, are we seeing the emergence of France and Germany as the (resurrected) 
hegemons? How these states handle current monetary troubles in conjunction with their 
other Eurozone members is an important issue which will impact on the future of monetary 
union itself. How small member states will still be able to punch above their weight in these 
changing conditions is certainly not only of academic interest, but it also touches on the 
balance between big and small member states, on the way decisions are taken in the 
European Union, and ultimately on the democratic accountability of governments. 
 
 
                                                          
548
 Héritier A., Mair P., SIEPOL Project.  
270 
Bibliography 
 
Administration de l‘Emploi Luxembourg, (undated) Rapport. Available at: 
http://chd.lu/wps/PA_1_084AIVIMRA06I432DO10000000/FTSShowAttachment?
mime=application%2fpdf&id=984520&fn=984520.pdf 
             (2008) Rapport annuel: Emploi et chômage 
Allegrezza S., Jesuit D. and Heinrich, G. A., (2004) ‗Poverty and Income Inequality in 
Luxembourg and the Grande Région in Comparative Perspective.‘ Socio-Economic Review, 
Vol. 2, pp. 263-283. 
Alvarez- Rivera M., ‗Election Resources on the Internet. Elections to the Luxembourg 
Chamber of Deputies.‘ Available at: http://electionresources.org/lu/ 
Arregui J., Thomson R., (2009) ‗States‘ Bargaining Success in the European Union.‘ 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 16, No. 5, pp. 655-676. 
Article 104(9) of Treaty of the European Union. 
Arter, D., (2000) ‗Small State Influence within the EU: The Case of Finland's ‗Northern 
Dimension Initiative.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.38, Issue 5,  pp. 677–697. 
Aspinwall M., (2006) ‗Government Preferences on European Integration: An Empirical 
Test of Five Theories.‘ British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, pp. 89-114. 
Bailer S., (2010) ‗What Factors Determine Bargaining Power and Success in EU  
Negotiations?‘ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, No.5, pp. 419-431. 
(2006) ‗The Dimensions of Power in the European Union.‘ Comparative European 
Politics, Vol. 4, No.4,  pp.355-378. 
(2004) ‗Bargaining Success in the European Union.‘ European Union Politics, 
Vol.5 Issue 1, pp 99-123. 
Baillie S., (1998) ‗A Theory of Small State Influence in the European Union.‘ Journal of 
International Relations AND Development, Vol. 1, No. 3-4, pp. 195- 219. 
Bale T., Szczerbiak A., (2006) ‗Why is there no Christian Democracy in Poland (And Why 
Does It Matter)?‘ SEI Working Paper 91. 
Banque de France, (2004)  Press release: ‗Europe – Main EU coordination mechanisms.‘ 
Informal ECOFIN in Scheveningen, 10-11 September.  Available at : 
271 
http://www.banque-
france.fr/gb/eurosys/telechar/europe/INFORMAL_ECOFIN_in_Scheveningen2004.pdf 
Bauler A., Question N°0306 de Monsieur André Bauler concernant Indemnité de chômage 
pour travailleurs frontaliers. 
Banzhaf J., (1965) „Weighted Voting Doesn‘t Work: A Mathematical Analysis.‘ Rutgers 
Law Review, Vol.19 pp. 317-343. 
Barry B (1980) Is It Better to Be Powerful or Lucky? Part I. Political Studies, Vol. 28, p. 
183-194 
(1980) Is It Better to Be Powerful or Lucky? Part II. Political Studies, Vol. 28, p. 
338-352 
Bazerman MH, Curhan JR, Moore DA & Valley KL. (2000) Negotiation. Annual Review of 
Psychology, Vol. 51, pp 279- 314 
BBC News website, (2002) ‗Row over ―stupid‖ Budget Rules.‘ 17. October.  
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2336823.stm 
 (2003) ‗Chirac's Budget Plea creates EU Storm.‘ 15 July. 
Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3066861.stm 
(2009) ‗Tough 2010 Irish Budget unveiled.‘ 9 December. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8402551.stm 
Beach D., Mazzucelli C., (2007) Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Beach D., (2007) ‗Leadership in the History-Making Decisions of European Integration.‘ 
Paper presented to Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics conference on “Studying 
the European Union: Current and Future Agendas”. London. 
Becker W., (2005) ‗Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact- A Licence To Run Up Debt.‘ 
EU Monitor. Deutsche Bank Research. 28 April. 
Bengtsson, R., Elgström, O. and Tallberg, J., (2004) ‗Silencer or Amplifier? The European 
Union Presidency and the Nordic Countries.‘ Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 27, pp. 
311–334. 
Berliner Zeitung (2001) ‗In einer Stunde war das Thema Euro durch.‘ December 31. 
Berton P., Kimura H., Zartmann W.E., (1999) International Negotiations. Actors, 
Structures, Process, Values. Macmillan Press. 
272 
Bindi F., (2011) Italy and the European Union. Brookings Institution Press. 
Boerzel T., Cichowski R. A., (2003) The State of the European Union: Law, Politics, and 
Society. Oxford University Press. 
Boerzel T., (2000) ‗Why there is no 'Southern Problem'. On Environmental Leaders and 
Laggards in the European Union.‘  Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.7, Issue 1,  pp. 
141 – 162. 
Blavoukos S., Pagoulatos G., (2008) ‗Negotiating in Stages: National Positions and the 
Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact.‘ European Journal of Political Research, Vol.42 
2008, pp. 247-267. 
Broman M., (2005) ‗Small State Influence in the European Union - 'Small State Smart 
State'?‘ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 
Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii. Available at: 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/4/5/pages70459/p70
459-6.php 
Brosius J., (2007)  La recherche d‟emploi des frontaliers au Luxembourg. CEPS/INSTEAD 
No 26. 26 September. 
Brookmire D. A., (1980) ‗The Effects of Perceived Ability and Impartiality of Mediators 
and Time Pressure on Negotiation.‘ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 311-
327.  
Brunila A., Buti M., Franco D. (eds), (2001) The Stability and Growth Pact. The 
Architecture of Fiscal Policy in EMU. Palgrave. 
Bulmer S., Lequesne C. (eds), (2005) The Member States of the European Union. Oxford 
University Press. 
Bulmer S., (1983) ‗Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making.‘ Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21, No 4, pp. 349- 364. 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, (January 2009) ‗Aktualisierung des deutschen 
Stabilitätsprogramms‗. 
Bunse S., Magnette P., Nikolaidis K., (2005) ‗Is the Commission the Small Member States‘ 
Best Friend?‘ SIEPS Report No. 9. 
Business Week, (2002) ‗So Much for Europe's Fiscal Discipline: The EU is facing a Crisis 
as Budgets balloon and Nations square off.‘ 3 June. 
273 
Council of Economic and Financial Affairs, (2003) ‗Implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, France and Germany.‘ 14492/1/03 REV 1 (Presse 320) 15. 25 November.   
Economic and Social Committee, (2000) ‗Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
on the Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on coordination of social security systems‘. 
OJ C75/29 
Council of Europe, (2007) ‗Initial periodical report presented to the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe in accordance with Article 15 of the European Charter.‘ 19 March. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. 
Council Regulation (EC) 1056/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding 
up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. 
Council Regulation (EC) 1055/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004. OJ L166 30.04.2004. 
Chirac Jacques, (1996) Intervention télévisée de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la 
République, interrogé par Mme Jacquemin et M. Durand, M. Adler , M. Chain et M. Field. 
Palais de l'Élysée. 12 December. Accessed on 12.03.2007, available at : 
http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais_archives/interventions/interviews_articles_de
_presse_et_interventions_televisees/1996/decembre/intervention_televisee_du_president_d
e_la_republique_interroge_par_mme_jacquemin_et_m_durand_m_adler_m_chain_et_m_fi
eld.27251.html 
Deutsche Welle, (2003) ‗Schröder Fans the Flames of Pact Dispute‘ 17 July. 
Available at: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,922425,00.html 
Directorate General for Research, (1997) Working Paper on Frontier Workers in the 
European Union. Social Affairs Series: W 16A. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/soci/w16/summary_en.htm 
Donnelly S., (2004) Reshaping Economic and Monetary Union. Manchester University 
Press. 
274 
Duer A., Matteo G., (2010) ‗Choosing a Bargaining Strategy in EU Negotiations: Power, 
Preferences, and Culture.‘ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, Issue 5, pp. 564 – 
580. 
Elgstrom, O. (ed.) (2003) European Union Council Presidencies, A Comparative 
Perspective. London, Routledge. 
Elting H-H., (1997) ‗The Belgium- Luxembourg Monetary Association. The effects of 
EMU on the Institut monétaire luxembourgeois.‘ Briefing 25. European Parliament Task 
Force on Economic and Monetary Union. 17 January. 
Employment and Social Policy Council meeting 20 October 2003. 13538/1/03/REV 1 
(Presse 302). 
Employment and Social Policy Council meeting 3 December 2001 C/01/451 
Employment and Social Policy Council meeting 3 June 2002 C/02/132 
Employment and Social Policy Council meeting 1 and 2 December 2003 15443/03 (Presse 
354)  
Economic and Social Committee, (2000) Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee 
on the “Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on coordination of social security systems. 
OJ C75/29 of 15.3.2000 
Euractiv, (2007) ‗Stability and Growth Pact‘ 7 July 2006, updated 19 February 2007. 
Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/euro/stability-growth-pact/article-133199 
Euregio Bodensee, (2007) Arbeitsmarkt Sommer 2006. Available at: 
http://www.statistik.euregiobodensee.org/pdfs/ammsommer.pdf 
European Commission, (2006) ‗Commission recommendation for a Council decision  
abrogating the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit‘ 29.11.2006 SEC 
(2006) 1529 final. 
(2004) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament - Strengthening economic governance and clarifying the implementation 
of the Stability and Growth Pact.‘ COM(2004) 581 final. 
(2003) ‗Recommendation for a Council Recommendation to France with a view to 
bringing an end to the situation of an excessive government deficit- Application of 
Article 104 (7) of the Treaty.‘  SEC (2003) 516 final 07.05.2003. 
275 
(1998) ‗Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on coordination of social security 
systems‘. COM/98/0779 final-AVC 98/0360.  Official Journal C038, 12/02/1999. 
P0010. 
(1998) ‗Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on coordination of social security 
systems‘ COM/98/779 final Explanatory Memorandum. 
 (1996) „A Stability Pact to ensure Budgetary Discipline in EMU (Note for the 
Monetary Committee)‘ II/163/1996. 18 March. 
Available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/10316/01/II_163_96.pdf 
(1996) ‗Commission proposal for a Council Regulation on the strengthening and 
the surveillance of budgetary positions. Commission proposal for a Council 
Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the excessive deficit procedure.‘ Com (96) 
486 final. 
 Available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/9781/01/COM_%2896%29_496_final.pdf 
 (undated) ‗Glossary: Qualified Majority Voting.‘ Accessed on 16. 02. 2009 and 
available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/qualified_majority_en.htm 
European Commission, (undated) ‗Glossary: Community and Intergovernmental 
methods.‘ Accessed on 16. 02. 2009 and available at: 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/community_intergovernmental_methods_en.htm 
(undated) ‗Glossary: The cooperation procedure.‘ on 16. 02. 2009 and available at: 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/cooperation_procedure_en.htm 
European Council, (1997) ‗Resolution of the Amsterdam European Council on the stability 
and growth pact‘. Official Journal C 236 of 02.08.1997. 
European Court of Justice, (2004) ‗Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-27/04. Press 
release No 57/04‘. Available at: www.curia.europa.eu 
European Parliament, (2009) ‗Press release on Composition of the European Parliament  
after European elections in June‘ Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20071008IPR11353 
(2005) ‗Recommendation for second reading on the Council Common Position for 
adoption of a Council regulation on amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the 
276 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies.‘ PE 359.997v02-00.   
(2005) ‗European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council 
regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of 
economic policies‘ (COM(2005)0154 — C6-0119/2005 — 2005/0064(SYN)) 
(2005) ‗European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council 
regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure‘ (COM(2005)0155 — C6-
0120/2005 — 2005/0061(CNS)) 
 (2005) ‗Legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies.‘ 
(COM(2005)0154 — C6-0119/2005 — 2005/0064(SYN)) 
 (2003) ‗European Parliament legislative resolution on the common position 
adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a European Parliament and 
Council regulation on the coordination of social security systems‘ (15577/6/2003 _ 
C5-0043/2004 _ 1998/0360(COD))  
(2003) ‗Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation 
on coordination of social security systems‘ PE 324.285. 
(2002) ‗Debate on Public Finances in EMU. Questions to Commissioner Solbes.‘ 
14 May.  
 (2000) ‗Factsheet: Social Security for Migrant Workers.‘ 10. October. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/4_8_4_en.htm 
(undated) ‗The co-decision procedure.‘ Accessed on 16. 02. 2009 and available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/staticDisplay.do?language=EN&i
d=55&pageRank=3 
(undated) ‗The consultation procedure.‘ Accessed on 16. 02. 2009 and available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/staticDisplay.do?language=EN&i
d=55&pageRank=4 
277 
(1998) ‗DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
regulation on coordination of social security systems‘ (COM(1998) 779 – C4-
0137/1999 – 1998/0360(COD)) Committee on Employment and Social Affairs. 
 (1996) ‗Legislative Resolution embodying Parliament's opinion on the proposal for 
a Council Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure‘. (COM(96)0496 - C4-0577/96 - 96/0248 (CNS)) 
(Consultation procedure).  
 (1996) ‗Legislative resolution embodying Parliament's opinion on the draft Council 
Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure‘ (6931/ 2/97 - C4-0182/97 96/0248 (CNS)) (Reconsultation). 
 (1996) ‗Legislative Resolution embodying Parliament's Opinion on the proposal for 
a Council Regulation on the strengthening of the surveillance and coordination of 
budgetary positions‘ (COM(96)0496 - C4-0576/96 - 96/0247(SYN)) (Cooperation 
procedure, first reading).  
European Voice, (2010) ‗Juncker re-appointed as Eurogroup president.‘ 18 January. 
 (2009) UK questions Opel deal. 24. September.  
 (2008) ‗Jean-Claude's halo is starting to wear a bit thin‘. 22 May. 
 (2005) ‗Blessed are the deal-makers.‘ 24 March. 
 (2005) ‗Juncker must keep à la carte stability pact off menu.‘ 10 March. 
Evans Peter B., Jacobson H. K., Putnam Robert D. (1993) Double-edged diplomacy: 
international bargaining and domestic politics. University of California Press. 
Financial Times, (2009) ‗Juncker takes on Blair for EU presidency.‘ 27 October. 
Fontagne L., (2004) Rapport "Compétitivité du Luxembourg: Une paille dans l'acier".  
Available at: http://www.odc.public.lu/publications/perspectives/PPE_3.pdf 
France Politique: http ://www.france-politique.fr/referendum-1992.htm 
Gerring J., (May, 2004) ‗What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?‘  
The American  Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 2 pp. 341-354. 
(2001) Social Science Methodology. A Critical Framework. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Greek Embassy, (2004) ‗EU finance ministers exchange views on reshaping of Stability 
Pact‘. 13 September. Available at: 
278 
http://greekembassy.org/embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=7&folder=531&article=1
4010 
Goetschel L., (1998) Small States Inside and Outside the European Union: interests and 
policies. Kluwer Academic Publishers Boston. 
Goldstein K., (December 2002) ‗Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite 
Interviews.‘ Political Science and Politics, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 669- 672. 
Good T. A., (2000) ‗Review of The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power 
from Messina to Maastricht.‘  
Available at:  http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=4515 
The Guardian, (2003) ‗Eastern Europe dismayed at Chirac snub.‘ 19 February. 
Hall R. L., (May 1992) ‗Measuring Legislative Influence.‘ Legislative Studies Quarterly, 
Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 205-231. 
Hayes-Renshaw F., Van Aken W., Wallace H., (2006) ‗When and Why the EU Council of 
Ministers Votes Explicitly.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 161- 
194. 
Heipertz M., Verdun A., (October 2004) ‗The Dog that Would Never Bite? What we can  
Learn from the Origins of the Stability and Growth Pact.‘ Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 11, Issue 5, pp. 765-780. 
(2005) ‗The Stability and Growth Pact- Theorizing a Case in European Integration.‘ 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, No 5, pp. 765 – 780. 
(2010) Ruling Europe. The Politics of the Stability and Growth Pact. Cambridge 
University Press 2010. 
Heisenberg D., (2005) ‗The Institutions of ―Consensus‖ in the European Union: Formal 
Versus Informal Decision-Making in the Council.‘ European Journal of Political Research, 
Vol.44, pp. 65–90. 
Héritier A., Mair P., SIEPOL Project. Available at: 
http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/RobertSchumanCentre/Research/InstitutionsGo
vernanceDemocracy/SIEPOL/Index.aspx 
Hey J.K.A., (2003) Small States in World Politics, Lynne Riener Publishers. 
Hirsch M., (2010) ‗The Luxembourg Model has Reached its Limits. Social Partnership and 
Tripartite Arrangements work only under Fair Weather Conditions.‟ Paper presented at the 
279 
Politicologenetmaal 2010 (Workshop 1B: European integration and consensus making in 
the Low Countries, KULeuven.  
Hirsch M., Lorig W. H., (2008) Das politische System Luxemburgs. Eine Einführung. VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Hirsch, M., (2004) ‗Luxembourg at the Helm: Experience, Determination and Self-Denial.‘ 
Notre Europe Studies & Research N°37. Available at: http://www.notre-
europe.asso.fr/IMG/pdf/Etud37-en.pdf. 
Hix, S., (2001) ‗Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the European Parliament:  
An Application of Nominate to the EU.‟ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
39, Issue 4, pp. 663-688. 
(1999) ‗Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive 
Constraints and Partisan Responses.‘ European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 
35, pp. 69-106. 
Hodson D., Maher I., (October 2004) ‗Soft Law and Sanctions: Economic Policy 
Coordination and the Stability and Growth Pact.‘ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 
11, pp. 798-13. 
Hosli M., Machover M., (2004) ‗The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council: A 
Reply to Moberg.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 497-521. 
Hosli M., Soetendorp B., (2001) ‗The Hidden Dynamics of EU Council Decision-making.‘ 
Acta Politica, Vol. 4, pp. 252-87. 
Hosli M., Wolffenbuttel R., (2001) ‗Estimating the Vote Distribution in the Council of the 
European Union‘ Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol.  4, No. 1, pp. 
38-54. 
Hosli, M., (2000) ‗Smaller States and the New Voting Weights in the Council.‘ Instituut  
Clingendael. July. Available at: 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2000/20000700_cli_ess_hosli.pdf 
(1996) ‗Coalitions and Power: Effects of the Qualified Majority Voting in the 
Council of the European Union.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.34, No. 
2, pp. 255-273. 
Hooghe L., Marks G., Wilson C., (2002) ‗Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on 
European Integration?‘ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 8, pp. 965-989. 
280 
Hooghe L., (2001) The European Commission and the Integration of Europe. Images of 
Governance. Cambridge University Press. 
Hopmann T. P., (1996) The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts. 
University of South Carolina Press. 
Hopmann T. P., (1995) Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving. Annals of 
the American Academy of Political Science. Vol. 542, November, pp 24- 47 
Howarth D. J., (2005) ‗Making and Breaking the Rules: French Policy on EU 
‗gouvernement économique‘ and the Stability and Growth Pact.‘  EIoP, Vol.9, No 15. 
Available at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2005-015.pdf  
Huberty, M., (2009) ‗The National Legislative and European Parliament Elections in 
Luxembourg .‘ Epern Election Briefing No.39. 
The Independent, (2004) ‗Euro Stability Pact Rulebook in Chaos after Court Ruling.‘  
Stephen Castle, 14 July. 
 (2002) ‗Analysis: 'Stupidity pact' crumbles as euro's foundation stone.‘ 23 October. 
Interregionale Arbeitsmarktbeobachtungsstelle, (2005) „Grenzgänger und 
grenzüberschreitender Arbeitsmarkt in der Großregion. Themenheft im Rahmen des 
Gesamtvorhabens „Stand, Perspektiven und Handlungserfordernisse des Arbeitsmarkts der 
Großregion bis 2020‘. Available at: 
http://www.dgstat.be/PortalData/22/Resources/downloads/studien_und_analysen/publikatio
nen/Themenheft_Grenzg_nger.pdf 
Irlenbusch B., Sutter M., (2006) ‗An Experimental Analysis of Voting in the Stability and 
Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union.‘ Journal of Public Choice, No. 129, pp. 
417-424. 
Johansson, K. M., (2002) ‗Another Road To Maastricht: the Christian Democrat Coalition 
and the Quest for European Union.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, 
pp. 971-893. 
Kane E., O‘Reilly-de Brún M., (2001) Doing Your Own Research, Marion Boyars 
Publishers. 
Kassim H., Menon A., Peters G., Wright V. (eds), (2001) The National Co-ordination of  
EU Policy: the European Level, Oxford University Press. 
(2001) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: the National Level, Oxford 
University Press. 
281 
Kerschen N., (undated) Entwicklungspfade von den Ursprüngen hin zu Europa : Das 
luxemburgische Wohlfahrtssystem. 
Knill C, Lenschow A, (1998) ‗Coping with Europe: the Impact of British and German 
Administrations on the Implementation of EU Environmental Policy.‘ Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 5, Issue 4, pp. 595 – 614. 
Kopeinig M., (2004) Jean-Claude Juncker- Der Europäer. Czermin Verlag GmbH Wien. 
Kral D., Brinar I., Almar J., (2003) ‗The Positions of Small Countries towards Institutional 
Reform. From Tyranny of the Small to Directoire of the Big?‘ EPIN Working Paper No. 6. 
Available at: http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1036.pdf 
Lampinen R., Uusikylä P., (1998) ‗Implementation Deficit — Why Member States Do Not 
Comply with EU directives?‘ Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pp. 231–25. 
Leblond P., (2006) ‗The Political Stability and Growth Pact is Dead: Long Live the 
Economic Stability and Growth Pact.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5, 
pp. 969-990. 
Lukes S., (2004) Power. A Radical View. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Maes I. and Verdun A., (2003) "The Role of Medium-Sized Countries in the Creation of 
EMU: The Cases of Belgium and the Netherlands". In European Union Studies Association 
(EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2003 (8th), March 27-29, 2003, Nashville, TN. 
Magnette P., Nikolaidis K., (2005) ‗Is the Commission the Small Member States‘ Best  
Friend?‘ SIEPS Report No. 9. 
(May 2003)  ‗Grands et petits Etats dans l‘Union européenne: réinventer la 
balance.‘ Etudes et recherches  Notre Europe. No. 25. Available at: 
http://www.notre-europe.eu/fileadmin/IMG/pdf/Etud25-fr.pdf 
Marks G., MacAdam D., (1996) ‘ Social movements and the changing structure of political 
opportunity in the European union.‘  West European Politics, Vol. 19, Issue 2 April 1996, 
p. 249 - 278 
Marks G., Wilson C. J., (2000) ‗The Past in the Present: a Cleavage Theory of Party 
Response to European Integration.‘ British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 
433-459. 
Mattila, M. (2004), ‗Contested Decisions: Empirical Analysis of Voting in the European 
Union Council of Ministers.‘ European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, pp. 29–50. 
282 
Maurer, A., (2000) ‗The German Presidency of the Council: Continuity or Change in 
Germany's European Policy?‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, pp. 44–47. 
Meerts P. W., Cede F., (2004) Negotiating European Union. Palgrave MacMillan. 
Meerts P., (2002) ‗The Negotiating Power of Small States in a Globalizing World: Options 
for Mongolia‘. Available at: 
 http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/PIN/PINPoints/pp18.pdf 
Michaelowa A., (1998) ‗Impact of interest groups on EU climate policy.‘ European 
Environment. Vol. 8, Issue 5, pp. 152–160. 
Miller R. L., Brewer J. D. (eds), (2003) The A-Z of Social Research. A dictionary of Key 
Social Science Research Concepts Sage Publications. 
Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Rapport d‘Activité 2009. 
(2008) ‗Rapport d‘Activité 2008‘. 
(2007) ‗Rapport d‘Activité 2007‘. 
(2006) ‗Rapport d‘Activité 2006‘. 
(2005) ‗Rapport d‘Activité 2005‘. 
(2003) ‗Rapport d‘Activité  2003‘. 
(2002) ‗Rapport d‘Activité 2002‘. 
(2001) ‗Rapport d‘Activité  2001‘. Available at: 
http://www.mte.public.lu/ministere/rapports-activite/  
Ministère des Finances, (2000) ‗1st update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth  
            Programme.‘ 
           (2000) ‗2nd update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‘ 
           (2001) ‗3rd update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‘ 
           (2003) ‗4th  update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‘ 
           (2003) ‗5th update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‘ 
           (2004) ‗6th update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‘ 
           (2005) ‗7th update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‘ 
           (2006) ‗8th update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‘ 
           (2007) ‗9th update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‘ 
           (2008) ‗10th update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‘ 
           (2009) 10
th
 update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme,          
283 
          ADDENDUM.‘ 
          (2010) ‗11th update of the Luxembourg Stability and Growth Programme.‘  
          Available at: http://www.mf.public.lu/finances_publiques/programme/index.html 
Ministère du Travail, (2008) ‗Rapport d‘Activité 2008.‘ 
Moberg A., (2002) ‗The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council.‘ Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 259-282. 
Moravcsik A., (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from  
Messina to Maastricht. Routledge/UCL Press. 
(1997) ‗Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.‘ 
International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 513-553.  
(1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht. European edition with London: Routledge/UCL Press. 
Napel, S., Widgrén M., (2009) ‗The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in Co-
Decision.‘ Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 27, pp. 129-154. 
Newton G (ed), (2000) Essays on Politics, Language and Society in Luxembourg. The 
Edwin Mellen Press. 
New York Times, (1995) ‘Kohl Casts Europe's Economic Union as War and Peace Issue.’ 
October 17. 
Nye R.J., (2008) ‗Soft Power and Public Diplomacy.‘ The ANNALS of the American  
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616, pp. 94-109. 
(1990) ‗Soft Power‘ Foreign Policy. No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary, Autumn, pp. 
153-171. 
Odell J. (2010) Three Islands of Knowledge about Negotiation in International 
Organizations. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, Issue 5, pp 619-632 
ORF, (2008) ‗Konflikt um Grenzgänger-Kontingent.‘ 16 December. Available at: 
http://burgenland.orf.at/stories/329061/ 
Panke D., (2010) ‗Dwarfs in International Negotiations - Punching Above Their Weights?‘  
PSAI Conference Paper. 
(2010) 'Small States in the European Union: Structural Disadvantages in EU Policy-
Making and Counter-Strategies.‘ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, No. 
6, pp. 799-817. 
284 
(2009) ‗Being Small in the Big, Wide World: The Power of Small States in 
international negotiations.‘ Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Toronto. 
Parties and elections: http://www.parties-and-elections.de/luxembourg2.html 
Peters G.B., (1998) Comparative Politics. Theory and Methods. MacMillan Press 
Peters G. B., (1994), Agenda Setting in the European Community. Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol.1, Issue 1, pp 9-26 
Peterson J., Bomberg E., (1999) Decision-Making in the European Union. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Peterson J., (1995) ‗Decision-Making in the European Union: Towards a Framework for 
Analysis.‘ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.2, Issue 1, pp. 69-93. 
Pijnenburg B., (1998) ‗EU lobbying by ad hoc coalitions: an exploratory case study.‘ 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 5, Issue 2, pp. 303 – 321 
Pochet, P., (2007) ‗Social Europe: Still binding regulations?‘ Paper prepared for the EUSA 
Tenth Biennal International Conference, Montréal, Canada. 
Pöttering H-G, (2002) ‗Speech in the European Parliament.‘ 21 October. 
Puetter U., (2006) The Eurogroup. How a Secretive Circle of Finance Ministers shape  
European Economic Governance. Manchester University Press.  
(2004) ‗The Role of the Eurogroup in EMU and the SGP.‘ Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 11 No. 5, pp. 854-870. 
Putnam R. D., (1988) ‗Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games.‘ 
International Organization, Vol.42, No. 3, pp. 427-460. 
Quaglia, L., Moxon-Browne, E., (2006) ‗What Makes a Good EU Presidency? Italy and 
Ireland Compared.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, Issue 2, pp. 249-368. 
Quaglia L., (2004) ‗Italy's Presidency of the European Union in 2003: A successful 
Business Manager?‘ South European Society and Politics. Vol. 9, No 3, pp. 149-165. 
Schelling T.C., (1960) Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press. 
Schure P., Verdun A., (2008) ‗Legislative Bargaining in the European Union.‘ European 
Union Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 459-486. 
Secretariat of the European Convention, (May 30, 2002) CONV 76/02.  
Secretariat of the European Convention, (October 21, 2002) CONV 357/02.  
285 
Segers M., Van Esch F., (2007) ‗Behind the Veil of Budgetary Discipline: The Political 
Logic of the Budgetary Rules in EMU and the SGP.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 45, No. 5, pp. 1080-1109. 
SIP  (2009) ‗Le Premier Ministre. Jean- Claude Juncker.‘ Available at:  
http://www.gouvernement.lu/gouvernement/premier-ministre/index.html 
(2005) ‗Article d'actualité : Jean-Claude Juncker préside les réunions du Conseil 
"Affaires économiques et financières" et de l´Eurogroupe à Bruxelles.‘ 17.01.2005-
18.01.2005. 
(2005) ‗Article d'actualité : Réunions de l´Eurogroupe et du Conseil "Affaires 
économiques et financières" à Bruxelles.‘ 16.02.2005-  17.02.2005. 
(2005) ‗Article d'actualité : Jean-Claude Juncker préside les réunions de 
l´Eurogroupe et du Conseil Affaires économiques et financières.‘ 07.03.2005-
  08.03.2005. 
(2005) ‗Communiqué : Accord sur la réforme du pacte de stabilité et de 
croissance.‘ 21.03.2005. 
(2005) ‘Article d'actualité : Entrevue du Premier ministre Jean-Claude Juncker avec 
le chancelier allemand Gerhard Schröder à Berlin.‘ 21.01.2005 
(2003) „Article d'actualité : François Biltgen présente l´accord relatif aux 
prestations de chômage pour travailleurs frontaliers.‘ 1.12.2003. 
 (undated) ‗Une monarchie constitutionnelle dans la tradition européenne.‘  
 (2003) ‗Portrait économique et social du Luxembourg. Available at: 
http://www.portrait.public.lu/pictures/fr/autres/portrait_fr.pdf 
Slapin, J. B., (2006) ‗Who is Powerful? Examining Preferences and Testing Sources of 
Bargaining Strength at European Intergovernmental Conferences.‘ European Union 
Politics, Vol.7, Issue 1, pp. 51-76. 
Sloam, J., (2003) ―Responsibility for Europe‘: The EU Policy of the German Social 
Democrats since Unification.‘ Journal of German Politics, Vol.12, No. 1, pp. 59-78. 
Der Spiegel, (2010) ‗The Iron Chancellor in the Euro Trap.‘ 28 October. 
(2009) ‗Attacke gegen Müntefering und Steinbrück. Juncker vergleicht Kritik an 
Steueroasen mit Nazi-Besatzung.‘ 9 May. 
Statec, (2010) ‗Population et emploi.‘  
286 
             Available at: http://www.statistiques.public.lu/fr/population/index.html 
(2010) ‗État de la population (x1000) 1981 , 1991 , 2001 – 2010.‘ Available at: 
http://www.statistiques.public.lu/stat/TableViewer/summary.aspx 
(2010) ‗Emploi et chômage 2000-2010.‘  21 September. Available at: 
http://www.statistiques.public.lu/stat/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=338&
IF_Language=fra&MainTheme=2&FldrName=5&RFPath=36 
            (2009) Note de conjoncture N° 2/2009 
            (2009) Note de conjoncture N° 1/2009 
            (2009) Note de conjoncture No. 2 2009 
(undated)‗Taux d'accroissement total, naturel, d'immigration nette (en o/oo).‘   
Available at: 
http://www.portrait.public.lu/fr/structures_economiques/population/croissance/grap
he2_1_1.html 
 (2006) ‗Kaleidoscope 2006‘. Available at: 
http://www.statistiques.public.lu/fr/publications/horizontales/kaleidoscope_2006_en
/kaleidoscope_2006_en.pdf 
(undated), ‗Les piliers du secteur financier aujourd'hui.‘ Available at: 
http://www.portrait.public.lu/fr/structures_economiques/structure/coups_de_project
eur/secteur_financier/piliers/index.html 
(undated) ‗Investissement direct par tête d'habitant en 2000 (en USD).‘ Available at:  
http://www.portrait.public.lu/fr/structures_economiques/relations/graphe2_3_2.html 
Steinmetz R., Wivel A., (2010) Small States in Europe. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
Stone Sweet A., (20005) ‗European Integration and the Legal System.‘ IHS Political 
Science Series, No. 101. 
Taggart, P., Szczerbiak A. (eds.), (2008) Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party 
Politics of Euroscepticism: Vol.2: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives. Oxford 
University Press. 
Tallberg J., Johansson K.M., (2008) ‗Party Politics in the European Council.‟ Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol.15, No 8, pp. 1222-1242. 
Tallberg J., (2008) ‗Bargaining Power in the European Council.‘ Journal of Common  
Market Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 685–708. 
287 
 (2007) ‗Bargaining Power in the European Council.‘ SIEPS Rapporter, No.1. 
 (2006) Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union. Cambridge University 
Press. 
(2003) ‗The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU 
Negotiations‘ Paper prepared for presentation at the EUSA‟s 8th International 
Conference, Nashville. 
Tendes Oresund (undated) ‗Number of commuters‘. Available at: 
http://www.tendensoresund.org/en/cross-border-commuting-across-oresund 
Thorhallsson B., (2000) The role of small member states in the European Union. Ashgate 
Ltd. 
The Times, (2007) ‗Gaston Thorn: Luxembourg‘s Honest Broker President of the European 
Commission.‘ 28 August. 
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties estabilishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0001010001 
Cornelissen R., (2009) ‗Presentation at the TRESS Seminar in the UK.‘ Accessed on 
20.12.2009 and available at: 
www.missoc.org/TRESSNEW/PUBLIC/SEMINARS/.../UK_2009_6.ppt 
Védrine H., (1996) ‗Les mondes de François Mitterrand, À l'Élysée (1981-1995).‘ Paris, 
Fayard. 
Wagemann C., Schneider C.Q., (2010) Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy 
Sets: Agenda for a Research Approach and a Data Analysis Technique. Comparative 
Sociology, Vol. 9, pp 376-396. 
Wallace H., Wallace W., (2000) Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford University 
Press. 
Wallace H., Young Alasdair R., (1997) Participation and policy-making in the European 
Union. Oxford University Press. 
Warntjen, A., (2007) ‗Steering the Union. The Impact of the EU Presidency on Legislative 
Activity in the Council.‘ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, pp. 1135–1157.   
Widgrén M., (2009) ‗The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making.‘  
CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 55. No. 1, pp. 30-56. 
288 
(2003) ‗Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules.‘ Available at: 
http://www.ucm.es/info/econeuro/documentos/documentos/dt232003.pdf 
Die Welt, (2009) ‗Bayern entschuldigt sich für Steinbrück-Vergleich.‗ 7 May. 
(1996) ‗Praise for the Summit saviour, Luxembourg Prime Minister Negotiates 
Compromise for Stability Pact‘. 16 December. 
Wort, (2009) ‗Parlament gegen Steinbrück.‘  6 May. 
Wurzel, R. K. W., (2000) ‗Flying into Unexpected Turbulence: The German EU Presidency            
              in the Environmental Field.‘ German Politics, Vol. 9, issue 3, pp. 23 – 42. 
(1996) ‗The Role of the EU Presidency in the Environmental Field: Does it Make a 
Difference which Member State Runs the Presidency?‘  Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 3, Issue 2,  pp. 272 – 291. 
289 
Interviews 
(Strictly Confidential: Details only available to Examiners and Supervisors) 
 
 
 
